Daniel A. Arnold
Dan Arnold is a scholar of Indian Buddhist philosophy, which he engages in a constructive and comparative way. Considering Indian Buddhist philosophy as integral to the broader tradition of Indian philosophy, he has particularly focused on topics at issue among Buddhist schools of thought (chiefly, those centering on the works of Nāgārjuna and of Dharmakīrti), often considering these in conversation with critics from the orthodox Brahmanical school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. His first book – Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion (Columbia University Press, 2005) – won an American Academy of Religion Award for Excellence in the Study of Religion. His second book – Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind (Columbia University Press, 2012) – centers on the contemporary philosophical category of intentionality, taken as useful in thinking through central issues in classical Buddhist epistemology and philosophy of mind. This book received the Toshihide Numata Book Prize in Buddhism, awarded by the Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He is presently working on an anthology of Madhyamaka texts in translation, to appear in the series "Historical Sourcebooks in Classical Indian Thought." His essays have appeared in such journals as Philosophy East and West, the Journal of Indian Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Revue Internationale de Philosophie. (Source Accessed Jul 13, 2020)
Library Items
Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga
Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyakṣa (which is akin to manovijñāna) might relate to svasaṃvitti; how those related doctrines might be brought to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to svasaṃvitti) concerning pramāṇaphala; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument for svasaṃvitti. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) svasaṃvitti reflects a perceptual or a constitutive understanding of self-awareness.
Arnold, Dan. "Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 323–78.
Arnold, Dan. "Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 323–78.;Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga;svasaṃvedana;Daniel A. Arnold; 
Affiliations & relations
- University of Chicago Divinity School · workplace affiliation
