Yogācāra
Basic Meaning
Along with Madhyamaka, it was one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu around the fourth century CE, many of its central tenets have roots in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the so-called third turning of the dharma wheel (see tridharmacakrapravartana).
Through a close examination on three Sanskrit compounds — i.e., tathāgatanairātmyagarbha, tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam — in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, this thesis will demonstrate how the tathāgatagarbha thought in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is significantly enriched by Yogācāric influence.
First, in regard to tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha, a doctrinal review of the term "nairātmya" is necessary, because its definition differs according to different traditions. In primitive Buddhism, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "anātman" (non-existence of a substantial self), which indicates that in the realm of suffering and the impermanence of life phenomena that arise according to the principle of co-dependent
origination/ pratītyasamutpāda, no eternal and dependent ātman can be found. According to
the Madhyamaka School, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "niḥsvabhāva" (no
Secondly, in regard to tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna, a doctrinal development is promoted owing to the identification of tathāgatagarbha with ālayavijñāna, which according to the Yogācāra School is also named "sarvabīljavijñāna" (cognition as the seed of everything). This latter synonym references its function of bringing forth all beings just as a giant tree originates from a seed. As a result of its identification with the ālayavijñāna, the tathāgatagarbha is said to be endowed with the function of bringing forth all forms of existence and thus becomes the "producing cause" of all. This interpretation is not seen in earlier scriptures wherein the tathāgatagarbha is described simply as a static substance supporting all beings.
Thirdly, in regard to pariniṣpannasvabhāvastathāgata-garbhahṛdayam, the implication of the tathāgatagarbha was expanded substantially by declaring that pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the very essence of tathāgatagarbha. The term "pariniṣpannasvabhāva" according to some important Yogācāra texts is defined as tathatā (ultimate realm of suchness). The combining of pariniṣpannasvabhāva with tathāgatagarbha that had formerly focused on the subjective potential of realizing wisdom, shifts the doctrinal emphasis toward the objective realm of realized perfection.
This thesis reveals that, having assimilated the Yogācāric doctrine of dharmanairātmya, ālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the tathāgatagarbha thinking in Laṅkāvatārasūtra presents the comprehensive and distinctive features in comparison to the scriptures that preceded it.
This dissertation begins with definitions of the term "tathāgatagarbha" and some of its synonyms which are followed by a brief review of the historical development of the Tathāgatagarbha theory from India to China. With these as the background knowledge, it is easier to point out the fallacies of the two Japanese scholars' criticism on this theory. A key issue in their criticism is that they viewed the Tathāgatagarbha theory as the ātman of the Upaniṣads in disguise. It is therefore necessary to discuss not only the distinction between the ātman mentioned in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and that in the Upaniṣads but also the controversy over the issue of ātman versus anātman among the Buddhist scholars.
In the discussion to clarify the issue of ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory, it is demonstrated that the ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory is not only uncontradictory to the doctrine of anātman in Buddhism but very important to the Bodhisattva practices in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. It functions as a unity for the Bodhisattvas to voluntarily return to the world of saṃsāra again and again. Furthermore, the purport of the entire theory, that all sentient beings are endowed with the essence of the Buddha, supports various Bodhisattva practices such as the aspiration to save all beings in the world, the six perfections, etc. In a word, the Tathāgatagarbha theory is an excellent representative of the soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Included in the end of this dissertation is an annotated translation of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. (Source Accessed May 26, 2020)
In this chapter I will look into interpretations of buddha-nature starting with the Sublime Continuum (Uttaratantra, ca. fourth century), the first commentarial treatise focused on this subject. I will then present its role(s) in Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, and in the interpretations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in particular. Next I will discuss the role of buddha-nature as a key element in the theory and practice of Buddhist tantra, which will lead into a discussion of this doctrine in light of pantheism ("all is God"). Thinking of buddha-nature in terms of pantheism can help bring to light significant dimensions of this strand of Buddhist thought. (Duckworth, introduction, 235)
The Fundamental Potential for Enlightenment sets forth an analysis of the natural and developed potential within all of us from the perspectives of the two main schools of mahayana thought–the Mind-Only school and the Middle Way school. It explains how this potential is transformed into the state of enlightenment and gives comprehensive definitions and explanations clearly establishing the existence and nature of the various facets of enlightenment.
(Source: back cover)Buddha-nature comes to shape a Madhyamaka interpretation of emptiness in a positive light in a way that parallels its place in a Yogācāra interpretation (as a positive foundation of mind and reality). Buddha-nature supplements a Yogācāra theory of mind and reality by offering a positive alternative to a theory of consciousness that otherwise functions simply as the distorted cognitive structure of suffering. It thus is not only the potential for an awakened mind, but the cognitive content of awakening, too.
In Tibet we see the interpretation of buddha-nature converge with Mahāyāna doctrines in structurally parallel ways. Paired with buddha-nature, the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka pivots from a “self-empty” lack of intrinsic nature to an “other-empty,” pure ground that remains. In narratives of disclosure characteristic of the doctrine of buddha-nature, we also see parallel shifts in the foundations of Yogācāra, as grounds of distortion like the basic consciousness, the dependent nature, and self-awareness are reinscribed into a causal story that takes place within a pure, gnostic ground.Du III au VII siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda «doctrine de la connaissance». Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du Ill siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au V siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le present exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique. (May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," 265)
English Translation:
L'Indien Prabhâkara-mitra, auteur de la traduction chinoise (entre 630 et 633 J. C.), assigne le M. S. A. à Asaṅga, qu'il qualifie expressément de « Bodhisattva ». La préface de là traduction, due à Li Pe-yo (l'auteur du Pe-Tsin chou) répète et confirme cette attribution, sans faire allusion à une révélation surnaturelle. Mais, à cette époque même, Hiuan-tsang apprend dans les couvents de l'Inde à classer le M. S. A. parmi les textes sacrés révélés à Asaṅga par Maitreya. Jusque-là, au témoignage de Paramârtha et des traducteurs chinois du vc siècle, le Saptadaçabhûmi çâstra (ou Yogâcâryabhûmi çâstra) avait seul passé pour révélé.
Un demi-siècle après Hiuan-tsang, Yi-tsing, qui n'est pas comme Hiuan-tsang un adepte de l'école Yogâcâra, continue à classer le M. S. A. parmi « les huit branches » (pa tchi) d'Asanga, où il fait entrer pêle-mêle et de son propre aveu plusieurs traités de Vasubandhu.
Chez les Tibétains[1], le M. S. A. est unanimement rangé dans les « Cinq çâstras de Maitreya », et il en ouvre la série. Mais les vers seuls sont attribués à Maitreya ; la prose qui commente ces vers est tenue pour un ouvrage à part, sous le titre de Sûtrâlaṃkâra-bhâṣya, attribué à Vasubandhu. La traduction tibétaine est due à Çâkyasiṃha l'Indien, assisté du Lotsava grand réviseur Dpal brcogs et autres. Je n'ai pas d'informations sur ces personnages; mais, quelle que soit leur date, Prabhâkara mitra leur est certainement antérieur ; avant le milieu du VIIc siècle, le Tibet, à peine ouvert à la civilisation, n'avait ni traducteurs, ni traductions. Nous sommes donc fondés à considérer l'ouvrage entier, prose et vers, comme dû à un seul auteur, Asaṅga. Au reste, si le tibétain distingue dans l'ouvrage deux parties, texte et commentaire, avec deux auteurs différents, le Tche-yuen lou chinois (Catalogue comparé des Livres Bouddhiques compilé dans la période Tche-yuen 1264–1294) donne à l'ouvrage entier, en tant qu'oeuvre du Bodhisattva Asaṅga, le titre fan (c.-à-d. sanscrit) de : Sou-tan-lo A-leng-kia-lo ti-kia, transcription de Sûtrâlaṃkâraṭîkâ « Commentaire du Sûtrâlaṃkâra » (Tche-yuen lou, chap. IX, in°.); en fait, cette désignation de ṭîkâ ne peut s'appliquer pourtant qu'à la prose explicative qui accompagne les vers ou kârikâs.
Le texte sanscrit est divisé en adhikâras ou « chapitres » régulièrement numérotés jusqu'au quinzième ; à partir de là les chapitres ne portent plus d'indication numérique jusqu'au chapitre final ; mais celui-ci est désigné comme le vingt et unième. Les sections marquées dans l'intervalle sont seulement au nombre de quatre ; il manque donc une unité pour parfaire le chiffre de 21. Il est probable que le dernier chapitre est à partager en deux sections, entre le vers 42 et le vers 43. Les dix-neuf derniers vers, avec leur refrain uniforme, constituent une unité bien nette comme hymne de conclusion.
Le tibétain[1] reproduit exactement les divisions du manuscrit sanscrit. Le chinois[2] représente un autre partage de l'ensemble. Le texte y est divisé en treize grandes sections, découpées d'une manière assez irrégulière en vingt-quatre chapitres. (Lévi, "Le Mahâyâna Sûtrâlaṃkâra," 7–9)
Notes
1. Outre Târanâtha, v. aussi Bouston traduit par Stcherbatzkoï, La littérature Yogâcâra d'après Bouston, Muséon, 1905, II. Il est assez surprenant de voir que les Tibétains comptent comme l'oeuvre personnelle d'Àsaṅga le (Saptadaça-)bhûmi çâstra, le seul ouvrage que la tradition ancienne assigne à Maitreya. En dehors de cet ouvrage (et, naturellement, des sections détachées qui en ont été traduites à part: Nanjio 1170, 1083,1086, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1200, 1235), le Canon chinois n'attribue à Maitreya que le Madhyânta-vibhaṅga(Nj. 1245, traduit par Hiuan-tsang), également compté comme une oeuvre de Maitreya par les Tibétains [Je laisse en dehors l'insignifiant opuscule : Sarvaçiksàsthitanâmârtha çâstra (Nj. 1315) traduit par Che-houentre 980 et 1000]. Le cas du Mahâyânasaṃparigraha çâstra offre un intérêt tout particulier. Le premier en date des trois traducteurs chinois, Buddhaçânta, en 531, présente l'ouvrage comme une « oeuvre d' A-seng-kia », dans le texte de l'édition de Corée ; mais les éditions proprement chinoises ont remplacé cette mention par « composition de Wou-tcho p'ou-sa [equals] Asaṅga bodhisattva ». La préface qui accompagne la traduction de Paramârtha, en 563, déclare que « le çâstra original (pen loun) a été composé par A-seng-kia, maître de la loi (fa che). » Hiuan-tsang, enfin, qui donne une traduction en 648, traduit fidèlement un colophon qui dit : « Moi, A-seng-kia, j'ai fini d'expliquer brièvement le Mahâyâna-saṃparigraha çâstra dans les sûtras du Grand Véhicule de l'Abhidharma », mais il présente le texte comme « la composition de Wou-tcho p'ou-sa [equals] Asanga bodhisattva ».
Wassilieff (Notes sur Târanâtha, p. 315 sq.) a tort de dire que « les cinq textes de Maitreya manquent tous [sämmtlich] chez les Chinois ». J'ai déjà signalé la traduction chinoise du M. S. A. et celle du Madhyânta-vibhâga. La version chinoise de l'Uttaratantra a échappé jusqu'ici aux recherches, parce qu'elle ne porte pas de nom d'auteur. C'est le Mahâyânottaratantraçâstra (Nj. 1236; éd. Tôk. XIX, 2) des catalogues chinois, traduit par Ratnamati en 508. Restent le Dharmadharmalâ-vibhaṅga et l'Abhisamayâlaṃkâra qui n'ont pas de correspondant connu ou reconnu en chinois. A propos des oeuvres d'Asaṅga conservées en chinois, j'ajoute encore que le Choun tchong louen (Nj. 1246; Tôk. XIX, 2), dont le titre sanscrit est restitué par Nanjio sous la forme : Madhyântânugama çâstra, est en fait — comme le titre chinois l'exprime exactement — un commentaire sur le Madhyamakaçâstra de Nâgârjuna, interprété au point de vue de la doctrine Yogâcâra.
1. La traduction tibétaine se trouve dans le Tanjour, Mdo. vol. XLIV (phi), le texte en vers va de 1 à 43b; le « bhâṣya » termine le volume, de la page 135 à la fin.
La besogne, à dire vrai, n'était pa si facile. Je ne disposais que de la copie exécutée, sous ma surveillance, par le Pandit Kulamāna, reproduction fidèle d'un original assez bon dans l'ensemble, mais parsemé de menues fautes dues principalement a la confusion de lettres analogues dans la devanāgari du Népal. Cette copie, sur papier népalais (gris au recto, jaune au verso), occupe 123 feuillets, à neuf lignes par page. L'ouvrage est complet: la seule lacune étendue se place à la suite du vers 2 de la llesection: deux feuillets avaient à cet endroit disparu de l'archétype; pour dissimuler la lacune, le copiste ancien a recouru à un procédé assez usuel ; il a copié ailleurs deux autres feuilles qu'il a insérées à la place des feuillets manquants. Je n'ai pas pu arriver à déterminer la provenance exacte de cette interpolation; mais elle vient sans aucun doute de quelque çāstra étroitement apparenté au Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṃkāra par le sujet et par le lexique. J'ai donné en Appendice à la suite du texte le contenu de ces deux feuilles: un chercheur plus heureux réussira probablement à les identifier. Les autres lacunes sont de peu d'étendue : XI, 5, une ligne; 51, deus lignes; XI, 70, deux ou trois lignes; XII, 7, un hémistiche.
La traduction chinoise, due à I'Hindou Prabhākara mitra (entre 630 et 633 J.-C.), comble heureusement toutes ces lacunes; sans elle, j'aurais dû renoncer même à éditer ce texte. C'est par une collation constante de la version chinoise que j'ai réussi—si j'y ai réussi— à dégager de mon unique manuscrit un texte acceptable et intelligible. Je n'ai pas cru devoir, sous couleur d'une « acribie ». intransigeante, étaler au bas des pages toutes les lectures vicieuses du manuscrit; Je ne les ai rapportées que dans les rares cas où ma correction affectait l'ensemble d'un mot. Je laisse à ceux qui voudront bien se référer à la copie de Kulamāna le soin de juger ce qu'a pu coûter d'efforts la constitution d'un texte présentable.
C'est de propos délibéré que je me suis refusé a faire disparaître les irrégularités d'orthographe et de sandhi de mon manuscrit. La tradition des scribes népalais a ses usages constants, par exemple la réduction du groupe ttva à ttva (bodhisatva, tatva, etc.), l'interchange des sifflantes palatale et dentale (kuçīda, kusīda, etc.); pour les textes qu'ils sont seuls à nous avoir conservés, il me paraît préférable de se conformer à leurs usages plutôt que de leur imposer les rigueurs d'un purisme théorique. le sancrit a bien assez d'uniformité pour qu'on n'aille pas effacer de parti pris les rares particularités de temps ou de lieu qui ont pu y marquer leur empreinte. Quant au sandhi, I'application mécanique des règles risque le plus souvent d'anéantir des nuances de ponctuation et de pensée exprimées justement par des infractions à ces règles.
Si j'ai préféré donner le texte en caractères devanāgarī, malgré les avantages pratiques de la transcription au point de vue occidental, c'est que nos éditions d'ouvrages bouddhiques ont chance d'atteindre une catégorie de lecteurs que nous me prévoyons pas assez peut-être tt qui mérite pourtant d'être prise en considération. Au Népal même, et par delà le Népal, dans le monde si peu accessible encore des Lamas, nous pouvons apporter ainsi à de bonnes âmes un aliment de piété qui se convertira peut-être en amorce de science: l'exemple donné par les éditeurs européens peut provoquer là-bas une imitation féconde, sauver de la destruction ou rappeler au jour des textes menacés, et activer ainsi le progrès des connaissances. L'indianisme n'est point un vain exercice de dilettantisme: derrière nos problèmes de linguistique, de philologie, d'histoire politique, religieuse ou sociale, il faut entrevoir les centaines millions d'êtres vivants que ces problèmes conditionnent à leur insu, et dont le sort est lié aux solutions qui doivent triompher.
Je manquerais à un réel devoir de gratitude si je n'exprimais pas ici mes remerciements à tous ceux qui ont collaboré à l'impression de ce livre, aux typographes de l'Imprimerie nationale, au Directeur des travaux, M. Héon, et surtout à M. Guérinot, de qui les corrections minutieuses m'ont valu des épreuves presque parfaites. Mon ami et collègue M. Finot a pris la peine de relire aussi toutes les épreuves. S'il reste encore des fautes, et je sais pertinemment qu'il en reste (un erratum sera donné à la fin de la traduction), responsabilité n'en saurait incomber qu'à moi, et à la faiblesse de la nature humaine. (Lévi, foreword, i-iii)
The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, and the Madyāntavibhāgaśāstra. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking. (Source Accessed Jan 28, 2020)
attempting to elucidate it much depends upon how one chooses to categorize
Tathagatagarbha as a system, upon the decisions one makes as to which terms,
concepts, argument-patterns and so forth must be present in order for it to be proper
to characterize some text or text-fragment as representing that system. These are
large questions, much too large to enter upon in this paper; my purpose here is
much more limited. I intend to offer a reasonably detailed exposition of a set of
sixteen verses from the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra [MSA] (IX.22-
37). These verses deal, or so the bhāṣya tells us, with the "profundity of the
undefiled realm" (anāsravadhātugāmbhīrya), and they conclude (37) with the only
use of the term tathāgatagarbha in the entire text There is little doubt that this is one
of the few early occurrences of the term in Indian Buddhist texts surviving in
Sanskrit; a relatively detailed study of these verses may perhaps shed some light
upon the historical and doctrinal questions just mentioned.
The systematic question underlying my comments upon these verses throughout will be: what is the relation between the ground of awakening, that which makes it possible, and the fact of awakening, its essential properties?
This thesis gives an account of Yogācāra Buddhist thought as presented in the works of Sthiramati, a leading sixth-century thinker in the Yogācāra tradition, along with a translation of his commentary on the Chapter on Enlightenment of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. The thesis introduces Sthiramati's life and times, and discusses the authorship and authenticity of works attributed to him.
Sthiramati's viewpoint is placed in the overall context of Yogācāra ontology. The thesis elucidates the fundamental categories of Yogācāra ontology, giving an analysis of the three identities (trisvabhāva) and their interrelationships, the connection between the three identities and the principle of representation-only (vijñaptimātra), and an account of basis-transformation (āśrayaparāvṛtti). This provides a philosophical foundation for interpreting the Yogācāra concept of Buddhahood, bringing out the intrinsic link between ontological realization and soteriological attainment in the Yogācāra system.
The thesis traces the Yogācāra account of Buddhahood in both its essence and its manifestation: Buddhahood is shown as both the absolute ground of being and as the locus for innumerable pure qualities and forms of mastery through which enlightenment is communicated to ordinary sentient beings. In this connection, the thesis presents the Yogācāra analysis of the Three Bodies of Buddha (Dharmakāya, the Truth-Body; Sambhogakāya, the Enjoyment-Body; Nirmāṇakāya, the Emanation-Body), which encompass both the essential being and the manifest functioning of Buddha. The three Budda-bodies are correlated with the four liberative wisdoms (jñāna) of the Buddha (the Mirror-like Wisdom, the Equality Wisdom, the Analytical Wisdom, and the All-Accomplishing Wisdom). The thesis recounts the classic Yogācāra discussion of the attributes of Buddhahood in terms of unity and multiplicity, and the nature and scope of Buddha's salvific activities.
The aims of the thesis are (1) to present Yogācāra Buddhology in its own terms; (2) to clarify the conceptual structure of Yogācāra Buddhology and the relationship in Yogācāra thought between Buddha and the phenomenal world, and between Buddha and the minds of sentient beings; and (3) to facilitate cross-cultural comparisons between Buddha and concepts of the Absolute in other religious traditions by providing a reliable presentation of the ontological, epistemological, and soteriological aspects of Yogācāra Buddhology.
The book's contribution to the broader field of the History of Religions rests in its presentation and analysis of the Buddhist Enlightenment as the salvific-transformational moment in which Tathatā 'awakens' to itself, comes to perfect self-realization as the Absolute suchness of reality, in and through phenomenal human consciousness. The book is an interpretation of the Buddhist Path as the spontaneous self-emergence of 'embryonic' absolute knowledge as it comes to free itself from the concealments of adventitious defilements, and possess itself in fully self-explicitated self-consciousness as the 'Highest Truth' and unconditional nature of all existence; it does so only in the form of omniscient wisdom.
This important study reveals how the Buddhist unconscious illuminates and draws out aspects of current western thinking on the unconscious mind. One of the most intriguing connections is the idea that there is in fact no substantial 'self' underlying all mental activity; 'the thoughts themselves are the thinker'. William S. Waldron considers the implications of this radical notion, which, despite only recently gaining plausibility, was in fact first posited 2,500 years ago. (Source: Routledge)
By down-playing the late commentorial traditions, the author attempts a general reappraisal of the epistemological and ontological writings of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. He concludes that the overlap in all areas of doctrine is significant, but particularly with respect to the teachings on the levels of truth, the enlightened and unenlightened states, the status of language and the nature of reality
The idea of dhātu-vāda is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto first found the dhātu-vāda structure in Indian tathāgata-garbha and Yogācāra literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (śāstras). (Yamabe, introductory remarks, 193)
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Frauwallner's way of translating was straightforward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to convey an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms in the source materials he maintained a single translation even when various meanings were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning he relied on the context and his explanation.
The same approach was taken by the translator of the present book. Although his translation attempts to be faithful to the 1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, he inserted helpful additional headlines into the text and considerably enlarged the index. All other additions by the translator are given within square brackets. Besides this, he created an Appendix, which contains one of Frauwallner's more important articles "Amalavijnana and Alayavijnana" (1951) to complement the long Yogacara section of the book, a bibliography of selective publications after 1969. The URLs for many of the source materials were also conveniently provided. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)Prof. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes is a professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna. His research interests include the Indian origin of the Tibetan Mahāmudrā traditions, buddha nature and the Tibetan gzhan stong tradition. He spoke with students at RYI on April 3, 2018. (Source Accessed Aug 13, 2020)
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Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)The thesis focuses on the relations between mind and karma and the continuity of life in saṃsāra based upon a concept of mind, the ālayavijñāna, as presented in the texts of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school of Indian Buddhism, A.D. 4-5th centuries. It has been the topic of many sectarian disputes as well as the springboard for several far-reaching doctrinal developments, so it is desirable to examine it within its early Indian Buddhist context.
The first section presents the multivalent viññāṇa of the Pali Canon and related concepts. It demonstrates that the major characteristics later predicated of the ālayavijñāna were present in an unsystematized but implicit form in the viññāṇa of the early discourses.
The next section describes the systematic psychological analysis developed by the Abhidharma and its consequent problematics. It argues that the incongruity of Abhidharmic analysis with the older unsystematized doctrines led to major theoretical problems concerning the key concepts of kleśa and karma, to which the Sautrāntika school offered the concept of seeds (bija).
The third section, based primarily upon the texts translated herein, depicts the origination and gradual development of the ālayavijñāna within the Yogācāra school from a somatic "life principle", to an explicitly unconscious mind, to its final bifurcation into an unconscious afflicted mind (kliṣṭa-manas) and a passive respository of karmic seeds, the latent loci of kleśa and karma, respectively.
The last section compares the ālayavijñāna systematically with Freud's and Jung's concepts of the unconscious, concluding that their respective philosophical milieus led both traditions to conceptions of unconscious mental processes as necessary compensations for strictly intentional epistemological models.
In the appendix the major texts presenting the ālayavijñāna, Chaps. V and VIII.37 of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, part of the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, and Ch. 1 of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, are translated and extensively annotated in order to contextualize the minutiae of this concept of mind with its canonical precursors and its Abhidharmic contemporaries. (Source: ProQuest)
Buddhism, as a religion arose in ancient India and developed in various parts of the world, aims at the unique goal that is providing welfare and happiness for human beings. The real happiness brought to mankind by Buddhism is not a satisfaction of self-requirement, but a spiritual benefit
coming from enlightenment of the absolute truth, emancipation of the ego of things and persons, and free from the hindrances of passion and ignorance. Buddhism that is mainly based on teachings of the Buddha delivered at different places on different occasions continues to develop and adapt to the new challenges in the form of thought, different cultures, religions, customs and tradition of the people wherever it went. However, all the Buddha’s teachings originate in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
All traditions of Buddhism accept that the Buddha attained enlightenment through stages of meditation that led to the Buddhahood endowed with transcendent wisdom and compassion. According to some Mahāyāna scriptures, the Buddhahood is nothing other than the Buddhanature which is the inherent essence within all beings. The doctrine of the Buddha-nature presented in several Mahāyāna scriptures of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha literature was formed in about the third century CE. There is no evidence that the doctrine of Buddha-nature formed a school in India like the Śūnyatā (Emptiness) of the Mādhyamika or the Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only) of the Yogācāra School, but the Buddha-nature plays an important role in the religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the East and Southeast Asian countries because it provides a faith of the permanence and immortality due to a declaration that all sentient beings possess the innate Buddha-nature and have a potentiality of becoming the Buddhas.
Although most of the followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism believe the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and constantly try their best endeavor to attain the goal of Buddhahood, there were a lot of opinions that criticize the doctrine of the Buddha-nature by asserting that it is not Buddhist because this idea of the Buddha-nature seems to be akin to the permanent Self
(ātman/brahman) presented in the Vedānta of Brahmanism. Conversely, according to some other scholars, the Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha referred in some Mahāyāna Sūtras does not represent a substantial self or ego; it is rather a positive language to express the thought of śūnyatā and to represent the potentiality of realizing the Buddhahood through Buddhist
practices. Modern scholars today fall into an unending discussion about the similarity or difference between the Buddha-nature and Brahman but no one compares the date of these doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to clarify the Buddhist orthodoxy of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature through chronological comparison of the date of Buddha-nature with that of Brahman. Based on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other scriptures, the work attempt to elucidate that the Buddhist thought of the Buddha-nature had existed prior the Vedāntic thought of Brahman. Indeed, the thesis shows that while the doctrine of the Buddha-nature had come into existence in the third century CE in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the
Vedāntic doctrine of Brahman appeared for the first time in the sixth century CE. Consequently, although the Buddha-nature is closely akin to Brahman/ātman of the Vedānta, the doctrine of the Buddha-nature is originally a thought of Buddhism. For this reason, the writer chose the topic
entitled “Thought of Buddha-nature as Depicted in the LaṅkāvatāraSūtra” for the Ph.D. thesis.
Study on the Buddha-nature is a task which cannot be carried out without the important texts, teachings, practices and historical movements of Buddhism. This study is mainly based upon the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, a Buddhist text of the later period of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, in which
the thought of the Buddha-nature is depicted in relationship with most of the Mahāyāna concepts such as the Buddhatā, Tathāgatagarbha, Ālayavijñāna, Dharmakāya, Mind-only, etc. Especially, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra emphasizes the practice of self-realization and sudden enlightenment of the Buddha-nature. It is also said that the Sūtra was handed down by Bodhidharma to his heir disciple Hui-ke 慧可 as the proof of enlightenment in Chan (Zen) Buddhism.
This thesis is an attempt to investigate and criticize the philosophical and religious thought of the Buddha-nature as depicted in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. In so doing, we have taken into consideration the following principle themes:
1. Evolution of the Buddha-nature Concept
2. The Buddha-nature in the Tathāgatagarbha Literature
3. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Hindu Philosophy
4. The Thought of Buddha-nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
5. The Practice of Buddha-Nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
6. Further Development of the Concept of Buddha-nature in
China
This dissertation seeks to locate the place of Taehyŏn 大賢(ca. 8th century CE), a Silla Korean Yogācāra monk, within the broader East Asian Buddhist tradition. My task is not confined solely to a narrow study of Taehyŏn’s thought and career, but is principally concerned with understanding the wider contours of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition itself and how these contours are reflected in Taehyŏn’s extant oeuvre. There are problems in determining Taehyŏn's doctrinal position within the traditional paradigms of East Asian Yogācāra tradition, that is, the bifurcations of Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra; Old and New Yogācāra; the One Vehicle and Three Vehicles; and the Dharma Nature and Dharma Characteristics schools. Taehyŏn's extant works contain doctrines drawn from across these various divides, and his doctrinal positions therefore do not precisely fit any of these traditional paradigms. In order to address this issue, this dissertation examines how these bifurcations originated and evolved over time, across the geographical expanse of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition. The chapters of the dissertation discuss in largely chronological order the theoretical problems involved in these bifurcations within Yogācāra and proposes possible resolutions to these problems, by focusing on the works of such major Buddhist exegetes as Paramārtha (499-569), Ji 基 (632-682), Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617-686), Fazang 法藏(643-712), and, finally, Taehyŏn.
In the tradition of Buddhism which has been transmitted to China and Japan, we can see two basically different streams of thought in the Yogācāra philosophy. Although this fact is well-known among Japanese scholars, it does not seem to be widely known among American, European, and Indian scholars. In order to understand correctly the Yogācāra philosophy, however, the clear understanding of these two streams of thought, their mutual differences, and their relation to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu is indispensable.
One of these two streams was introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang. Although the thought of this stream can be known through the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Hsuang-tsang, it can be known in its most all-inclusive and systematic form in the Ch'eng wei shih lun of Dharmapāla.[1] This stream of thought continued from the time of Hsuang-tsang to the present day. Happily, it did not die out in China and Japan where its study was continued and where present-day scholars are well acquainted with it. There is no unclear point as regards the more important aspects of this stream of thought.
The other stream of thought, represented by the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Buddhasānta, Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, Dharmagupta, Prabhākaramitra, and others, was introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang. The translations of these masters, unlike those of the other stream, were not widely studied and the actual nature of its thought is difficult to determine. With the exception of Paramārtha, there are only one or two translated works of each of these masters. And, even in the study of their works, it is not possible to determine the differences from the other stream of Yogācāra thought.
Paramārtha, however, translated a great many of the important works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. And, with the discovery and publication of the Sanskrit texts, eminent scholars of Japan have done comparative studies based on the Sanskrit original and the Chinese and Tibetan translations in order to determine the extent to which the stream of thought introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang differs from that stream which was introduced by Hsuang-tsang. The results of this research clearly show that there is a fundamental difference between the theory introduced by Paramārtha and that of Hsuang-tsang. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that the theories introduced by Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are both said to be the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. If the theories of Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are fundamentally different, the problem arises as to which transmission is faithful to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu; or, if they are both separate traditions, what was the theory of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu? This has been the focus of attention of present-day Japanese scholars doing research in the Yogācāra philosophy. As the studies of the Yogācāra philosophy by Western and Indian scholars have been lacking in knowledge of these two streams of thought, their interpretations of the central problems of the Yogācāra philosophy have been ambiguous and often erroneous and do not show a clear understanding of it. Their understanding of the Yogācāra philosophy is not in accord with the theory of either one of these two streams of thought. And, because the differences between their interpretations and the two streams of thought are not clear, one cannot find a clear-cut understanding of the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu.
It is my aim in this paper to present the differences of interpretation of these two streams of thought relating to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu which were transmitted to China and to examine the question of which of the two streams is faithful to the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. As this paper cannot possibly deal with the whole of the Yogācāra philosophy, it will deal with only a few of the essential points. (Ueda, preparatory remarks, 155–56)
Notes
- Dharmapāla and others, Ch'eng wei shih lun,P Taishō-Daizōkyō, Vol. 31, No. 1585. French translation: "Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi," by Dharmapāla, translated from Chinese into French by La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1928-1929).
In Giuseppe Tucci’s collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and photographed materials, a set of positive prints of texts filmed at Ñor monastery contains a codex unicus of
Vairocanaraksita’s (fl. 11th/12th century) Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha commentarial
works:
1. Viṃśikāṭikāvivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikāvṛtti and Vinītadeva’s Viṃśikāṭīkā);
2. Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti (glosses on Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya and Vinītadeva’s Triṃśikāṭīkā);
3. Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya
and Sthiramati’s Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā);
4. Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (glosses on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā);
5. *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya)2 and
6. *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti).3
V. Gokhale (1978) was the first to study these works, using Saṅkṛtyāyana’s negatives and the prints made from them, which have been preserved in Patna. He reported titles of the six works, without, however, going into detail because of the poor quality of the images. Subsequently the details of the works remained unknown for a long time, and no complete editions have been published. To be sure, Zuiryū Nakamura edited the text of folios 9v2–14v7 of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (the text of folios 15r1–17r5 remains to be edited);4 and Mathes in his translation of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti referred to some sentences from the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti.5 I myself also edited a small portion of the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti.6
The present paper contains an editio princeps of the Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti. Critical editions of the other three works are under preparation: Francesco Sferra is preparing a critical edition of the Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti, and I am preparing critical editions of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī, the Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti for publication. (Kano, introduction, 343-44)
Notes
- [From title] I am grateful to Prof. Francesco Sferra and Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for a number of text-critical suggestions, and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen for permitting me to use his preliminary handwritten transcription of Vairocanarakṣita’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, and also for his very valuable suggestions concerning that text. I am indebted, too, to Mrs. Bärbel Mund of Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen for giving me the permission to use photographic images of the Göttingen Collection, to Dr. Diwakar Acharya for his help with deciphering barely legible letters in the manuscript, to Prof. Toru Yagi for his very valuable suggestions regarding Vairocanarakṣita’s grammatical explanations, to Dr. Martin Delhey, Dr. Kengo Harimoto and Dr. Koichi Takahashi for reading my draft and making many valuable suggestions, and to Prof. Robert Kritzer and Philip Pierce for their English proofreading.
- The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: sūtrālaṃkāraḥ samāptaḥ II II kṛtiḥ paṇḍitavairocanarakṣitapādānaṃ II II. Other possible Sanskrit titles are Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti, Sūtrālaṃkārakatipayapadavivṛti, or Sūtrālaṃkāraṭippaṇī.
- The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaḥ]. The two illegible akṣaras after °vibhā in the bottom margin are probably gaḥ. Cf. the colophon to the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti. One might expect something like Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (as suggested by Gokhale 1978: 638), or Dharmadharmatāvibhāgaṭippaṇī. In Kano 2005: 142, I referred to this work under the title “Dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaṭīkā],” supplying the three akṣaras enclosed by square brackets. However, in view of its scope, it can hardly be a ṭīkā, a type of commentary typically more extensive in nature.
- For his edition, see Nakamura 1985. For studies of this text, see Nakamura 1980, 1982, 1992. Unfortunately, Nakamura’s edition contains many errors (around 190). It is remarkable that his edition shares some notable errors with Jagdishwar Pandey’s modern transcription preserved at Göttingen under the shelf-mark Xc14/90 (which contains a transcription of the full text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī); we can deduce that one of the two was made on the basis of the other. In my unpublished dissertation (Kano 2006b), I have critically edited the whole text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī and presented a list of corrections to Nakamura’s edition.
- See Mathes 1996: 37, 115-135.
- The text of folio 17r>sub>7–v6 of this work is edited in Kano 2006a: 92, n. 40.
I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha's notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of "original awakening" (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In contrast, a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805).
The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha's corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha's interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha's disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha's original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha's true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha.
This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 2T5c (600–664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang's characterization of the notion of "aboriginal uncontaminated seeds" looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of "tathāgatagarbha" in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of "tathāgatagarbha" strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India.
addition to the traditional six kinds of mind, viz. the five sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (manovijñāna), there are two new, more or less subliminal forms, viz. kliṣṭa-manas and ālayavijñāna. The former is a continuous, subtle notion or feeling of 'I', whereas the latter, in accordance with the frequent Chinese rendering, i.e. "store mind," "connaissance-réceptacle, may, in a preliminary way, be characterized as the container or store-house of the latent residues or Impressions of previous actions (karman) and mind processes, or, following the usual Tibetan translation kun gźi rnam par śes pa ("fundamental mind", "Grunderkennen"), as the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being. It should be kept in mind that (at least in the "orthodox" Yogācāra school) ālayavijñāna is strictly person-bound, each living being having its own ālayavijñāna.
The present essay, though also including a few remarks on the origin of kliṣṭa-manas ( see § 7. 1A. 2. 2), is primarily concerned with the problem of the origin and development of ālayavijñana. Yet, my treatment of this matter is not exhaustive either. I have rather confined myself to dealing with the problem of the origin of ālayavijñāna in a rather limited sense (see § 1.4), and to an attempt to deduce, from my starting-point and the data available in the oldest materials, certain crucial aspects of the early development of this concept.
In accordance with the limited scope of the present essay, I
feel it justified to confine myself, as for previous research, to a short systematic outline of the essential aspects of what it has contributed to the question of the formation of the concept of ālayavijñāna (§ 1.3). Though I admit that a full account of the history of research on ālayavijñāna would be useful, it would take much more time than I can afford, and anyway it should, in view of the fact that most pertinent works are in Japanese, be written by a Japanese scholar. Nevertheless, apart from specific references in the notes, a few
recent theories on the origin of ālayavijñāana will be discussed in detail in § 7, because they advocate solutions considerably differing from mine, and because I should scarcely be justified in setting up a theory of my own if I did not give my reasons for not adopting one or the other of those already set forth.
As for the question of the origin of the concept of ālayavijñāna, the solution presented in this essay must remain a hypothetical one. In view of the fact that
even basic problems of the literary history of the older Yogācāra texts, esp. of the Yogācārabhūmi, are still unsolved or controversial and since some early materials are known only from fragments—and there may have been others no longer extant in explicit quotations—, statements on the early history of Yogācāra thought are almost inevitably, at least for the time being, bound to be hypothetical. But I think Suguro is right in emphasizing that we have no choice but to try to reconstruct the historical development of Yogācāra thought if we want to re-enact it, as it were, as a dynamic, living process, and not merely take stock of the
petrified (and often incoherent) results. Besides, even preliminary observations in terms of a history of ideas may, if handled with caution, on their part be helpful in resolving problems of literary history. But what I consider essential is that, even if we cannot (or cannot yet?), in our hypotheses on matters of the history of ideas (as well as of the literary history) of uncertain periods like early Yogācāra, reach certainty, we are none
the less clearly called upon to proceed from mere possibility or non-committal plausibility to probability; i.e. we should try to find out criteria which permit us to single out, from among the at times considerable number of possible explanations, the one which is (or at least those few which are) probable; and it is precisely this that I intend to do in the present essay. (Schmithausen, introductory, programmatic and methodological remarks, Vol. 1, 1–3)
(*Author's notes have been omitted)
Read Vol. 2 OnlineTerm Variations | |
---|---|
Key Term | Yogācāra |
Topic Variation | Yogācāra |
Tibetan | རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་ ( naljor chöpa) |
Wylie Tibetan Transliteration | rnal 'byor spyod pa ( naljor chöpa) |
Devanagari Sanskrit | योगाचार |
Romanized Sanskrit | Yogācāra |
Chinese | 瑜伽行派 |
Chinese Pinyin | Yuqiexing pai |
Japanese | 瑜伽行 |
Japanese Transliteration | Yugagyō |
Buddha-nature Site Standard English | Yoga-Practice school |
Karl Brunnhölzl's English Term | Yoga Practice (Practitioner) |
Richard Barron's English Term | Yogic Practitioners |
Ives Waldo's English Term | one who practices yoga |
Term Information | |
Source Language | Sanskrit |
Basic Meaning | Along with Madhyamaka, it was one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu around the fourth century CE, many of its central tenets have roots in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the so-called third turning of the dharma wheel (see tridharmacakrapravartana). |
Term Type | School |
Definitions | |
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism | See pp. 1033–34. In Sanskrit, “Practice of Yoga” ; one of the two major Mahāyāna philosophical schools (along with Madhyamaka) in India, known especially for its doctrines of “mind-only” (cittamātra) or “representation-only” (vijñaptimātratā), the trisvabhāva, and the ālayavijñāna. In addition, much of the exposition of the structure of the Mahāyāna path (mārga) and of the Mahāyāna ABHIDHARMA derives from this school. The texts of the school were widely influential in Tibet and East Asia. |