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From Buddha-Nature
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A
''A Buddha Within'' is a study and translation of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, one of the earliest Indian scriptures to promote buddha-nature. The short sūtra contains nine similes for buddha-nature that can be divided into two categories: potential and perfected. These include the metaphor of a seed and gold hidden under a poor person's house. In the first, buddha-nature must be grown and developed; in the second, it is already perfected and must only be revealed. In both cases, however, buddha-nature is already present, and no fundamental transformation is needed to become a buddha: the promise is made that buddhahood is already present in all sentient beings. Zimmerman argues that the sūtra is best read as an ethical treatise, an encouragement to pursue enlightenment.
The first one hundred pages of the book are Zimmerman's commentary on the sūtra and its place in Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhism. He argues that there were two recensions of the scripture in India, the earliest of which went to China, and the later translated fourteen times into Tibetan. Key to his argument is that the Chinese translations do not contain the first simile of a pure white lotus growing in a muddy swamp. This, the sole passage to use the terms tathāgatagarbha, was thus added later, after the term had gained popularity.
Zimmerman surveys the doctrinal issues raised by the scripture, including the relationship between buddha-nature theory and Yogacāra in China, and zhentong and rangtong in the Tibetan context. The remainder of the book is an analysis of each recension and translation, an English translation incorporating all recensions and translations, and a critical edition of the Tibetan and Chinese. There is no surviving Sanskrit version. +
Tibetan Buddhists often describe their religion, and the path of practice it teaches, in terms of "three vows" (''sdom gsum'')-namely, the three codes of discipline associated with the monastic traditions of the Vinaya, the progressive path of the bodhisattva, and the esoteric precepts of the tantras. Mastery of the three codes implies broad and deep scriptural learning as well as scrupulous attention to every detail of one's personal conduct and deportment. For such mastery to be recognized means the achievement of an authoritative status within the religious community. Hence, in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the three codes were subject to intensive scrutiny and became a focal point of sustained commentary and debate.
Among the many works of Tibetan masters devoted to the three codes, none has enjoyed more notoriety than ''A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes'' (''sDom pa gsum pi rab tu dbye ba'') by the celebrated author Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltshen (or Sapan, n82-I251), presented here in a Western translation for the first time. Not so much a text on the content of the codes themselves as an examination of the many particular questions that relate to the codes-questions that Sapan saw as subject to misunderstanding on the part of his Tibetan contemporaries- The Three Codes has a strongly polemical character. Thus it is easy to see why some readers found the work objectionable in places, others praised it, and all became fascinated by it. Few indigenous Tibetan writings have inspired so abundant and diverse a body of later commentary, commentary that rivals even that on the great Indian Buddhist treatises in its extent.
Whatever one may conclude about the correctness of Sakya Pandita's opinions on any given topic, there can be no doubt that by raising so many questions so trenchantly, Sapan roused Tibetan Buddhists from doctrinal complacency and contributed mightily to the formation of the remarkable intellectual culture that has long distinguished the Buddhist monastic colleges of Tibet. It is for this reason that Sakya Pandita is remembered as the first of the three great thinkers renowned in Central Tibet as emanations of Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom. The two who followed him-the great Dzokchen master Longchen Rabjampa (1308-1364) and the peerless scholar and adept Je Tsongkhapa (1357-I419)-were themselves indebted to Sakya Pandita in myriad ways.
MATTHEW T. KAPSTEIN
Editor, SUNY Buddhist Studies Series
''A Direct Path to the Buddha Within'' is one of a handful of recent densely-presented studies of Tibetan attempts to grapple with the ''Uttaratantra'' and tathāgatagarbha theory. [[Klaus-Dieter Mathes]] takes as his focus [[Gö Lotsāwa Zhönu Pal]]'s commentary on the sūtra, the translation of which makes up 165 pages out of the 421 of the book (excluding back matter). Preceding the translation are three introductory chapters on the intellectual context of Gö's work. The translation is followed by three chapters that individually address Mathes' three questions: what are "subtle" buddha qualities, how is buddha-nature related to prājñaparamitā, and how does [[Gö Lotsāwa]] read Mahāmudrā into the ''Uttaratantra'' and other Yogācāra works? The book assumes a high level of understanding of the issues and is meticulous in its detail and documentation; the footnotes have footnotes.
Mathes argues that Gö's intention with his commentary was to provide a sūtra basis for Mahāmudrā, the otherwise tantric teaching of the Kagyu tradition. There is some irony in this, as Mathes somewhat blithely dismisses what he claims was [[Longchenpa]]'s attempt to use the same material to find an Indian basis for Dzokchen, an otherwise tantric teaching of the Nyingma tradition. Both great masters did indeed seem hard-pressed to justify the central teaching of their tradition against criticism of Prājñaparamitā-based Madhyamaka adherents in the Sakya and Kadam/Geluk traditions. These criticisms generally centered on the issue of whether the ultimate could correctly be described as possessing qualities of its own or whether emptiness was, in fact, a radical denial of all propositions. Sakya, Kadam, and Geluk writers argued either that the ''Uttaratantra'' was provisional—a Yogācāra teaching in need of interpretation—or its teaching on buddha-nature was in line with a Madhyamaka presentation of emptiness, denying the language-positive elements of the scripture.
Gö rejected both of these positions, arguing that the ''Uttaratantra'' is consistent with other Third-Turning teachings of Yogācāra and that such teachings are definitive. This was a necessary move in order to conflate cataphatic Yogācāra doctrine with Mahāmudrā: buddha-nature for Gö is not a synonym for emptiness, but rather for "the unfabricated nature of mind" and "luminosity," core Mahāmudrā doctrine. But Gö differentiated his approach from other advocates of a Yogācāra interpretation. He argued against the notion that buddha-nature is fully formed in every sentient being (the "buddha qualities" discussion), advocating instead that buddha-nature is a potential that needs to be developed. We are not like golden statues hidden in mud, but rather like acorns that need water and sunlight to grow into oak trees.
Tsongkhapa's ''Lamp'' presents one of the most comprehensive and detailed presentations of the highest yoga class of Vajrayana Buddhism, especially the key practices— the so-called five stages (''pañcakrama'')— of the advanced phase of Guyhasamāja tantra. Beginning with a thorough examination of all the relevant Indie literature, Tsongkhapa draws particularly from the writings of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Nāropa to develop a definitive understanding of the Vajrayana completion stage. Traditionally the work belongs to a class of “hidden texts” that are to be read only by those who have received initiations. The teachings and practices in this volume follow on from those contained in the sādhana volume (volume 13). Whereas in the generation stage, meditators visualize the Buddha in the form o f the Guhyasamāja deity residing in a mandala palace, in the completion stage discussed in the present volume, meditators transcend ordinary consciousness and actualize the state of a buddha themselves. In the course of presenting these practices, Tsongkhapa's work outlines the subtle human physiology manipulated by the tantric adept, especially the network of channels and cakras, as well as the wind energies and vital drops that flow through them. Other topics, such as the Tibetan Buddhist understanding of the process of death and dying, the intermediate state of existence, and rebirth— central concepts of which find their origin in the Guhyasamāja Tantra— as well as theories of human psychology, such as the scope and dynamic of the emotions, dream states, and near-death experiences, are also addressed in detail. This text was Tsongkhapa's last major work, which he completed in 1419, the year of his death. Its impact on the course of tantric practice in Tibet has been definitive for the Geluk school and profound for Tibetan Buddhism as a whole.
-Thupten Jinpa, General Editor +
B
This volume presents the first book-length study in English of the concept of Buddha nature as discussed in the Buddha Nature Treatise (Fo Xing Lun), attributed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Paramartha in the sixth century. The author provides a detailed discussion of one of the most important concepts in East Asian Buddhism, a topic little addressed in Western studies of Buddhism until now, and places the Buddha nature concept in the context of Buddhist intellectual history. King then carefully explains the traditional Buddhist language in the text, and embeds Buddha nature in a family of concepts and values which as a group are foundational to the development of the major indigenous schools of Chinese Buddhism.
In addition, she refutes the accusations that the idea of Buddha nature introduces a crypto-Atman into Buddhist thought, and that it represents a form of monism akin to the Brahmanism of the Upanisads. In doing this, King defends Buddha nature in terms of purely Buddhist philosophical principles. Finally, the author engages the Buddha nature concept in dialogue with Western philosophy by asking what it teaches us about what a human being, or person, is.
(Source: back Cover) +
The present study comprises two volumes. The first offers a detailed analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s position on buddha nature in which we have attempted to fill in some of the historical and doctrinal background necessary to understand his main contributions to this subject. The second presents a selection of critically edited texts and translations of the his most important writings on buddha nature.<br>
While the details of Volume II can be gleaned from the table of contents, it may be useful to give a short résumé of Part I. In the first chapter, we have sketched a general outline of the author’s position on buddha nature in relation to the major lines of interpretation advanced by leading scholars of his generation that he sought to creatively resolve through his own dialectical approach. In chapter two, we take a broader view of the major views on buddha nature that had developed in India and Tibet and consider how masters of the Karma bka’ brgyud tradition positioned their own views in relation to these. We are aided in this regard by a useful synopsis of Indian and Tibetan buddha nature ideas composed by one of the Eighth Karma pa’s main teachers, Karma phrin las (1456–1539); this forms the centerpiece of the chapter. In the third chapter, we flesh out the skeletal outline of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s position traced in the preceding chapters with a more detailed analysis of his central claims regarding buddha nature. This was the most painstaking portion of the book to write and may well be the most challenging for readers unacquainted with the finer points of buddha nature theory. Yet it also contains the most substantive material for understanding the author’s interpretation of buddha nature and its doctrinal foundations. Our philosophical aim was to clarify the author’s efforts to articulate and justify his tradition’s position on buddha nature in relation to parallel or rival positions held by other Indian and Tibetan masters. To this end, we identified in his treatments sixteen central propositions regarding buddha nature and attempted to elucidate each in terms of its historical-doctrinal evolution. In doing so, our objective has been not only to compile an inventory of the author’s core propositions and to compare them with those of other Buddhist scholars, but further to probe beneath the doxographical surface of these positions to get at the guiding aims and aspirations that led him to espouse the positions he did. Though somewhat more detailed than the previous chapters, Chapter Three is nonetheless indispensable for appreciating the scope and originality of the Karma pa’s contribution to the Buddhist understanding of buddha nature theory. It is thus also essential for clarifying and contextualizing the materials translated in Volume II. (Higgins and Draszczyk, preface, 17–18.)
''Buddha-Nature and Emptiness'' by Japanese scholar <div class="inline-person-tag grey-hoverlay position-relative d-inline-block nowrap px-1 rounded">START_WIDGET07534b74bc73dbe2-1END_WIDGET'"`UNIQ--noglossary-00000001-QINU`"'START_WIDGET07534b74bc73dbe2-2END_WIDGET
</div> is a book of herculean research and superior writing. With apparent ease, [[Kano, K.|Kano]] consults Chinese, Tibetan, and various Sanskrit-hybrid literature to surround the ''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'' and its eleventh-century Tibetan translator and commentator [[Ngok Lotsāwa]] with the necessary information to clarify what [[Kano, K.|Kano]] believes to be their central goals. For the first, this was the systematization of Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature; for the second, it was to strip out the ontological aspect of the definitive.
The book is organized historically, with initial chapters on the origin and impact of the''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'' in India ([[Kano, K.|Kano]] is fully cognizant of the treatise’s history in China but the book is not concerned with that topic). These address the issues of authorship, influence, translation, and transmission. [[Kano, K.|Kano]] mines virtually every surviving piece of Indian Buddhist literature for references to the text, and one of the remarkable feats of the book is the resurrection of the transmission lineage of the ''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'' in India, in particular, how he breathes life into relationships between men who lived well over a thousand years ago.
The second section of the book is dedicated to [[Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab]]’s late eleventh-century Tibetan translation and commentary of the treatise that he knew as the ''[[Uttaratantra]]''. As [[Kano, K.|Kano]] explains, the ''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'' systematized buddha-nature doctrine with awareness of both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra doctrine, but without allegiance with either. [[Ngok]], however, like all Tibetans after him, was intent on fitting buddha-nature theory into these standard doctrinal schools of thought. Buddha-nature, both [[Ngok]] (and [[Kano, K.|Kano]]) decided, was a valuable tool in the promotion and pursuit of the Buddhist goal of liberation; yet philosophically the assertion of a permanent, existent self was problematic and needed to be explained away.
The second part of the book does for [[Ngok]] and his commentary what the first part of the book did for the ''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'': [[Kano, K.|Kano]] packs them in fascinating information about [[Ngok]]’s teachers and contemporaries, and he carefully unravels the complicated philosophical position [[Ngok]] established. This includes a lengthy chapter on [[Ngok]]’s Indian guru, [[Sajjana]], who was also the teacher to [[Tsen Khawoche]], a man who fully accepted the ontological aspect of buddha-nature and influenced the dzokchen and mahāmudrā interpretations of the doctrine. As a committed Mādhyamika, [[Ngok]] however was forced to confront what [[Kano, K.|Kano]] calls the “incompatibilities between the Buddha-nature and the Madhyamaka doctrines, especially with regard to the ultimate ontological status of Buddha-nature, which has never been accepted as Madhyamaka doctrine.” Step-by-step [[Kano, K.|Kano]] skillfully explains how [[Ngok]] did this by redefining three aspects of buddha-nature—''dharmakāya'', ''tathatā'', and ''gotra''—as resultant, intrinsic, and causal aspects of emptiness, respectively. Attentive to the historical nature of ideas, Kano ends the book with a lengthy section on [[Ngok]]’s impact on the many Tibetan ''[[Ratnagotravibhāga]]'' commentators who followed him; [[Ngok]]'s translation (and the only one of six to survive) became canonical, and his commentary has been continuously read in almost every Tibetan Buddhist educational center.
Based on teachings given by [[Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche]] in Dordogne, France in 2003-2004, this commentary contains side-by-side copies of the translations of the ''The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra'' from [[Buddha Nature: The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra|Rosemarie Fuchs]] and [[The Changeless Nature|Ken and Katia Holmes]], together with the Tibetan verses.
The book includes a lengthy question and answer section organized around the chapters of the root text, but found at the end of the book. Also included are a Tibetan-Sanskrit-English glossary and an index. +
Jonathan Silk's ''Buddhist Cosmic Unity: An Edition, Translation and Study of the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta'' is the first study of a tathāgatagarbha sūtra that exists only in Chinese translation, although it was known to Tibetans through extensive quotations in the Ratnagotravibhāga. In addition to an informative introduction, Silk provides six appendices on philological puzzles such as the term amuktajña and the reputed author of the Ratnagotravibhāga as understood by the Chinese, whether it should be rendered Sāramati or Sthiramati (Silk concludes that there is not enough evidence to decide).
The basic structure of the sūtra is a refutation of wrong views, chief among them the question as to whether the number of sentient beings increases or decreases (hence the title of the text: the No-Increase No-Decrease Sūtra). The incorrect assumption is that when a being attains enlightenment the number of ordinary beings decreases as that individual dissolves into nothing. The authors explain why this is not the case using the concepts of dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha. The first is understood as the absolute nature of reality that is the quintessential nature of all beings. It appears as pure (in the body of a buddha), mixed pure and impure (in the bodies of bodhisattvas), and impure (in the rest of us). The nature is the same; the appearance is purely subjective. The text thus conflates dharmakāya with tathāgatagarbha, although in a way that Silk admits is obscure. He summarizes as "the three modes are nothing more than modalities of the embryo of the tathagatas, variously related to the ultimate Reality." As one would expect with a study of a tathāgatagarbha text, Silk addresses (using Zimmerman for support) the ambiguity of whether tathāgatagarbha means beings "contain a seed / serve as a womb of a tathagata" or, as Silk puts it, "the quintessence of beings is to contain a tathagata; their nature is to be loci for future buddhas." This latter sense, Silk maintains, is how the concept is understood by the sūtra.
G
Thupten Jinpa and Donald S. Lopez, Jr deliver Gendun Chopel's life's work--the account of his pilgrimage through South Asia that combines travelogue, drawings, history, and ethnography--in English. Scholars and practitioners alike will embrace these tales of ancient India, recent Indian past, and early Tibetan history told from Chopel's sharp, critical humor that comes alive through Thupten Jinpa and Donald S. Lopez's rendering. An appendix including Tibetan transliterations used in the work, notes, and an index are included. +
L
The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339), propounded a unique synthesis of Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the classical teachings on buddha-nature. His work occupies an important position between its Indian predecessors and the later, often highly charged debates in Tibet about "rangtong" (self-emptiness) and "zhentong" (other-emptiness). The Third Karmapa is widely renowned as one of the major proponents of the Tibetan zhentong tradition. This book contains a collection of some of his main writings on buddha-nature and the transition of ordinary deluded consciousness to enlightened wisdom.
===An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje===
<blockquote>You realize that whatever appears dawns within the play of the mind<br>And that mind itself is the dharmakāya free of clinging.<br>Through the power of that, you, the supreme siddhas, master apparent existence.<br>Precious ones of the Kagyü lineage, please bestow excellent virtue.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Through the heart of a perfect Buddha awakening in you,<br>You possess the blossoming glorious qualities of supreme insight.<br>You genuine holder of the teachings by the name Dzogchen Ponlop,<br>Through your merit, the activity of virtue,</blockquote>
<blockquote>You publish the hundreds of flawless dharma paintings<br>That come from the protectors of beings, the Takpo Kagyü,<br>As a display of books that always appears<br>As a feast for the eye of intelligence of those without bias.</blockquote>
<blockquote>While the stream of the Narmadā'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF1-QINU`"' river of virtue<br>Washes away the stains of the mind,<br>With the waves of the virtues of the two accumulations rolling high,<br>May it merge with the ocean of the qualities of the victorious ones.</blockquote>
''This was composed by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje as an auspicious aspiration for the publication of the precious teachings called'' The Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra ''by the supreme Dzogchen Ponlop Karma Sungrap Ngedön Tenpe Gyaltsen on April 18, 2004 (Buddhist Era 2548). May it be auspicious.''
===Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje===
In Tibet, all the ravishing and beautiful features of a self-arisen realm—being encircled by ranges of snow mountains adorned by superb white snowflakes and being filled with Sal trees, abundant herbs, and cool clear rivers―are wonderfully assembled in a single place. These wonders make our land endowed with the dharma the sole pure realm of human beings in this world. In it, all aspects of the teachings of the mighty sage, the greatly compassionate teacher skilled in means, are perfectly complete―the greater and lesser yānas as well as the mantrayāna. They are as pure and unblemished as the most refined pure gold; they accord with reasoning through the power of things; they dispel the darkness of the minds of all beings; and they are a great treasury bestowing all benefit and happiness one could wish for, just as desired. Not having vanished, these teachings still exist as the great treasure of the ''Kangyur'', the ''Tengyur'', and the sciences as well as the excellent teachings of the Tibetan scholars and siddhas who have appeared over time. Their sum equals the size of the mighty king of mountains, and their words and meanings are like a sip of the nectar of immortality. Headed by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche with his utterly virtuous and pure intention to solely cherish the welfare of the teachings and beings, many dedicated workers of Nitartha ''international'', striving with devotion, diligence, and prajñā, undertook hardships and made efforts over many years to preserve these teachings and further their transmission, and restore them. In particular, they worked toward the special purpose of propagating the excellent stream of teachings and practices of the unequaled Marpa Kagyü lineage, the great family of siddhas, in all directions and times, like the flow of a river in summertime. Through these efforts, the ''Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra'' publication series, inclusive of all the essential meanings of the perfectly complete teachings of the victor is magically manifesting as a great harvest for the teachings and beings. Bearing this in mind, I rejoice in this activity from the bottom of my heart and toss flowers of praise into the sky. Through this excellent activity, may the intentions of our noble forefathers be fulfilled in the expanse of peace.
''Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje<br>Gyütö Ramoche Temple<br>July 19, 2002 (Buddhist Era 2547)''
===Foreword by The Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche===
The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje, is regarded as the architect of the
Karma Kagyü interpretations of the view on buddha nature and other key
topics that later became central to the philosophical school known as ''Shentong'' (“empty of other”). His writings became the authoritative basis for the standard Karma Kagyü position on buddha nature and the touchstone for the writings of subsequent lineage authors on the subject of buddha nature and ''shentong'', such as the eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje. Rangjung Dorje’s three most renowned treatises are ''The Profound Inner Reality'' (Tib. zab mo nang don), ''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'' (Tib. rnam shes ye shes ’byed pa), and ''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart'' (Tib. snying po bstan pa). His main work, ''The Profound Inner Reality'', is one of the most complete elucidations of the Buddhist teachings on the completion stage practices of the Anuttarayogatantra. ''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'' explains the mahāyāna theory of eight consciousnesses and their transformation into the five wisdoms. ''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart'' clarifies the Buddha’s teachings on ''tathāgathagarbha''. The latter two texts are known as "the two lesser treatises of Rangjung Dorje."<br>
The teachings from these three treatises play an essential role for practitioners of vajrayāna Buddhism by providing an overview which enriches the meditator's understanding of the complete transformative path of vajrayāna. The Karma Kagyü lineage is heir to both of the great mahāyāna traditions of emptiness—''Rangtong'' Madhyamaka ("Empty-of-self Middle Way”) and ''Shentong'' Madhyamaka ("Empty-of-other Middle Way"). It is commonly understood in this lineage that the ''rangtong'' approach is needed to determine and gain certainty in the right view, while ''shentong'' is required for the practice of meditation. This combination of the right view of emptiness and the meditative experience of luminous buddha nature is considered to be jointly
necessary for complete awakening.<br>
While the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, and his followers emphasized the view of genuine emptiness that comes from the Madhyamaka teachings of the great Indian master Nāgārjuna, Rangjung Dorje and, later, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé emphasized the luminous empty mind of buddha nature, which is mainly presented in the treatises of the great Indian masters Maitreya and Asaṅga. Thus, the Karma Kagyü lineage inherits the great treasure of the complete teachings of both mahāyāna lineages.<br>
It is my great delight that Dr. Brunnhölzl has translated the crucial passages on the view in ''The Profound Reality'' as well as the two lesser treatises with their commentaries. Karl has been studying and practicing Buddhism for many decades under the guidance of great Buddhist masters, such as the Venerable Khenchen Tsültrim Gyatso Rinpoche. An accomplished translator, Karl is also skilled in presenting the most complicated and intricate subjects in a clear and direct manner, as well as in leading meditation trainings. This work is an invaluable gift and great contribution to Western Buddhism. I trust that this book will bring great insight and genuine benefit for all readers.
Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche<br>
Nalanda West<br>
Seattle, Washington<br>
September 22, 2008<br>
===Preface===
In an ongoing effort to create a body of English translations of essential works by the Karmapas and other major lineage figures of the Tibetan Karma Kagyü School, I present here a volume with some of the main writings of the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF2-QINU`"' (1284–1339), on buddha nature, the origin and permutations of ordinary deluded consciousness, its transition to nonconceptual nondual wisdom, and the characteristics and functions of buddhahood together with its enlightened activity. These materials primarily include:
*Chapter 1 and excerpts from chapters 6 and 9 of ''The Profound Inner Reality'' with its autocommentary
*''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart''
*''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom''
*Excerpts from ''The Ornament That Explains the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''''
In addition, this volume contains four shorter poems by the Third Karmapa:
*''The Wisdom Lamp That Illuminates the Basic Nature''
*''Proclaiming Mind's Way of Being Mistaken ''
*''Stanzas That Express Realization''
*''A Song on the Ālaya''
These texts by the Third Karmapa are supplemented by:
*Two commentaries on ''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart'' and ''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'' by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF3-QINU`"' (1813–1899)
*Excerpts from a commentary by the First Karma Trinlépa, Choglé Namgyal'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF4-QINU`"' (1456–1539) on the first chapter of the autocommentary on ''The Profound Inner Reality''
*Excerpts from Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF5-QINU`"' (1504–1566) presentation of buddhahood, kāyas, wisdoms, and enlightened activity in his commentary on the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''.
As for the view of Karmapa Rangjung Dorje, this book may be regarded as a continuation of, and elaboration on, the remarks thereon in ''In Praise of Dharmadhātu'' (which also contains the Third Karmapa's commentary on this text), providing translations of more of the still-extant materials that describe his unique approach to both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. In the Kagyü tradition, it is generally said that its distinct outlook on Madhyamaka was primarily presented by the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF6-QINU`"' (1507–1554), while its position on buddha nature (and the tantras) was mainly put forth by the Third Karmapa. As the following will show, the Yogācāra tradition of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu may well be included in the scope of the Third Karmapa's explanations, which generally present a creative synthesis of Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the teachings on buddha nature. In addition, all of the above materials are not only scholarly documents, but bear great significance for practicing the Buddhist path and making what is described in them a living experience.
My wish to publish these texts in English dates far back, and the work on them has been in progress for about fifteen years, but had to be postponed many times due to other responsibilities, so I am truly delighted that this project finally comes to fruition. It would not have been possible without all the Tibetan masters from whom I received oral explanations on most of the above texts over the last two decades. In this regard, my heartfelt gratitude goes to Khenchen Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, Tenga Rinpoche, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, Sangyé Nyenpa Rinpoche, Ringu Tulku, and the late Khenpo Lama Thubten. I am also very grateful to all the Western scholars, particularly Professor Lambert Schmithausen and Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes, who opened many doors to the Indian sources of the Yogācāra tradition.
Sincere thanks go to Sidney Piburn and Jeff Cox from Snow Lion Publications for their continuous support and readiness to publish this work, and to Michael Wakoff for being a meticulous and caring editor. I am also very grateful to Stephanie Johnston, who read through the entire manuscript, offered many helpful suggestions, and produced both the layout and the index. As for Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on ''Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'', its first-draft translation was prepared together with Anna Johnson, Christine McKenna, Gelong Karma Jinpa, and Karma Chögyal during a three-month Tibetan Intensive at Gampo Abbey, Canada.
May this book be a contributing cause for the buddha heart of H.H. the Seventeenth Gyalwang Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Drodul Dorje swiftly embracing all sentient beings in whatever ways suitable. May it in particular contribute to planting and sustaining both the great scholarly and meditative traditions of the Karma Kagyü lineage in the English-speaking world, since they were founded and fostered by all the Karmapas as a means to introduce all beings into their true nature.
Fremont, Seattle, September 11, 2007
===Introduction===
====The Indian Yogācāra Background====
In certain parts of the Eastern as well as the Western academic traditions, the Yogācāra School has often been neglected or misrepresented, usually in favor of assigning the "pole position" among Buddhist schools to Madhyamaka (in particular, to its Prāsaṅgika brand). There are many reasons for this, but two of the main ones are (1) making superficial and out-of-context judgments based on a unidimensional understanding and discussion of what seem to be stereotypical "buzz words" (such as ''cittamātra'') and (2) not treating the concepts and explanations of Yogācāra in their own terms, but looking at them through the lenses of other philosophical systems. As Nguyen says:
<blockquote>It is a truism in modern studies of systems of meaning (such as cultures, languages, religions, mythology) that it is necessary first to see such a system of meaning from within, in terms of its own categories and concepts, and its own inherent logic. If on the contrary, we set out by attempting to view a system of meaning in terms of categories fundamentally alien to it, we are in danger of misconstruing the system and constructing a distorted interpretation of it that overlooks its basic meanings and inherent structure. This mistake has often been made in the past in studies of Yogācāra philosophy. . . .</blockquote>
<blockquote>In Buddhist literature itself, texts like the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', and ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' are always careful to consider all particular concepts in their integral relationship to the thought-system as a whole. Each of these texts deserves careful study.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF7-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Hall adds:
<blockquote>The argument over whether Vijñānavāda is idealistic or realistic bears a marked resemblance to the controversy as to whether Madhyamaka is nihilism or transcendental absolutism.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Mistaking taxonomy for understanding is a fault not limited to modern writers on Buddhism. A similar excessive concern for and trust in doctrinal labels can be seen in ancient Indian philosophers and Tibetan scholastics, and even in the Abhidharma itself. The identification of one school with another (such as that of Vijñānavāda with some Western form of idealism) is not only likely to be misleading; it is only all too often the point at which the argument stops. A more fruitful approach to comparative philosophy would begin by tentatively accepting several comparable philosophies as coherent systems in their own terms, and would proceed to apply their several viewpoints to specific problems of philosophy.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF8-QINU`"' </blockquote>
As should be evidenced by many of the following quotes from Yogācāra texts, this school was definitely not advocating some kind of naïve idealism or psychologism, nor an ultimately and truly existing consciousness.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AF9-QINU`"' King says:
<blockquote>It should be made clear from the outset then that the Yogācāra school is far more complex in its understanding of the nature of experience than is usually acknowledged.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFA-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Lusthaus elaborates:
<blockquote>Buddhism is not a psychologism. Even Yogācāra, which does propose to reduce karma and the entirety of the triple world to cognitive factors, is not a psychologism. This is because the point of Buddhist analysis is not the reification of a mental structure or theory of mind, but its erasure. Vasubandhu highlights the closure of cognitive horizons not because such a closure is either desirable or unalterable, but because the closure can only be opened once its all-encompassing complexity and ubiquity is understood and recognized. Yogācāra uses psychological arguments to overcome psychological closure, not to enhance it.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFB-QINU`"' </blockquote>
The Yogācāras were also not immune or oblivious to notions such as "emptiness," "lack of nature," and "identitylessness" (which are often wrongly considered to belong solely and uniquely to Madhyamaka), but included and greatly used them as parts of their own explanations too. Specifically, hermeneutic frameworks such as the three natures, the threefold lack of nature, and the three emptinesses (see below) are not at all presented in order to contradict the prajñāpāramitā sūtras or Nāgārjuna, but equally serve to explain emptiness, just within a further developed hermeneutical system. As King says:
<blockquote>As a Mahāyāna school, the Yogācāra developed as a response to the insights of those same [prajñāpāramitā] sūtras. Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult indeed to have ignored the centrality of the notion of ''śūnyatā'' to these texts. In fact, the idea that the early classical Yogācāra of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu found any difficulty whatsoever in embracing the basic insights of the Madhyamaka school disregards both the historical and textual evidence, which, on the contrary, displays a spirit of underlying continuity and acceptance.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFC-QINU`"'</blockquote>
However, in contrast to the Mādhyamikas' reluctance to speak about the specifics of seeming reality and the Buddhist path of purifying the deluded mind (or mind at all), the Yogācāra system, besides presenting sophisticated analyses of ultimate reality, also elaborates on how the deluded mind operates, how it can make the transition to the unmistaken wisdom that sees this mind's own ultimate nature, and what the characteristics and the fruition of this wisdom are. Thus, Yogācāra not only investigates the definitive meaning of the scriptures in a nonreifying manner, but also what happens experientially in the minds of those who study and practice this meaning. At the same time, it provides broader contextualizing comments on the sūtras and addresses typical misconceptions about emptiness and Madhyamaka, such as it being pure nihilism (which was a very common concern even among Buddhists since the time of Nāgārjuna). Consequently, one could even argue that the Yogācāra system is not only not inferior to the Madhyamaka approach, but exhibits a much more encompassing outlook on human experience and the soteriological'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFD-QINU`"' issues of the Buddhist path than the almost exclusively one-way deconstructive approach of the Mādhyamikas. This seems to have occurred already to some people in India, as the following verse attributed to the audience of the seven-year debate between Candragomī and Candrakīrti illustrates.
<blockquote>Ah, the treatises of noble Nāgārjuna<br>Are medicine for some and poison for others.<br>The treatises of Ajita'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFE-QINU`"' and noble Asaṅga<br>Are nectar for all people.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000AFF-QINU`"' </blockquote>
King elaborates:
<blockquote>Thus, we find in the Yogācāra, as in the Madhyamaka school, a pointed refusal to become involved in an ontological debate. It is interesting that this type of analysis is something of a bridge-building exercise between what might be seen as an undue emphasis upon negative language (via negativa) in the exposition of emptiness by (some?) Mādhyamikas on the one hand, and the overarching realism (via positiva) of the Abhidharma schools on the other hand. As such, the Yogācāra movement can be seen as a "re-forming" of the Middle Path. This is not to say that such a reformation is necessarily out of step with the understanding of ''śūnyatā'' as systematized in the ''śāstras'' of Nāgārjuna (who is clearly neither a nihilist nor a realist in the accepted senses of the terms), but merely that, in its emphasis upon the "given" of meditative and so-called "normative" perception, the Yogācāra aim is to establish the appropriate parameters of linguistic usage and a rigorous logic for the establishment of the Mahāyāna position on experientially verifiable grounds.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B00-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In addition, quite a number of Tibetan masters emphasize that Yogācāra (whether it is called that way or ''shentong'') is more in harmony with the vajrayāna. For example, Śākya Chogden (1428–1507) says:
<blockquote>As for the reasonings that ascertain all phenomena as lacking a nature, the other one [that is, Niḥsvabhāvavāda] is vaster, while the [description of] the definitive meaning of what is to be experienced through meditation is more profound in this system. Because its explanation of nothing but nondual wisdom as what is to be experienced as a result of meditation very greatly accords with the vajrayāna [systems], this [latter] system is more profound.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B01-QINU`"'</blockquote>
and
<blockquote>In the uncommon texts of mantra,<br>There is no explanation whatsoever<br>About what is to be experienced through the view<br>That is not in accord with the texts of Maitreya.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B02-QINU`"'<br>. . .<br>The Maitreya dharmas accord with the mantra[yāna],<br>Because they assert solely nondual wisdom<br>As what is to be realized after [all] phenomena<br>In terms of apprehender and apprehended have been realized to be empty.</blockquote>
For all these reasons, let alone the Buddhist perspective proper, Yogācāra presentations of mental processes also have great potential to significantly contribute to the modern cognitive sciences. Nguyen suggests:
<blockquote>In modern studies of comparative philosophy and religion, Yogācāra thought, once adequately understood, should provoke major interest, given its startling parallels with the most modern developments in Western thought about cognition and epistemology. Just as the modern researchers now acknowledge that the modern world has much to learn from the medical lore of traditional cultures, the same could be said of classical Buddhist philosophical pyschology.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B03-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In sum, the Yogācāra tradition considered itself as a continuation of all the preceding developments in Buddhism and not as a radical departure from them or even as a distinct new school per se. To retain what was regarded as useful in other schools of Buddhism did not mean to be ignorant of the pervasive Madhyamaka cautions against reifications of any kind. Thus, the vast range of Yogācāra writings represents a digest of virtually everything that previous Buddhist masters had developed, including intricate abhidharma analyses, charting the grounds of the many levels of the paths in the three yānas, subtle descriptions of meditative processes, presentations of epistemology and reasoning, explorations of mind and its functions in both its ignorant and enlightened modes, and commentaries on major mahāyāna sūtras. Thus, any linear or one-dimensional presentation of this Buddhist school seems not only misguided, but highly inconsiderate, due to the rich variety of this school’s sources and explanatory models (in itself, this variety and its development are nice examples of key Yogācāra notions, which usually describe processes rather than states or things). Nevertheless, a brief overview, in the Yogācāra School's own terms, of the main topics addressed in the following texts by the Third Karmapa is indispensable to demonstrate how firmly he is steeped in the view and explanations of this school.
====The Major Yogācāra Masters and Their Works====
Let's begin with the Indian masters (in roughly chronological order) and their major texts'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B04-QINU`"' that are at the core of the Yogācāra tradition. First and foremost, we have Maitreya and his five seminal works, which are the foundations for all subsequent Yogācāra scriptures:
*''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B05-QINU`"'
*''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B06-QINU`"'
*''Madhyāntavibhāga''
*''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''
*''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (''Uttaratantra'')'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B07-QINU`"'
Nāgamitra (third/fourth century?) composed a ''Kāyatrayāvatāramukha'', which discusses dharmakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya in terms of the three natures.
Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both fourth century CE) were the two earliest commentators on the five texts by Maitreya and also composed many texts of their own. The following main Yogācāra texts are attributed to Asaṅga:
*''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna'' (commentary)
*''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (commentary)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B08-QINU`"'
*''Yogācārabhūmi'' (consisting of the ''Bahubhūmivastu'', ''Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī'', ''Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī'', ''Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī'', and ''Vastusaṃgrahaṇī'')
*''Abhidharmasamucchaya''
*''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''
Vasubandhu's main Yogācara works consist of:
*''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya''
*''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya''
*''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti''
*''Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B09-QINU`"'
*''Viṃśatikākārikā''
*''Triṃśikākārikā''
*''Trisvabhāvanirdeśa''
*''Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa''
*''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa''
*''Vyākhyāyukti''
Guṇabhadra (394–468) was greatly active in translating and teaching mahāyāna sūtras as well as Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0A-QINU`"' materials in China. He is credited with the first translation of the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra''.
Dignāga (c. 480–540) is said to have taught at the Indian Buddhist University of Nālandā and is mainly famous for his logico-epistemological texts. However, as many studies have shown, these works (such as the ''Pramāṇasamucchaya'') are generally grounded in the Yogācāra system. In addition, he also wrote a few more explicitly Yogācāra texts, such as the ''Ālambanaparīkṣā'' with its autocommentary.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0B-QINU`"'
Ratnamati (fifth–sixth century) was another Indian active in China, who greatly emphasized the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings. He translated the ''Uttaratantra'', Vasubandhu's commentary on the ''Daśabhūmikasūtra'', and many other such texts.
Bodhiruci's collaboration with Ratnamati (and Buddhasānta) in translating Vasubandhu's above commentary came to an end over their disagreement as to whether ''tathāgatagarbha'' represents classical Yogācāra thought or not. Bodhiruci translated thirty-nine texts into Chinese, among them the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', the ''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra'', and the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''.
Kambala (also fifth–sixth century) wrote a brilliant poetic treatise, called ''Ālokamālāprakaraṇanāma'', which represents an unusually early and unique approach of synthesizing Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Combining the framework of the three natures with that of the two realities, Kambala clearly assimilates Madhyamaka to Yogācāra and not vice versa (as, for example, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did much later). Also the autocommentary on his ''Bhagavatīprajñāpāramitānavaślokapiṇḍārtha'' (better known as ''Navaślokī'') exhibits typical Yogācāra features.
Guṇamati (sixth century) wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's ''Vyākhyāyukti'' and is renowned as Sthiramati's main teacher. Both were active at the Buddhist University of Valabhi (in present-day Gujarat).
Sthiramati (c. 510–570) is often unduly ignored, but he not only composed important commentaries on several of the above texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, but also systematized and elaborated many classical Yogācāra themes. Especially his large commentaries on Maitreya's ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' as well as his shorter one on Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' can be considered as landmarks in Yogācāra writing in their own right. His Yogācāra works include:
*''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya''
*''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā''
*''Viṃśatikābhāṣya''
*''Triṃśikābhāṣya''
*''Abhidharmasamucchayavyākhyā'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0C-QINU`"'
*''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāsa''
Paramārtha (499–569) traveled to China in 546 and remained there until the end of his life, being the first one to widely teach and translate Yogācāra (and ''tathāgatagarbha'') materials there. The Chinese canon contains thirty-two texts attributed to him, either works authored by him or translations (partially with significant embedded comments). The latter include several sūtras, Asaṅga's ''Viniṣcayasaṃgrahaṇī'' and ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'', Vasubandhu's ''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya'' and ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya'' (Paramārtha's most complex and significant work), and Vasubandhu's ''Viṃśatikā'' and ''Triṃśikā''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0D-QINU`"' He also translated, if not authored, the famous ''Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0E-QINU`"' In addition, he is considered as the author (or at least the commentator and redactor) of the ''Buddhagotraśāstra (Fo Xing Lun)'','"`UNIQ--ref-00000B0F-QINU`"' which is one of the rare texts that synthesizes explicitly and in detail many classical Yogācāra materials, such as the three natures, with the notion of ''tathāgatagarbha''. Among Paramārtha's novel interpretations of Yogācāra concepts, the best known is his theory of a ninth consciousness, called ''amalavijñāna'' (see below). This is primarily found in his commentary on Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'', called ''Evolution of Consciousness (Chuan Shi Lun)'','"`UNIQ--ref-00000B10-QINU`"' and the comments embedded in his translations of the ''Viniṣcayasaṃgrahaṇī'', the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'', and its ''Bhāṣya.'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B11-QINU`"' Together with Kumārajīva (344–413) and Hsüan-tsang (602–664), he is considered to be one of the greatest translators of Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B12-QINU`"'
Dharmapāla (530–561) was an abbot of Nālandā University. His works are only extant in Chinese, and Hsüan-tsang, who was instrumental in bringing Yogācāra teachings to China, greatly relies on Dharmapāla's views (primarily in his ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'', which compiles the commentaries by ten Indian Yogācāras on Vasubandhu's ''Viṃśatikā'' and ''Triṃśikā''). Dharmapāla also composed a commentary on Dignāga's ''Ālambanaparīkṣā'' and had a famous written debate with Bhāvaviveka, which is found in the former's commentaries on Āryadeva's ''Catuḥśataka'' and ''Śataśāstra'' from a Yogācāra point of view.
Another sixth-century Yogācāra is Asvabhāva, who often closely follows Sthiramati and wrote the following commentaries on texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Kambala:
*''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā''
*''Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana''
*''Ālokamālāṭīkāhṛdānandajananī''
Śīlabhadra (529–645) followed Dharmapāla as the abbot of Nālandā and taught Hsüan-tsang for fifteen months during the latter's stay there. He is the author of the ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'', one of two extant commentaries on the Buddhabhūmisūtra (the other one being the ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'').'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B13-QINU`"' His text greatly relies on the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and its ''Bhāṣya'', as well as on the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''.'
Guṇaprabha (sixth century) is of course most famous for his ''Vinayasūtra'', but he also wrote a commentary on the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'', a ''Bodhisattvabhūmiśīlaparivartabhāṣya'', and a commentary on Vasubandhu's ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa''.
Jinaputra (second half of sixth century) wrote a commentary on the ''Abhidharmasamucchaya'' and a short part of the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', called ''Bodhisattvabhūmiśīlaparivartaṭīkā''.
Prasenajit (sixth/seventh century) is reported to have studied with Sthiramati, Śīlabhadra, and many other masters, being highly erudite in all Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist fields of knowledge. However, he preferred to live as a hermit outside of the Buddhist institutional mainstream and repeatedly refused to become the personal teacher of the then king of Magadha, instead dwelling with many hundreds of students on a mountainside. Though he is not known to have composed any texts of his own, he was highly influential in teaching Hsüan-tsang a great number of both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts, particularly providing the final clarifications on the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', for two years after the latter had been taught by Śīlabhadra. When Hsüan-tsang returned to Nālan'thereafter, he debated some Mādhyamikas and finally even composed a (lost) Sanskrit treatise in three thousand stanzas on Yogācāra and Madhyamaka not being mutually exclusive, but in harmony.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B14-QINU`"'
Candragomī (sixth/seventh century) was a disciple of Sthiramati. In his early adulthood, he had been married to a princess, but left her to spend the rest of his life keeping the five Buddhist precepts of a layman. He was very erudite in all Buddhist and non-Buddhist fields of learning and also a great poet. After being invited to Nālandā by Candrakīrti, he had an ongoing debate with the latter for seven years, defending the Yogācāra view. His teachings are reported to have been focused mainly on the ''Daśabhūmikasūtra'', the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', the ''Samādhirājasūtra'', the ''Gaṇḍālaṃkāradhāraṇī'', and the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, of which he also composed synopses. Among his works, the most famous are the ''Candravyākaraṇa'' (a work on Sanskrit grammar), the ''Śiṣyalekha'', and the ''Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃsaka'' (a mnemonic summary of the Ethics chapter of the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi''). Many other texts by him (such as a *''Pradīpamālā'' on the stages of the bodhisattva path) are mentioned in various sources, with some of them being more specifically Yogācāra, but none of them have survived.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B15-QINU`"'
Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660), like Dignāga, is best known for his contributions to epistemology and logic through his seven texts on valid cognition (such as the ''Pramāṇavārttika''), but these texts also clearly exhibit many Yogācara traits.
Vinītadeva (c. 645–715) composed commentaries on Vasubandhu's ''Viṃśatikā'' and ''Triṃśika'' and Dignāga's ''Ālambanaparīkśā'' (as well as on several of Dharmakīrti's treatises on valid cognition).
Pṛthivībandhu (seventh century?) wrote a detailed commentary on Vasubandhu's ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa''.
Jñānacandra (eighth century) composed a brief meditation manual, called ''Yogacaryābhāvanātātparyārthanirdeśa'', and a commentary on Nāgamitra's ''Kāyatrayāvatāramukha''.
Sāgaramegha (eighth century) wrote a massive commentary on the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'', called ''Yogācārabhūmaubodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā''.
Sumatiśīla (late eighth century) authored a detailed commentary on Vasubandhu's ''Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa''.
Late Yogācāras (all tenth–eleventh century) include Dharmakīrti of Sumatra'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B16-QINU`"' (one of the main teachers of Atiśa); Jñānaśrīmitra (''Sākarasiddhi, Sākarasaṃgraha'', and ''Sarvajñāsiddhi''); Ratnakīrti (''Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī'' and ''Sarvajñāsiddhi''); and Jñānaśrībhadra (commentary on the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', summary of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', and commentary on the ''Pramāṇavārttika''). Ratnākāraśānti is variously considered a Yogācāra or Mādhyamika. In any case, most of his works (such as ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'', ''Triyānavyavasthāna'', ''Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-Madhyamapratipadāsiddhi'', ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'', and ''Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa'') exhibit a synthesis of both these systems, often referred to as "Vijñapti-Madhyamaka."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B17-QINU`"'
Several other Indian Mādhyamikas, such as Śrīgupta (seventh century?), Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra (all eighth century), Viydākaraprabha (eighth/ninth century), Jetāri (tenth/eleventh century), and Nandaśrī, indeed used a lot of Yogācāra materials, but clearly upheld the Madhyamaka view as their final position.
In brief, the main classical Indian exponents of Yogācāra are no doubt Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati. As will be seen in the following, it is also primarily their works that provide the roadmap for the discussions of the eight consciousnesses, the four wisdoms, the three kāyas, and buddha nature in the Third Karmapa's texts translated below.
In terms of its contents, it should be noted that the Yogācāra system is by no means some kind of speculative philosophy that starts from a priori axioms and then constructs a magnificent edifice of abstract concepts in order to define what is true. On the contrary, the Yogācāra School proceeds from observing and analyzing a wide range of meditative experiences (hence its name), which reveal both the deluded and nondeluded processes of the mind. Through exploring and outlining the perceptual and conceptual structures of such processes, the Yogācāra system works out primarily their epistemological and soteriological implications (and only secondarily their ontological ones). As common in the Buddhist tradition (and many Indian spiritual traditions in general), Yogācāra treats epistemological analysis (a purely philosophical discipline for Western minds) as inseparable from, and being most relevant for, soteriological concerns (a religious matter for Western minds). In other words, the delusion about a truly existent self and phenomena and its resultant suffering are basically taken to be a cognitive error, while liberation or buddhahood is nothing but the removal of this error. As ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' VI.2 says:
<blockquote>In itself, the view about a self lacks the characteristic of a self,<br>As do its deformities―their characteristics differ [from a self].<br>Nor is there another [self] apart from these two, so it arises as a mere error.<br>Therefore, liberation is the termination of this mere error.</blockquote>
Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' and Sthiramati'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B18-QINU`"' comment that neither "the view about a self" (the mind that entertains the various beliefs related to "me" and "mine") nor its "deformities" (the five skandhas produced by afflictions and impregnations of negative tendencies) have the characteristics of a self, since their characteristics differ from those of a self, which on their view is purely imaginary (both the grasping at a self and the skandhas are multiple, conditioned, impermanent, not all-pervading, and so on, while the self is said to have the opposite characteristics). Nor is there a self outside of this grasping and the skandhas. Therefore, such grasping is nothing but an error, just as is mistaking a rope for a snake. And since there is no self that is in bondage, liberation is simply the termination of this error—there isn't anybody or anything that is liberated. ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.4 agrees, saying that liberation is nothing but the extinction of the false imagination that does not exist as it appears, yet seemingly exists and operates within a mind that is ignorant about its own true nature, in the form of projecting the fundamentally delusive duality of subject and object, upon which we then act.
The following is a brief outline of some of the main Yogācāra notions and pedagogic templates that are employed toward the end of terminating mind's self-delusion and revealing its natural state.
''Continued'' [[Books/Introduction#The world is merely mind's own play|''here'']]
====The World Is Merely Mind's Own Play====
One of the most inclusive notions in Buddhism in general and Yogācāra in particular is ''vikalpa'' (Tib. rnam rtog), with the related ''kalpanā'' (Tib. rtog pa), ''parikalpa'' (Tib. kun rtog), and their cognates. All of them have the basic sense of "constructing," "forming," "manufacturing," or "inventing." Thus, in terms of mind, they mean "creating in the mind," "forming in the imagination," and even "assuming to be real," "feigning," and "fiction." This shows that their usual translation as "thought" or "concept" is not wrong, but―particularly in a Yogācāra context―far too narrow. Fundamentally—and this is to be kept in mind throughout Buddhist texts—these terms refer to the continuous, constructive yet deluded activity of the mind that never tires of producing all kinds of dualistic appearances and experiences, thus literally building its own world.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B19-QINU`"' Obviously, what is usually understood by "conception" or "conceptual thinking" is just a small part of this dynamic, since, from a Buddhist point of view, ''vikalpa'' also includes nonconceptual imagination and even what appears as outer objects and sense consciousnesses—literally everything that goes on in a dualistic mind, be it an object or a subject, conscious or not.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1A-QINU`"' Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' 20–21ab says:
<blockquote>Whichever entity is imagined<br>By whichever imagination<br>Is the imaginary nature,<br>Which is unfindable.</blockquote>
<blockquote>But the other-dependent nature<br>Is the imagination that arises from conditions.</blockquote>
The meaning of "imagination" as an essentially deluded, dualistic, and illusory mental activity is particularly highlighted by the classical Yogācāra terms ''abhūtaparikalpa'' ("false imagination," lit. "imagination of what is unreal")'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1B-QINU`"' and ''parikalpita'' ("the imaginary," one of the three natures), with the latter being everything that appears as the division into subject and object that is produced by false imagination. The following passages serve to identify what false imagination is and its extent. For example, ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.8ab says:
<blockquote>False imagination [consists of]<br>The minds and mental factors of the three realms.</blockquote>
Vasubandhu's ''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya'' on I.1 states:
<blockquote>Here, false imagination is the imagination of apprehender and apprehended.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1C-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Sthiramati's ''Ṭīkā'' elaborates on this:
<blockquote>False imagination means that duality is unreal (or false) in it, or that [duality] is imagined by it. The word "false" indicates that it does not exist as it imagines [itself] in the form of being apprehender and apprehended. The word "imagination" indicates that referents are not found as they are imagined. Thus, being free from apprehender and apprehended is explained to be the characteristic of this [false imagination]. So, what is this [false imagination]? Without further differentiation, false imagination consists of the minds and mental factors of past, present, and future, which serve as causes and results, comprise the three realms, are beginningless, terminated by nirvāṇa, and conform with saṃsāra. But when differentiated, it is the imagination of the apprehender and the apprehended. Here, the imagination of the apprehended is consciousness appearing as [outer] referents and sentient beings. The imagination of the apprehender is consciousness appearing as a self and cognition. "Duality" refers to apprehender and apprehended, with the apprehended being forms and so on, and the apprehender being the eye consciousness and so on.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1D-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Rongtön Shéja Künrig's'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1E-QINU`"' (1367–1449) commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' explains:
<blockquote>All the many kinds of conceptions that are mentioned in the scriptures are included in false imagination, because they have the aspects of the three realms appearing as the duality of apprehender and apprehended under the sway of latent tendencies. False imagination is threefold―the conceptions that are the mere appearance as the duality of apprehender and apprehended; those that have the aspect of coarse states of mind; and those that have the aspect of the appearance of terms and their referents. The first consists of the mere appearance, under the sway of latent tendencies, of apprehender and apprehended being different. The second is what the abhidharma explains as the confused mental chatter that is included in the portions of [the mental factors of] intention and prajñā. The third is the clinging to referents through following names.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B1F-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In sum, this means that "imagination" includes all eight consciousnesses with their accompanying mental factors as well as their respective objects. As for all of this appearing, but actually being unreal, the mind's own confused play, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.15 states:
<blockquote>False imagination is explained<br>To be just like an illusion.<br>Just as the aspect in which an illusion [appears],<br>It is explained as the mistakenness of duality.</blockquote>
The ''Bhāṣya'' adds that false imagination should be known to be the other-dependent nature, which is also stated in XI.40cd. Furthermore, verses 4–5 of the ''Triṃśikā'' declare:
<blockquote>What appears here? The imagination of what is nonexistent.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B20-QINU`"'<br>How does it appear? By way of having the character of duality.<br>What is its nonexistence with that [duality]?<br>The very nature of nonduality in it.</blockquote>
<blockquote>What is the imagination of the nonexistent here?<br>It is the mind that imagines in certain ways what [does not exist],<br>[But its] referents, which it imagines like that,<br>Are absolutely never found in these ways.</blockquote>
Sometimes, the opposite of false imagination―correct imagination―is also presented. The latter refers to the mind being engaged in cultivating the antidotes for false imagination on the Buddhist path. "Correct imagination" refers to increasingly more refined—but still more or less dualistic—mental processes or creations that serve as the remedies for respectively coarser kinds of obscuring mental creations, perceptions, and misconceptions (false imagination). Initially, on the paths of accumulation and preparation, such remedial activities are conceptual in a rather obvious way, such as meditating on the repulsiveness of the body as an antidote against desire, or cultivating bodhicitta through contemplating the kindness of one's parents and so on. More subtle approaches would include familiarizing with momentary impermanence or personal and phenomenal identitylessness. From the path of seeing onward, all coarse conceptions of ordinary sentient beings (even the remedial ones) have ceased. However, during the first seven bhūmis, there are still subtle concepts about true reality, and on the last three bhūmis, about attaining the final fruition of buddhahood. In other words, though phenomena are not taken as real anymore, on the first seven bhūmis, there is still the apprehending of characteristics, and on the last three bhūmis, there is still a subtle tendency of duality. In brief, since the remedial wisdom that consumes what is to be relinquished still depends on what it relinquishes and still entails subtle reference points with regard to the dharmadhātu,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B21-QINU`"' it must eventually and naturally subside too, once even its most subtle fuel (the apprehending of characteristics and duality) is burnt up. Using the example of washing a stained shirt, remedial wisdom would correspond to the detergent used to wash away the stains. Obviously, after the detergent performed its function, both it and the stains would need to be removed from the shirt in order for it to be considered clean―from the perspective of the clean shirt itself, both stains and detergent are dirt. Thus, though correct imagination is the remedy for false imagination, both are still "imagination" in the sense that, from the perspective of the sole unmistaken cognition of a buddha, even the realizations on the bhūmis are not final and have to be transcended. As for the "nonconceptual wisdom" of buddhahood, it is the mind's ultimate cognitive capacity that is not impaired by any imaginations or mental fictions―in it, there is no delusional need or impulse to construct anything. Thus, a more literal rendering of the term would be "nonimaginative" or "nonconstructive" wisdom, whose facets or functions are the four wisdoms explained below.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B22-QINU`"'
===="Mind-Only?"====
Everything being mind's imagination leads to the most well-known, but also most misunderstood notions of the Yogācāra School―''cittamātra'' or ''vijñaptimātra''. Very often, it is still said that these terms mean that outer objects do not exist and everything is "only mind," with "mind" being the only thing that really or ultimately exists. However, when looking at what the Yogācāra texts themselves say, this is a gross misrepresentation. The beginning of Vasubandhu's ''Viṃśatikāvṛtti'' says:
<blockquote>In the mahāyāna, the three realms are presented as being mere cognizance (''vijñaptimātra''). The sūtras say, "O sons of the Victor, all three realms are mere mind (''cittamātra'')." . . . Here, the word "mind" has the sense of [mind] being associated with [its mental factors]. "Mere" has the meaning of excluding referents.</blockquote>
<blockquote>All this is mere cognizance<br>
Because of the appearance of nonexistent referents,<br>
Just as the seeing of nonexistent strands of hair<br>
In someone with blurred vision.</blockquote>
Like many other Yogācāra texts, Vasubandu's indeed continues by denying the existence of material outer objects, but the full purpose of teaching ''cittamātra'' is much vaster―realizing phenomenal identitylessness. Moreover, in this process, mere mind itself is no exception to being identityless. The ''Viṃśatikāvṛtti'' on verse 10 says:
<blockquote>How does the teaching on mere cognizance serve as the entrance to phenomenal identitylessness? It is to be understood that mere cognizance makes the appearances of form and so on arise, but that there is no phenomenon whatsoever that has the characteristic of form and so on. "But if there is no phenomenon in any respect at all, then also mere cognizance does not exist, so how can it be presented as such?" Entering into phenomenal identitylessness does not mean that there is no phenomenon in any respect at all. . . . It refers to the identitylessness in the sense of an imaginary identity, that is, a nature of phenomena as imagined by childish beings, which is the imaginary [nature, consisting of fictional identities] such as apprehender and apprehended. But it is not [meant] in the sense of [the nonexistence of] the inexpressible identity that is the object of the buddhas.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B23-QINU`"' Likewise, one enters into the identitylessness of this very mere cognizance as well, in the sense of [it lacking] any identity imagined by yet another cognizance. It is for this reason that, through the presentation of mere cognizance, one enters into the identitylessness of all phenomena, but not through the complete denial of their [relative] existence. Also, otherwise, [mere] cognizance would be the referent of another cognizance, and thus [a state of] mere cognizance would not be established, since it [still] has a referent.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B24-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Hall further comments on this as follows:
<blockquote>''Vijñapti'' designates the basic phenomenon of conscious experience, without requiring its separation into object, subject, and act of cognition. . . . To translate ''vijñapti'' as "representation" conveys its "public" aspect, but seems to imply representation of something. . . . On the contrary, . . . when ''vijñapti'' is qualified as "''vijñapti''-only," it cannot be meant as a representation of anything else, especially not of an external object. . . . As is so often the case in Buddhist philosophy, Vasubandhu is consciously navigating between two extremes, which in this case may be called realism and idealism.</blockquote>
<blockquote>In negative terms, ''vijñapti-mātra'' rules out the realist extreme: substantial external objects of cognition are denied. However, ''vijñapti-mātra'' has also a positive connotation, and the fact that Vasubandhu here affirms precisely ''vijñapti'' ― rather than ''vijñāna'' or ''citta'', which might be more easily misunderstood―seems to indicate an intent to avoid the idealist extreme as well. What is exclusively affirmed is not consciousness as an abiding entity, but the content of momentary acts of consciousness. When this ''vijñapti'' is equated with ''citta'', ''manas'', and ''vijñāna'', it follows that mind itself is ''vijñapti-mātra'': it consists of nothing else than the contents of momentary mental acts. The intention here is not to reduce the material to the mental, but to deny the dichotomy, while affirming that the basic reality is more usefully discussed in the terms belonging to a correct understanding of the mental.</blockquote>
<blockquote>. . . Vasubandhu points out that this teaching of ''dharma-nairātmya'' works only when ''vijñapti-mātra'' itself is understood to be ''vijñapti''-only. Clearly, no reification of consciousness is intended here. . . .</blockquote>
<blockquote>The doctrine of ''vijñapti-mātra'' is not the metaphysical assertion of a transcendental reality consisting of "mind-only." It is a practical injunction to suspend judgment: "Stop at the bare percept; no need to posit any entity behind it."</blockquote>
<blockquote>Rather than asserting "mind-only" as the true nature of unconditioned reality, Vasubandhu presents "mind-only" as a description of our delusion: the dreams of this sleep from which the Buddha has awakened. It is, after all, saṃsāra that is declared to be ''vijñapti-mātra''. Yet if "mind-only" is merely skepticism about reified external entities, how does it avoid the opposite extreme of reductionism? The world is neither completely real, nor completely unreal, but like a dream. A dream has its own presence and continuity, but its objects lack the substantiality of external objects. Whether common-sense things or Abhidharmic dharmas, dream-objects are bare percepts. If the dream-world saṃsāra is "mind-only" then freedom and the Buddhist path are possible―we can "change our minds." If the realms of meditation are "mind-only" then one can create a counter-dream within the dream of the world's delusion. Most important, one can awaken from a dream.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B25-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Thus, that "mere mind" is being constantly referred to in Yogācāra texts as the delusional perception of what does not exist (these texts moreover abounding with dreams, illusions, and so on as examples for it) hardly suggests that said momentary mental activities exist in a real or ultimate way. In addition, Asvabhāva's ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana'' explicitly says that "mere mind" refers only to the mistaken minds and mental factors of saṃsāra (the realities of suffering and its origin), but not to the reality of the path:
<blockquote>As for [the statement in the sūtras], "[All three realms are] mere mind," "mind" and "cognizance" are equivalent. The word "only" eliminates [the existence of] referents, and by virtue of [such referents] not existing, [the existence of] an apprehender is eliminated too, because [both] are imaginary. [However,] since this [mind] does not arise without the mental factors, these mental factors are not negated. As it is said, "Without mental factors, mind never arises." . . . "All three realms" refer to cognizance appearing as the three realms. Through saying, "all three realms," it is held that the minds and mental factors that are associated with craving, such as desire, and contained in the three realms are just mere cognizance. However, this does not refer to [the minds and mental factors in meditative equipoise] that constitute the reality of the path (those that focus on suchness and those that focus on the other-dependent [nature]) and those during subsequent attainment. For, they are not made into what is "mine" through the cravings of engaging in the three realms, are remedies, and are unmistaken.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B26-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Moreover, many Yogācāra works proceed by explicitly and repeatedly making it clear that "mere mind" does not exist and is to be relinquished in order to attain the full realization of buddhahood. For example, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' VI.7–8 says:
<blockquote>Understanding that referents are mere [mental] chatter,<br>[Bodhisattvas] dwell in mere mind appearing as these.<br>Then, they directly perceive the dharmadhātu,<br>Thus being free from the characteristic of duality.</blockquote>
<blockquote>The mind is aware that nothing other than mind exists.<br>Then, it is realized that mind does not exist either.<br>The intelligent ones are aware that both do not exist<br>And abide in the dharmadhātu, in which these are absent.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B27-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The ''Bhāṣya'' on these verses comments that, once bodhisattvas realize that referents are nothing but mental chatter, they dwell in mere mind appearing as such referents. This represents the four levels of the path of preparation. Subsequently, on the path of seeing, bodhisattvas directly perceive the dharmadhātu free from the characteristic of the duality of apprehender and apprehended. As for directly perceiving the dharmadhātu, having realized that there is no apprehended object that is other than mind, bodhisattvas realize that mere mind does not exist either, because without something apprehended, there is no apprehender.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B28-QINU`"' Also ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' V.7 says on the culmination of the path of seeing:
<blockquote>If apprehended referents do not exist like that,<br>Can these two be asserted as the apprehenders of anything?<br>Thus, their characteristic is the emptiness<br>Of a nature of an apprehender.</blockquote>
The above two verses from the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' represent one of the classic descriptions of the "four yogic practices" found in many mahāyāna texts in general and Yogācāra works in particular. These four steps of realization are:
*(1) Outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind (''upalambhaprayoga, dmigs pa'i sbyor ba'')
*(2) Thus, outer objects are not observed as such (''anupalambhaprayoga mi, dmigs pa'i sbyor ba'')
*(3) With outer objects being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either (''upalambhānupalambhaprayoga, dmigs pa mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba'')
*(4) Not observing both, nonduality is observed (''nopalambhopalambhaprayoga, mi dmigs dmigs pa'i sbyor ba'').
Thus, stages (1)–(3)―and thus the notion of ''cittamātra''―are progressively dealt with on the bodhisattva path only up through the end of the path of preparation. Stage (4) marks the path of seeing (the first bhūmi), on which bodhisattvas have to let go of the notion of ''cittamātra'' as well. This progression is also clearly expressed in ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' III.11–14, specifically matching these four stages with the four stages of the path of preparation (heat, peak, poised readiness, and the supreme mundane dharma). Here too, the notion of ''cittamātra'' is said to be relinquished:
<blockquote>After this [stage of poised readiness], the destruction of the discriminating notion of mere cognizance represents the samādhi that immediately precedes [the path of seeing]. This is to be regarded as the stage of the supreme mundane dharma.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B29-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The text also speaks about the ultimate purpose and function of the notion of mere cognizance:
<blockquote>Why do [bodhisattvas] engage in mere cognizance? The cognitions of [nonconceptual and unmistaken] supramundane calm abiding and superior insight focus on [all] the miscellaneous dharmas [of the mahāyāna, whose general characteristic is suchness], and the subsequently attained [nonconceptual] cognition in terms of various kinds of cognizance [realizes all phenomena to be nothing but imaginations of apprehender and apprehended]. Through these [cognitions], they relinquish all seeds in the ālaya-consciousness together with their causes, and thus increase the seeds of making contact with the dharmakāya [―cultivating the latent tendencies for listening of the mahāyāna. Finally,] through undergoing the fundamental change of state, they perfectly accomplish all the buddhadharmas and thus attain omniscient wisdom. This is why they engage [in mere cognizance].</blockquote>
<blockquote>Since the subsequently attained cognition regards everything that arises in the ālaya-consciousness and all characteristics of mere cognizance as being like illusions and such, it arises in a naturally unmistaken way. Therefore, these bodhisattvas are always unmistaken in their teachings on causes and results, just as illusionists are with regard to the phenomena in the illusions they produced.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2A-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In other words, like so many other general Buddhist and specific Yogācāra notions, ''cittamātra'' (or ''vijñaptimātra'') is no exception to simply being an expedient pedagogic tool to realize a certain level on the path. However, it is neither the final realization, nor to be reified in any way (thus becoming an obstacle to this very realization), but―as in the above example of cleaning a shirt―to be discarded once its intended function has been accomplished. In connection with the four yogic practices, the same crucial point is expressed in many other Yogācāra texts too, such as ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.6–7:
<blockquote>Based on observation,<br>Nonobservation arises.<br>Based on nonobservation,<br>Observation arises.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Thus, observation is established<br>As the nature of nonobservation.<br>Therefore, observation and nonobservation<br>Are to be understood as equal.</blockquote>
Sthiramati's ''Ṭīkā'' comments:
<blockquote>There is no difference between the nonobservation of referents and the observation as mere cognizance in that [both] do not exist. Thus, they are to be understood as equal. . . . [The latter] is just called "observation," since an unreal object appears [for it]. However, since there is no [actual] referent, nothing is observed by this ["observation"]. Therefore, ultimately, its nature is nonobservation. . . . Hence, it is said that it does not exist as the nature of observation. In such observation, neither is the nature of observation to be eliminated, nor is the nature of nonobservation to be established. They are the same in that they are undifferentiable. . . . "So why is [mere] cognition called 'observation' then?" In its nature, it is nonobservation, but [it is designated] in this way, since an unreal object appears [for it], as this is the convention in the world and the treatises.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2B-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' states:
<blockquote>Through [referents] being observed in this way, they are observed as mere cognizance.<br>
By virtue of observing them as mere cognizance,<br>Referents are not observed,<br>And through not observing referents,<br>Mere cognizance is not observed [either].<br>Through not observing this [mere cognizance],<br>One enters into the observation of both being without difference.<br>This nonobservation of a difference between these two<br>Is nonconceptual wisdom.<br>It is without object and without observing,<br>Since it is characterized<br>By the nonobservation of all characteristics.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2C-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Verses 36–38 of Vasubandhu's ''Trisvabhāvanirdeśa'' agree:
<blockquote>Through the observation of it being merely mind,<br>A knowable object is not observed.<br>Through not observing a knowable object,<br>Mind is not observed [either].</blockquote>
<blockquote>Through not observing both,<br>The dharmadhātu is observed.<br>Through observing the dharmadhātu,<br>Mastery is observed.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2D-QINU`"'</blockquote>
<blockquote>Having gained mastery,<br>Through accomplishing the welfare of oneself and others,<br>The wise attain unsurpassable enlightenment<br>With its nature of the three kāyas.</blockquote>
Verses 26–30 of his ''Triṃśikā'' say:
<blockquote>For as long as consciousness<br>Does not dwell in mere cognizance,<br>The aftereffects of dualistic apprehension<br>Will not come to a halt.</blockquote>
<blockquote>But "all this is mere cognizance"<br>Refers to this observing too―<br>Anything that is propped up in front [of one's mind]<br>Means not dwelling in "merely that [cognizance]."</blockquote>
<blockquote>When consciousness itself<br>Does not observe any focal object,<br>It rests in the very being of mere consciousness,<br>Since there is no apprehender without something apprehended.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2E-QINU`"'</blockquote>
<blockquote>Then, it is no-mind and nonreferential―<br>It is supramundane wisdom.<br>This is the fundamental change of state<br>And the relinquishment of the twofold impregnations of negative tendencies.</blockquote>
<blockquote>It is the uncontaminated dhātu<br>That is inconceivable, virtuous, stable,<br>And blissful―the vimuktikāya<br>Called the dharma[kāya] of the great sage.</blockquote>
As in line 28c above, sometimes, Yogācāras differentiate between "mere mind" (''cittamātra''), "mere consciousness" (''vijñānamātra''), and "mere cognizance" (''vijñaptimātra'') on the one hand, and "the very being or nature of mere mind, consciousness, and cognizance" (adding the suffixes –''tā'' or –''tva'' to the former terms), with the latter indicating the actual nature of the former, that is, the nondual dharmadhātu or nonconceptual wisdom. Another way to put this is that ''cittamātra'' and so on usually just correspond to false imagination or the other-dependent nature, while ''cittamātratā'' and such refer to its true nature―the perfect nature.
Also, as Sthiramati states in his introduction to the ''Triṃśikābhāṣya'', one of the main objectives of the ''Triṃśikā'' is to help those who do not correctly understand ''cittamātra'', due to their attachment to the supposed reality of persons and phenomena, to fully realize the actuality of personal and phenomenal identitylessness in order to accomplish the true fruition of the teaching of ''cittamātra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B2F-QINU`"' In general, Sthiramati explains that demonstrating that phenomena do not exist permanently (that is, as having an intrinsic nature of their own) means to avoid the extreme of superimposition, while to say that they are "mere cognizance" serves to avoid the extreme of utter denial. Thus, there is also a difference in Yogācāra texts between mind, consciousness, and cognizance on the one hand, and "mere mind," and so on on the other hand. Mind or consciousness stands for the delusive activity of mental construction itself as well as the fictional reality it constructs, while "mere mind" and so on denote the realization that this supposed reality is not ultimately real, but only the plethora of one's own ongoing mental chatter. Thus, on the path, what appears as one's personal projected universe of the false duality of subject and object is first reduced to seeing the projector of this illusory world―one's very own mind, called "false imagination," "''cittamātra''," or "the other-dependent nature." Then, once the "bare structure" of the latter without the overlay of delusional fictions (the imaginary nature) is seen, the truth of ''cittamātra'' is realized, since to realize the true nature of false imagination or the other-dependent nature as always being free from such overlay is called the attainment of the perfect nature, which is nothing but the nonconceptual wisdom of seeing the ultimate essence of the other-dependent nature. This is also the attainment of suchness, the dharmadhātu, and so on as the final true realization of ''cittamātra''. Hsüan-tsang states in his ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'':
<blockquote>Since ''citta'' and ''caittas'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B30-QINU`"' depend on other things to arise (paratantra), they are like a magician's trick, not truly substantial (“real”) entities. But so as to oppose false attachments to the view that external to ''citta'' and ''caittas'' there are perceptual-objects (ching, ''viśaya'') [composed of] real, substantial entities, we say that the only existent is consciousness. But if you become attached to the view that ''vijñapti-mātra'' is something truly real and existent, that's the same as being attached to external perceptual-objects, i.e., it becomes just another dharma-attachment [and definitely not liberating].'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B31-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Paramārtha says the following in his commentary on verses 17–18 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'':
<blockquote>What does it mean to establish the principle of Consciousness-Only? The meaning, fundamentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense with the mind. Now if the objective world does not exist, Consciousness-Only would also be destroyed. This is what I mean by "the principle of Consciousness-Only is upheld." This is called the pure component [of consciousness] because both defilements and the objective world do not exist [in the system of Consciousness-Only]. . . .<br>For this reason, outside of consciousness no events can take place. This is why it is called the impure component, for only the prior sense object is dispensed with but not consciousness itself. . . .<br>Q: If one dispenses with sense objects but retains consciousness, then one can say that there is a principle of Consciousness-Only. But if both the sense object and consciousness are to be dispensed with, how can consciousness [of any kind] be maintained?
A: One establishes that Consciousness-Only temporarily dispenses with the sense object but retains the [existence of] mind. In the final analysis, however, one dispenses with sense objects in order to empty the mind. This is the correct meaning. Therefore, [when] both the sense object and consciousness are dissolved, this principle is upheld. [When] both the sense object and consciousness are dissolved, this [state] is identical to the true nature [tattva or tathatā]. The true nature is identical to Pure Consciousness (''amala-vijñāna''). Additionally, we can say in the final analysis that this is Pure Consciousness.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B32-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In his comments on verses 21–22 and 28,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B33-QINU`"' Paramārtha repeats his stance of ''cittamātra'' meaning the nonexistence of both objects and consciousness. On verses 23–25, where the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the perfect natures are described as the threefold lack of nature (see below), he concludes that the principle of ''cittamātra'' is explained in order to indicate this threefold lack of nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B34-QINU`"'
In the light of all this, it seems as (un)justified to call the Yogācāra School "Mind-Only School" or "Mere Mentalism" (''sems tsam pa'') as it would be to refer to the Madhyamaka School as the "Name-Only School" (''ming tsam pa''). Just as the notions of ''cittamātra'' or ''vijñaptimātra'' play a significant role in the Yogācāra School, the notions of ''nāmamātra'' (name-only) and ''prajñaptimātra'' (imputation-only) play a significant role in Madhyamaka, describing the fact that all phenomena are merely nominal and imputed, but they neither represent the ultimate or most essential feature of Madhyamaka, nor encompass its much larger scope. Rather, all the above notions are explicitly to be transcended in their respective systems and not to be reified, or even to be put forth as ultimate reality. In fact, all four standard Indian Buddhist schools (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka) were named after their most essential or encompassing features and not after something that they themselves explain to be relinquished.
====Mind's Play Has Many Faces====
In Yogācāra texts, false imas also true for most other notions, such as the skandhas, in Buddhism in general), it cannot be overemphasized that what is described are dynamic processes and not any kinds of static entities or states. Thus, when Yogācāras speak about two, three, or eight consciousnesses (or three natures, five wisdoms, and three kāyas, for that matter), they in no way mean two, three, or eight distinct "minds," or even just static properties of a single mind. Rather, different numbers of consciousness stand for different functions of the mind, all of which operate as momentarily impermanent and changing processes (like constantly moving, changing, and interacting currents in the ocean), none of which is truly existent. ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.3 speaks of mind displaying as all kinds of seeming expressions in terms of subject and object:
<blockquote>Consciousness arises as the appearance of referents,<br>Sentient beings, a self, and cognizance,<br>[But] it does not have an [external] referent.<br>Since that does not exist, it does not exist either.</blockquote>
''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.9 specifies the subjective side of this further:
<blockquote>A single one is the conditioning consciousness.<br>The remaining entail experience.<br>Experience, delimitation,<br>And setting in motion are the mental factors.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B35-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Thus, there are two main kinds of consciousness―the ālaya-consciousness, as the most basic ground of mind, and the other seven consciousnesses that operate out of this ground and engage their respective objects (which are also nothing but different aspects of this basic ground). According to the ''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya'', the ālaya-consciousness is the "conditioning consciousness," because it is the foundation of all other consciousnesses, which entail experiencing their respective objects. Among mental factors, feeling refers to pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent experiences; discrimination delimits the characteristics of objects; and the other mental factors set consciousness in motion to engage objects.
Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' presents a threefold model of the dynamic evolution or display of saṃsāric mind:
<blockquote>[Mind's] behavior in terms of self and phenomena<br>Operates in many different ways<br>In the modulation of consciousness.<br>This modulation is threefold―</blockquote>
<blockquote>Maturation, what is called "thinking,"<br>And the cognition of objects.<br>Here, maturation is the "ālaya-consciousness,"<br>Which contains all the seeds.<br>. . .<br>What operates by resting on the [ālaya-consciousness]<br>Is the consciousness called "mentation,"<br>Which has it as its focal object, its nature being self-centeredness.</blockquote>
<blockquote>It is always associated with the four afflictions,<br>And obscured yet neutral.<br>. . . <br>This is the second modulation.<br>The third is the observation<br>Of the six kinds of objects . . .'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B36-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Thus, Vasubandhu's three basic modulations (''pariṇāma'') of consciousness are the ālaya-consciousness, the afflicted mind,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B37-QINU`"' and the remaining six consciousnesses (the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness). In Yogācāra texts, these are also referred to as the triad of "mind" (Skt. citta, Tib. sems), "mentation" (Skt. manas, Tib. yid),'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B38-QINU`"' and "consciousness" (Skt. vijñāna, Tib. rnam shes), respectively. As for the eight consciousnesses, they are described in detail in AC and NYC below, which also provide copious quotations. So, to highlight some of the essential features here, the ālaya-consciousness is nothing but the sum total of the virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral tendencies that make up the mind stream of a sentient being. Thus, it is not like a container separate from its contents, but resembles the constant flow of all the water drops that are labeled "a river." In other words, there is no other underlying, permanent substratum or entity apart from the momentary mental impulses that constitute this ever-changing stream of various latent mental tendencies. Due to certain conditions—mainly the stirring of the afflicted mind (comparable to stirring by a wind or strong current)—various momentary appearances of subject and object manifest. What seem to be external (objects), internal (mind and the sense faculties), or both (the body) are not so, but just different aspects of the ālaya-consciousness appearing as if close or far. Right after each moment of this dualistic interaction of subjects and objects, the imprints created by them merge back into—or are "stored"—in the ālaya, just as waves on the surface of a river emerge from and remerge into it, every time interacting and criss-crossing with other such waves, and thus changing the overall current. In this way, the ālaya-consciousness is both the cause for saṃsāric appearances and their result, that is, their imprints that reemerge later. This does not mean that the ālaya actively creates anything, it is just the dynamic network of various causes and conditions interacting, which is otherwise known as dependent origination. In this way, it is said to be equivalent to fundamental ignorance and the karma accumulated by it, thus serving as the basis for all appearances and experiences in saṃsāra, which at the same time represent the sum of all factors to be relinquished in order to attain nirvāṇa. Thus, the ālaya-consciousness fully ceases to exist only upon the attainment of buddhahood. As the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' and others say, because of all of this, it is not to be misconceived as an ātman or a creator.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B39-QINU`"'
The afflicted mind is simply another expression for mind not recognizing its own nature. Technically speaking, it is the consciousness that solely focuses inwardly and thus mistakes the empty aspect of the ālaya-consciousness as being a self and its lucid aspect as what is "other." It is said to be so close to the ālaya that it misperceives it in this way, very much like when one cannot see a table clearly or even recognize it as a table, when one presses one's eye against its surface. Usually, we think that not seeing or recognizing something is due to being too far away from it, but, as in this example, the afflicted mind is the most fundamental case of not recognizing something due to being too close to it. This is the starting point of fundamental subject-object duality, which then ramifies into the appearances of the remaining six consciousnesses and their objects, all of them being constantly filtered and afflicted through this basic self-concern. Thus, these consciousnesses are always accompanied by the three primary mental afflictions (desire for what seems pleasurable, aversion toward what seems unpleasurable, and indifference toward what seems to be neither) as well as countless secondary mental disturbances based on these afflictions. Karmic actions (trying to obtain what seems desirable and get rid of what seems not) ensue, inevitably leading to various kinds of suffering sooner or later. Thus, the wheel of saṃsāra spins.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3A-QINU`"' Asaṅga's ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' describes "mentation" as follows:
<blockquote>Among those [consciousnesses], mentation is twofold. Since it is the support that acts as the immediate condition, the “mentation which is [any] consciousness that has just ceased” is the support for [the arising of] consciousness. The second is the afflicted mind, which is always congruently associated'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3B-QINU`"' with the four afflictions of the views about a real personality, self-conceit, attachment to the self, and ignorance. This is the support for the afflictedness of consciousness. [Thus,] consciousness is produced by virtue of the first [aspect of mentation] as its support, while the second one makes it afflicted. [Mentation] is a consciousness, because it cognizes objects. Since it is [both] immediately preceding and self-centered, mentation has two aspects.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3C-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Thus, the part of mentation that is the afflicted mind constantly entails a set of four subtle afflictions. Just as is the afflicted mind itself, these four are largely instinctive and unconscious, with any conscious thinking such as, "I am so and so" belonging to the conceptual part of the sixth consciousness, which superimposes more conscious and coarse layers of ego-clinging, based on the gut-level sense of "me" that constitutes the afflicted mind. Being a consciousness, it is moreover constantly associated with the five neutral omnipresent mental factors: impulse, feeling, discrimination, contact, and mental engagement (as is the ālaya-consciousness). However, despite being accompanied by these four afflictions, in itself, the afflicted mind is neutral in the sense of being neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous. For example, if we think, "I will help my sick mother," the ensuing action will be virtuous, and if we think, "I will kill someone," the ensuing action will be nonvirtuous. Still, in both cases, the clinging to "I" is the same. Thus, the very fact that the afflicted mind is essentially neutral makes it at all possible to accumulate virtue (at least in its still-contaminated form), despite one's grasping at a self. Finally, however, since the afflicted mind―the grasping at "me" and "mine"―is the root of all other afflictions, such as desire and anger, it must be relinquished. In other words, since this clinging to a self is the opposite of the prajñā that realizes the lack of a self, it obscures liberation from saṃsāra.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3D-QINU`"'
As for the term "mentation," despite being primarily used for the afflicted mind in Yogācāra texts, it is also generally used for the mental-sense faculty (equivalent to the immediate condition) as well as the sixth consciousness. Matters are further complicated by texts that provide overlapping descriptions and functions of all these terms. When the Indian Yogācāra texts (as does the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' above) speak of the "immediate condition," they discuss it as either being related to the afflicted mind (as above), or in the context of the four conditions (causal, dominant, immediate, and object condition). Thus, the commentaries on the above quote from the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' say that the first kind of mentation corresponds to the "dhātu of mentation" and the "āyatana of mentation" (as in the ''Abhidharmakośa''), there being thus no mentation distinct from the six consciousnesses―any one of these six having just ceased is mentation. The first five consciousnesses have the five physical sense faculties as their supports, but the sixth consciousness does not have such a support. Consequently, in order to attribute a support to this consciousness too, mentation (or the mental-sense faculty) is what serves as its support (which is nothing but a previous moment of any one of the six consciousnesses having ceased and thus triggering the next one). In relation to the mental consciousness which immediately follows one of these consciousnesses that have just passed, they serve as its immediate condition and the support for its arising. It is in this sense that Sthiramati's commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.42 says that the arising of the mental consciousness relies on the afflicted mind, just as the arising of an eye consciousness relies on the eye sense faculty. Also, Sthiramati's ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya'' states:
<blockquote>Any one of the six consciousnesses, such as the eye [consciousness], that has ceased is present as the entity which is the support for the arising of the immediately following consciousnesses. Therefore, since they function as the supports for the immediately following minds, they are called "mentation." . . . The immediate condition is consciousness immediately upon its having ceased.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3E-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Guṇaprabha's ''Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa'' says:
<blockquote>As for [mentation] "functioning as a mental support," this refers to what is present in being the six operating consciousnesses. As [''Abhidharmakośa'' I.17ab] explains:</blockquote>
<blockquote>Mentation is the consciousness<br>Immediately after [any of] the six [consciousnesses] have passed.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Any of these [six] having ceased is what is called "mentation." For example, a certain son is called the "father" of someone else, and a certain fruition is called the "seed" of something else. Likewise, when the six results that consist of the operating consciousnesses having ceased serve as the support for the arising of other [subsequent] consciousnesses, they are referred to as "functioning as mental supports.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B3F-QINU`"'"</blockquote>
Thus, "mentation" can either designate the mental-sense faculty (which equals the immediate condition), the afflicted mind, or the seventh consciousness as consisting of both the afflicted mind and the immediate condition (or immediate mind).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B40-QINU`"' However, in specific Yogācāra terminology, what mentation actually refers to is only the afflicted mind. As Sthiramati comments on Vasubandhu's ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa'':
<blockquote>"In actual fact, mentation is what focuses on the ālaya-consciousness" means that the afflicted mind permanently focuses on the ālaya-consciousness as being a self, because it is congruently associated with focusing on a self in terms of being ignorant about it, [entertaining] views about it, being proud of it, and being attached to it. It always exists by virtue of having the character of self-centeredness. In actual fact, this is what is called "mentation." To refer to [the state of] consciousness immediately upon the six collections of consciousnesses, such as the eye [consciousness], having ceased as "mentation" is in order to establish [this state] as the location of [the arising of] the sixth―the mental―consciousness, but not because it has the aspect of self-centeredness. Therefore, in actual fact, it is not mentation per se.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B41-QINU`"'</blockquote>
As the ''Abhidharmasamucchaya'' and many other texts explain, the afflicted mind is the ever-present ego-clinging in saṃsāric beings and even in those on the Buddhist path of learning:
<blockquote>Except for when the path [of seeing] has become manifest [in one's mind stream], in the meditative absorption of cessation,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B42-QINU`"' and the level of nonlearning, it is always present in virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral states.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B43-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In terms of the hīnayāna path, this means that the afflicted mind is not present in the meditative equipoises of all noble beings from stream-enterers up through arhats, since the realization of the ultimate is incompatible with views about a self, and since arhats have relinquished all afflicted phenomena of the three realms.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B44-QINU`"' In terms of the mahāyāna path, the afflicted mind is out of function during the meditative equipoises of bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi onward, because both personal and phenomenal identitylessness are directly realized. However, by virtue of habitual latent tendencies, it still operates during the subsequent attainment of the first seven bhūmis (therefore, they are called "impure”). On the eighth bhūmi, the afflicted mind is fully relinquished. From a mahāyāna perspective, the afflicted mind is inactive in the meditative equipoise of arhats with remainder, but its latent tendencies still show in their phases of subsequent attainment. In arhats without remainder, these tendencies are not manifest, since such arhats are in constant meditative equipoise. However, together with the remaining cognitive obscurations, they constitute what the mahāyāna calls "the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance."
There is not much to say on the remaining six consciousnesses, except for the sixth one being explained as twofold in the teachings on valid cognition (''pramāṇa''). These two are the (more commonly known) thinking mind and what is called "mental valid perception." The latter refers to the part of the sixth consciousness that, like the five sense consciousnesses, is able to directly perceive sense objects (such as visible forms) upon being triggered by a preceding moment of sense consciousness (such as a visual consciousness). Together with the five sense consciousnesses, mental perception represents the outwardly oriented consciousnesses, while the thinking mind focuses on (more or less) conceptual mental images, which may or may not be triggered by preceding sense perceptions (such as seeing, reading, or hearing about something, and then thinking about it).
In general, it is said that the sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness are "unstable" consciousnesses, that is, they do not operate at all times (such as when being fast asleep). The afflicted mind and the ālaya-consciousness are "stable" (they operate even during deep sleep and coma). However, in certain meditative states, even the afflicted mind temporarily sinks back into the ālaya-consciousness, but rearises from it once one rises from such meditations. In a way, the ālaya-consciousness can be understood as referring to nothing but the ever-unimpeded underlying stream of the vivid clarity aspect of mind, otherwise mind would be like a stone, or would have to be switched on again out of nothing upon waking up in the morning, or coming out of a coma or deep meditation.
Several texts by Paramārtha speak about the ''amalavijñāna'' ("pure or stainless consciousness") as a ninth kind of consciousness.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B45-QINU`"' It refers to the unconditioned, changeless, permanent mind unaffected by any impurities, identical with suchness as the ultimate. This ''amalavijñāna'' is said to be the foundation of the Buddhist path, while the ālaya-consciousness is the foundation of all defilements and eventually eliminated. Paramārtha also equates this ''amalavijñāna'' with suchness, nonconceptual wisdom, and mind's luminosity. He says that it is unmistaken and free from both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures (which comprise the manifestations of mistaken consciousness), thus being reminiscent of typical ''shentong'' positions.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B46-QINU`"'
====Mind Operates on Three Levels====
The three "natures" or "characteristics" are the main Yogācāra pedagogic template to explain mind's operational modes when deluded and undeluded. They are the imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the perfect nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B47-QINU`"' In Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese texts, one finds a great number of sometimes very different presentations of what these three natures are and how they are interrelated.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B48-QINU`"' However, if one keeps in mind that all of these models describe processes rather than three clearly separate and fixed things or realities, their descriptions are not contradictory, but just emphasize different aspects of the same dynamics. For example, it is much easier to describe the features of a book, a CD, or a flower that lie still in front of oneself than the ever-changing and interacting movements of waves on the ocean. The fluid character of all three natures is shown in the following passages from the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'':
<blockquote>In one sense, the other-dependent nature is other-dependent; in another sense, it is imaginary; and in yet another sense, it is perfect. In what sense is the other-dependent nature called "other-dependent”? It is other-dependent in that it originates from the seeds of other-dependent latent tendencies. In what sense is it called "imaginary”? Because it is both the cause of [false] imagination and what is imagined by it. In what sense is it called "perfect”? Because it does not at all exist in the way it is imagined.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B49-QINU`"'</blockquote>
and
<blockquote>Thus, in terms of its imaginary aspect, this very other-dependent nature is saṃsāra. In terms of its perfect aspect, it is nirvāṇa.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4A-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In this vein, the other-dependent nature is the process or experiential structure in which the world presents itself as a seeming (delusive) reality for beings whose minds have a dualistic perceptual structure (which is the imaginary nature). The perfect nature is the underlying fundamental process or structure of mind's true nature and its own expressions as they are unwarped by said dualistic perceptual structure. In more technical terms, the other-dependent nature is the basic "stuff" or stratum of which all our saṃsāric experiences and appearances consist. It is the mistaken imagination that appears as the unreal entities of subject and object, because these are appearances under the sway of something "other," that is, triggered by the latent tendencies of ignorance. The other-dependent nature appears as the outer world with its various beings and objects; as one's own body; as the sense consciousnesses that perceive these objects and the conceptual consciousness that thinks about them; as the clinging to a personal self and real phenomena; and as the mental events, such as feelings, that accompany all these consciousnesses. Thus, false imagination is what creates the basic split of bare experience into seemingly real perceivers that apprehend seemingly real objects. The duality of subject and object—the imaginary nature—does not even exist on the level of seeming reality, but the mind that creates this split does exist and functions on this level. However, the other-dependent nature in no way exists ultimately, since the Yogācāra texts repeatedly describe it as illusionlike and so on, and also state that it is to be relinquished, while the perfect nature is what is to be revealed (see below).
The imaginary nature covers the entire range of what is superimposed―consciously or unconsciously―by false imagination onto the various appearances of the other-dependent nature. This starts from the most basic gut-level sense of subject-object duality―the very fact that, for example, sense objects naturally seem to appear to be "out there" and the perceiver is "here”; people naturally thinking and instinctively acting in terms of "me" and "others”; and standard notions such as "me and my body," or "me and my mind," all of which represent the imaginary nature. Progressively coarser levels of mistaken overlay include more reified conscious notions of a self and really existent phenomena up through the most rigid belief systems about what we and the world are. In other words, what appear as one's own body and mind form the bases for imputing a personal self. What appear as other beings, outer objects, and the consciousnesses that relate to them provide the bases for imputing really existent phenomena. In detail, the imaginary nature includes the aspects that appear as conceptual objects (such as the mental image of a form); the connections of names and referents (the notion that a name is the corresponding referent and the mistaking of a referent for the corresponding name); all that is apprehended through mental superimposition (such as direction, time, outer, inner, big, small, good, bad, and so on); and all nonentities (such as space). All of these exist only conventionally, as nominal objects for the dualistic consciousnesses of ordinary sentient beings, but are not established as really existent. ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIII.17 says:
<blockquote>Just as there are neither depths nor heights<br>In a perfect painting, but are seen there,<br>There is never any duality in any respect<br>In false imagination, but it is seen there.</blockquote>
The perfect nature is emptiness in the sense that what appears as other-dependent false imagination is primordially never established as the imaginary nature. As the ultimate object and the true nature of the other-dependent nature, this emptiness is the sphere of nonconceptual wisdom, and it is nothing other than phenomenal identitylessness. It is called "perfect," because it never changes into something else, is the supreme among all dharmas, and is the focal object of prajñā during the process of purifying the mind from adventitious stains. Since the dharmas of the noble ones are attained through realizing it, it is called "dharmadhātu." By virtue of its quality of never changing into something else, it is termed "suchness." Just as space, it is without any distinctions, but conventionally, the perfect nature may be presented as twofold—the unchanging perfect nature (suchness) and the unmistaken perfect nature (the nondual nonconceptual wisdom that realizes this suchness). At times, the perfect nature is also equated with the luminous nature of mind free from adventitious stains, or buddha nature. The ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' characterizes the three natures as follows:
<blockquote>"In this . . . very extensive teaching of the mahāyāna . . ., how should the imaginary nature be understood?" It should be understood through the teachings on the synonyms of nonexistents. "How should the other-dependent nature be understood?" It should be understood to be like an illusion, a mirage, an optical illusion, a reflection, an echo, [the reflection of] the moon in water, and a magical creation. "How should the perfect nature be understood?" It should be understood through the teachings on the four kinds of pure dharmas. As for these four kinds of pure dharmas, (1) natural purity means suchness, emptiness, the true end, signlessness, and the ultimate. Also the dharmadhātu is just this. (2) Unstained purity refers to [the state of] this very [natural purity] not having any obscurations. (3) The purity of the path to attain this [unstained purity] consists of all the dharmas concordant with enlightenment, such as the pāramitās. (4) The pure object in order to generate this [path] is the teaching of the genuine dharma of the mahāyāna. In this way, since this [dharma] is the cause for purity, it is not the imaginary [nature]. Since it is the natural outflow of the pure dharmadhātu, it is not the other-dependent [nature either]. All completely pure dharmas are included in these four kinds [of purity].'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4B-QINU`"'</blockquote>
As in this passage, many Yogācāra texts emphasize the unreal nature of the other-dependent nature and that it is definitely not the ultimate existent.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4C-QINU`"' Nevertheless, the other-dependent nature's lack of reality does not prevent the mere appearance and functioning of various seeming manifestations for the mind. The ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' continues:
<blockquote>Why is the other-dependent nature taught in such a way as being like an illusion and so on? In order to eliminate the mistaken doubts of others about the other-dependent nature. . . . In order to eliminate the doubts of those others who think, "How can nonexistents become objects?" it is [taught] to be like an illusion. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can mind and mental events arise without [outer] referents?" it is [taught] to be like a mirage. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can likes and dislikes be experienced if there are no referents?" it is [taught] to be like a dream. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can the desired and undesired results of positive and negative actions be accomplished?" it is [taught] to be like a reflection. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can various consciousnesses arise if there are no referents?" it is [taught to be] like an optical illusion. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can various conventional expressions come about if there are no referents?" it is [taught] to be like an echo. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can the sphere of the meditative concentration that apprehends true actuality come about?" it is [taught] to be like [a reflection of] the moon in water. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can unerring bodhisattvas be reborn as they wish in order to accomplish their activity for sentient beings?" it is [taught] to be like a magical creation.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4D-QINU`"'</blockquote>
These passages also highlight that the template of the three natures is not so much an ontological model, but primarily a soteriological one. This is also expressed in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' on XIX.77–78, which says that the realization of the three natures is the special realization of bodhisattvas. As Nguyen says:
<blockquote>The close association between ontology and soteriology is indeed one of the distinctive features of Buddhism as a whole, and a topic that was given a most thorough analytical treatment in the Yogācāra tradition. . . . In fact, from the perspective of Mahāyāna Buddhism in general and the Yogācāra School in particular, the realization of Reality in itself implies the attainment of enlightenment, that is, nirvana, or in other words, the attainment of buddhahood. This is because in Mahāyāna Buddhology, buddhahood is synonymous with Ultimate or True Reality. Put differently, within the Yogācāra world view, ontological realization is not different from soteriological attainment. Thus the realization of True Reality in this context is more than just an ontological insight into reality; it also carries broader implications and ramifications from the practical perspective of soteriology.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4E-QINU`"'</blockquote>
This becomes even clearer when the three natures are also referred to as "lack of nature" and "emptiness." The ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' says:
<blockquote>When scrutinized with insight,<br>Neither the dependent, nor the imaginary,<br>Nor the perfect [natures] exist.<br>So how could insight imagine any entity?'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B4F-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The way in which ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.50–51 speaks about the lack of nature of all phenomena in general sounds exactly like what is found in prajñāpāramitā or Madhyamaka texts:
<blockquote>Because [phenomena] do not exist as themselves or through an identity of their own,<br>Do not dwell in a nature of their own,<br>And do not exist as they are apprehended,<br>Their lack of nature is asserted.</blockquote>
<blockquote>The lack of nature establishes,<br>With each one being the basis of the following one,<br>Nonarising, nonceasing,<br>Primordial peace, and parinirvāṇa.</blockquote>
More specifically, the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra's'' seventh chapter speaks at length about the lack of nature in terms of characteristics, the lack of nature in terms of arising, and the ultimate lack of nature as representing the imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect natures, respectively. Asaṅga's ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣya'' says that this threefold lack of nature is taught as a remedy for four wrong ideas about the meaning of what is taught through the lack of nature in general. For example, it is a misconception to think that the lack of nature is mere nonexistence, or to believe that what is without nature cannot arise even as a mere appearance on the level of seeming reality.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B50-QINU`"'
In its discussions on establishing the mahāyāna sūtras as the words of the Buddha, chapters 3 and 4 of Vasubandhu's ''Vyākhyāyukti'' not only defend the prajñāpāramitā sūtras against the charge of nihilism, but point out that these sūtras themselves criticize nihilism as the activity of māras'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B51-QINU`"' and that their key notion "lack of nature" is not to be understood literally in the sense of nothing existing at all. Rather, it has to be interpreted in the correct way, which is accomplished through the threefold lack of nature as presented in the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B52-QINU`"' In particular, the lack of nature of all phenomena must be clarified in this way in order to relinquish the extremes of superimposition and denial, that is, in order to (1) prevent childish beings from clinging to the existence of the imaginary nature and (2) prevent those who do not understand, when just the main points are being discussed, from clinging to the nonexistence of those phenomena whose nature it is to be inexpressible. When discussing the levels and modes of existence of what are described by the three natures themselves, the ''Vyākhyāyukti'' matches them with the framework of the two realities:
<blockquote>It may be said, "The Bhagavat taught in the ''Pāramārthaśūnyatā[sūtra]'', 'Both karmic actions and their maturations exist, but an agent is not observable.''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B53-QINU`"' How is this [statement to be understood]―in terms of the ultimate or the seeming? . . . If it is in terms of the ultimate, how could all phenomena lack a nature? If it is in terms of the seeming, it should not be said that an agent is not observable, since an agent too exists on the level of the seeming." To start, [one needs to know] what this "seeming" and what the ultimate is. By virtue of this, one will know what exists on the level of the seeming and what exists ultimately. Some [śrāvakas] may say, "The seeming consists of names, expressions, designations, and conventions, while the specific characteristics of phenomena are the ultimate." However, in this case, since both karmic actions and their maturations exist as both names and specific characteristics, [whether they pertain to the ultimate or not] depends on one's concept of existence, [that is, on] how one asserts these two [―karma and maturation―as being either names or specifically characterized phenomena].</blockquote>
<blockquote>I hold that a person is something that exists on the level of the seeming, but not as something substantial, because it is [just a] name that is labeled onto the skandhas. Karmic actions and their maturations exist substantially on the level of the seeming, but do not exist ultimately, because they are the objects of mundane cognition. [''Paramārtha'' means] being the object of the ultimate, because the ultimate (''parama'') is supramundane wisdom and it is the object (''artha'') of the latter.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B54-QINU`"' The specific characteristics of the [above] two [karmic actions and their maturations] are not the sphere of this [wisdom], since its sphere is the inexpressible general characteristic [that is suchness]. Here, you may wonder, "Is it mundane cognition or supramundane [wisdom] that represents valid cognition?" There is only one [ultimately valid cognition]―supramundane [wisdom]. Mundane cognition has divisions―being attained subsequently to supramundane [wisdom], it is not [ultimate] valid cognition. [Needless to say then that any] other [cognitions] are not valid cognition [either]. Thus, this accords with a verse of the Mahāsaṅghikas:</blockquote>
<blockquote>Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,<br>Nor is the tongue, the body, or mentation valid cognition.<br>If these sense faculties were valid cognition,<br>Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B55-QINU`"'</blockquote>
<blockquote>. . . If one speaks about "the seeming" and states that "what accords with afflicted phenomena is explained as flaws" and "what accords with purified phenomena is explained to be excellent" [and yet claims that] these are nothing but mere verbiage, how could one explain anything to be excellent, explain anything as a flaw, or actually accept any seeming phenomena without doubt? In other words, if these too were [utterly] nonexistent, how could [the Buddha] speak of existence on the level of the seeming? Through denying all afflicted and purified phenomena, one could not express anything, since one would not abide in [knowing] what is the case and what is not the case and moreover refute one's own statements.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B56-QINU`"'</blockquote>
This points to two of the main misconceptions that explain why the Yogācāras saw a need to interpret the message of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in terms of the three natures. Obviously, since these sūtras themselves teach one to reject what is afflicted and practice or adopt what is pure, in terms of the path, it makes no sense to simply take emptiness as meaning that nothing whatsoever exists on any level of reality, because then there is nothing to adopt or to reject. Thus, given the emptiness of all phenomena on the ultimate level, the existence of skandhas, karmic actions, a person, adopting, rejecting, and so on can only be, and must be accepted on, the level of seeming reality. However, within that level, one needs to further distinguish clearly between mere imaginary labels (such as the person) and the functional phenomena (such as skandhas and actions) that are taken as the bases for such labeling and perform the functions to be worked with on the path, even though both do not exist ultimately (neither does the path that nevertheless leads to the realization of the ultimate). Thus, verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' state:
<blockquote>Based on the three kinds of lack of nature<br>Of the three kinds of nature,<br>It is taught that all phenomena<br>Are without nature.</blockquote>
<blockquote>The first one lacks a nature<br>In terms of characteristics; the next one<br>Lacks existence on its own,<br>And the following is the lack of nature as such.</blockquote>
Sthiramati's commentary explains:
<blockquote>"The first one" is the imaginary nature. It "lacks a nature in terms of characteristics," because its characteristics are imputed. [For example,] form has the characteristic of form, feeling has the characteristic of experience, and so on. Thus, since [the imaginary nature] has no character of its own (''svarūpa''), just as a sky-flower, it is the lack of nature of any character of its own. "The next one" refers to the other-dependent nature. It does not exist by itself (''na svayaṃbhāva''), because it arises through other conditions, just as an illusion. Thus, as shown, there is no arising of it, which is why it is referred to as "the lack of nature in terms of arising." Because the perfect nature is the ultimate of all phenomena, which are other-dependent in nature, it is referred to as their true nature (''dharmatā''). Therefore, the perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature, because the nature of the perfect [nature] is to not be any entity (''abhāvasvabhāvatvāt'').'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B57-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In brief, just as when mistaking the moving colors and shapes in a movie for a story line with actual persons with all their emotions and so on, the imaginary nature stands for the illusory display of dualistic appearances that actually do not exist in the first place, let alone having any characteristics of their own. Therefore, it is called "the lack of nature in terms of characteristics." Just as the mere movement of said shapes and colors on the screen, the other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances which means that they appear in an illusionlike manner, but are without any nature of their own and do not "really" arise. Thus, the other-dependent nature is called "the lack of nature in terms of arising." The perfect nature is "the ultimate lack of nature," which has two aspects. First, although there is no personal identity, the perfect nature is what functions as the path that remedies the notion of a personal identity. Just as an illusory ship can be used to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means to cross the ocean of saṃsāra to the other shore of nirvāṇa. In terms of dependent origination, this remedial or path aspect is actually contained within the other-dependent nature, but since it is the cause for realizing the ultimate, it is included in the category of "the ultimate lack of nature." The second aspect of the perfect nature is the one by virtue of which enlightenment is attained through actively engaging in it and is undifferentiable from phenomenal identitylessness. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever (just as the colors and shapes in a movie are nothing but the display of photons, which are ultimately unfindable). This aspect is "the ultimate lack of nature" per se. Note, however, that, while the Madhyamaka system greatly tends to speak only about the objective side of this "ultimate lack of nature," the Yogācāra tradition also emphasizes its subjective side. In other words, the lack of nature or emptiness is not just limited to being something like the bare fact of said photons being unfindable, but there is an awareness or experience of this very fact. Needless to say, for Yogācāras too, the true realization of the ultimate lack of nature also entails the emptiness or unfindability of that very experience, but any realization of this has to happen in the mind―it is not just an abstract fact like a mathematical equation at which no one looks. Fundamentally, all phenomena, including one's mind, have always been, are, and will be empty, but this fact alone makes nobody a buddha, unless it is made into an incontrovertible, all-pervasive, and personal experience of boundless freedom and compassion and is as natural an outlook informing all one's actions as it is for ordinary beings to experience themselves and the world as real, dualistic, and suffering.
Regarding emptiness understood in terms of the three natures, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIV.34 says:
<blockquote>If one knows the emptiness of the nonexistent,<br>Likewise the emptiness of the existent,<br>And also natural emptiness,<br>Then this is expressed as "knowing emptiness."</blockquote>
On the level of seeming reality, the imaginary nature is just nominally existent, while the other-dependent nature is substantially existent in the sense of what conventionally performs functions. The perfect nature does not exist in any of these two ways, but is the ultimate incontrovertible state of mind experiencing its own true nature. Again, by definition, this personally experienced wisdom is in itself completely without any reference points, such as it existing or not existing. For these reasons, the imaginary nature is also called "the emptiness of the nonexistent”; the other-dependent nature, "the emptiness of the existent”; and the perfect nature, "the ultimate or natural emptiness." Thus, as mentioned above, the three natures not only accord with the prajñāpāramitā notions of emptiness and the lack of nature, but moreover serve as progressive stages of the transition from utter delusion to the undeluded wisdom of a buddha with all its qualities. Nguyen says:
<blockquote>As an elaboration of the teaching of the Middle Path, the concept of the three identities may be compared to the Madhyamaka School's concept of Emptiness (''śūnyatā''). Śūnyatā is a hermeneutic concept used to deconstruct the reification of all the constituent factors and processes that are thought to make up the reality of persons and phenomena. The three identities concept not only accomplishes a deconstruction of these factors, but also reveals a realization of their true nature (''tathatā'') replete with positive implications from the perspectives of both epistemology and soteriology.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B58-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Thus, just as in the case of the notion of ''cittamātra'' above, the three natures are to be practically and progressively engaged as the bodhisattva path, with each one to be transcended by the following one. As the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' says:
<blockquote>How should one engage in [appearances as being mere cognizance]? . . . One engages in this just like in the case of a rope appearing as a snake in a dark house. Since a snake does not exist, [to see it] in the rope is mistaken. Those who realize [that the rope] is its referent have turned away from the cognition of [seeing] a snake where there is none and dwell in the cognition of [apprehending] a rope. [However,] when regarded in a subtle way, such is also mistaken, since [a rope] consists of [nothing but] the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and what can be touched. [Thus,] based on the cognition of [seeing color] and so on, the cognition of [apprehending] a rope has to be discarded too. Likewise, based on the cognition of [seeing] the perfect nature, . . . also the cognition of mere cognizance is to be dissolved. . . . Through engaging in mere cognizance, one engages in the other-dependent nature.<br>How does one engage in the perfect nature? One engages in it by dissolving the notion of mere cognizance too. . . . Therefore, there is not even an appearance of [phenomena] as mere cognizance. When bodhisattvas . . . dwell in the dharmadhātu in an immediate way, what is observed and what observes are equal in these bodhisattvas. In consequence, what springs forth [in them] is equal nonconceptual wisdom. In this way, such bodhisattvas engage in the perfect nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B59-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The path quality of the three natures is also taught in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' III.9cd–10a:
<blockquote>In full understanding, relinquishing,<br>And attaining and revealing,<br>The reality of the path is fully explained.</blockquote>
Mipham Rinpoche comments on this as follows.
<blockquote>The imaginary [nature] is what is to be fully understood through the path, that is, it is to be understood that it does not exist as any entity. Therefore, it is taught [through the term "path" here] by way of designating the object through the name of the subject―the path. The other-dependent [nature] is what is to be relinquished through the path. This means that enlightenment is attained by virtue of false imagination, which entails dualistic appearances, becoming extinguished. Therefore, this corresponds to [line I.4d] in the chapter on the characteristics of afflicted phenomena above:</blockquote>
<blockquote>Its extinction is held to be liberation.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Therefore, to designate [the other-dependent nature] through the name "path" is a designation of what is to be relinquished through the name of the remedy. The perfect [nature] is explained as the path, because it is that which is to be attained and revealed. [In this case,] the cause is designated through the name of the result.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5A-QINU`"'</blockquote>
A similar statement is found in the opening lines of the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'':
<blockquote>After having understood, something is to be relinquished<br>And something else is to be revealed.</blockquote>
Also, the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' on XI.13 says:
<blockquote>True reality is always free from duality, the basis of mistakenness,<br>And inexpressible in every respect, having the nature of being free from reference points.<br>It is held to be what is to be understood, relinquished, and purified, though it is naturally stainless.<br>Its purity of afflictions is asserted to be like space, gold, or water.</blockquote>
The true reality being always free from duality refers to the imaginary nature, because it absolutely never exists as the characteristics of apprehender and apprehended. [True reality serving as] the basis of mistakenness refers to the other-dependent [nature], because it is what imagines this [duality of apprehender and apprehended]. The inexpressible [true reality], having the nature of being free from reference points, is the perfect nature. Here, the first true reality is what is to be fully understood; the second one is what is to be relinquished; and the third one is both what is to be purified from adventitious stains and naturally pure. In its natural purity, like space, gold, or water, it is pure of afflictions. Space and so on are neither naturally impure, nor is their purity not asserted [as being revealed] by virtue of adventitious stains disappearing.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5B-QINU`"'
Thus, one of the main reasons for speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to account for the process of mind progressing from its mistaken state to freedom, which―as far as the Buddhist path is concerned―takes place within the dependently originating structure of the other-dependent nature, realizing the nonexistence of the imaginary nature and revealing or becoming immersed in the perfect nature instead. Thus, from the perspective of the path, the imaginary nature is to be known for what it is―utterly nonexistent; the other-dependent nature is to be relinquished in the sense of mind ceasing to create dualistic appearances; and the perfect nature is that which is to be manifested or realized, which is just the true nature of the first two natures, once the other-dependent nature ceases to project the imaginary nature. In other words, in terms of the Buddhist path, the delusive complexities of the ontologically and epistemologically more fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent nature can be reduced to, or collapsed into, the underlying single ontologically and epistemologically stable structure of the perfect nature, which is simply uncovered. This is what is called "fundamental change of state" (see below). As should be clear, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the basic unmistakenness and irreversibility of this change of state.
To conclude this discussion of the three natures and to get a glimpse of the variety of explanations on the three natures, let's look at the four models that are presented in Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' on I.1.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5C-QINU`"'
<blockquote>False imagination exists.<br>
Duality is not present in it.<br>
But emptiness is present in it,<br>
And it is also present in this [emptiness].</blockquote>
<blockquote>[Model 1] . . . Some think, "All phenomena are without nature in every respect, just like the horns of a rabbit." Therefore, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." This is [to be] supplemented by the words, "by a nature of its own." "But in that case, since the sūtras state that all phenomena are empty, does this not contradict the sūtras?" There is no contradiction. For, [line I.1b] says, "Duality is not present in it." False imagination is said to be empty, because it is free from the nature of apprehender and apprehended, but it is not that it lacks a nature in every respect. Therefore, this does not contradict the sūtras. "But if duality does not exist in any respect, just as the horns of a rabbit, and false imagination exists ultimately by virtue of a nature of its own, then the nonexistence of emptiness would follow." It is not like that, because [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." Emptiness is the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended. Thus, emptiness does not become nonexistent. You may think, "But if nonduality is emptiness and it exists in false imagination, why are we not liberated? Also, given that it is present [in false imagination], why is it not apprehended?" In order to remove such doubts, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." Since false imagination is present in emptiness, You, sir, are not liberated. By virtue of possessing stains, unlike clear water, it is not suitable to be realized.</blockquote>
<blockquote>[Model 2] Or, some may regard forms and so on to exist substantially as something other than mind and mental factors. So in order to refute them, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists" means that this very [false imagination] is what exists substantially, but form exists neither as something separate from it, nor substantially. "What is the reason [for that]?" For, [line I.1b] says, "Duality is not present in it." False imagination is neither the apprehender of anything, nor is it apprehended by anything. "So what is it?" It is just sheer being, free from apprehender and apprehended. Since no form and so on is apprehended outside of consciousness, just as in a dream, consciousness arises appearing as form and so on. "But if its cause does not exist, its arising is not tenable." Therefore, the lack of focal object is just as in a dream. You should understand that consciousness appearing as referents also arises in other cases, [such as the waking state,] by virtue of its seeds maturing. Since there is no apprehender without something to be apprehended, it is not tenable for an apprehender to exist if there is nothing to be apprehended. Therefore, form and so on do not exist apart from false imagination. "However, by virtue of there being nothing to be apprehended, there is no pure object (''viśuddhyālambana'') [either], and thus no liberation." This is not the case. For, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." Here, the word "but" means "because." That is, precisely because emptiness is the pure object―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended―that exists in false imagination, it is not that there is no liberation. "But if it exists in false imagination, given that it is present [there], why is it not apprehended?" It is [only] by virtue of its being obscured through false imagination that it is not suitable to be apprehended like the stainless sky, but not by virtue of its being nonexistent. In order to teach that, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in emptiness."</blockquote>
<blockquote>[Model 3] Or, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." It is neither that all [phenomena] do not exist, nor is it that they have a real nature of their own―they exist as the nature of the modulations of consciousness. Some think, "Form and so on appear in just the way they appear, that is, through a nature of their own and as something separate from false imagination." In order to refute such superimpositions onto what is unreal, [Maitreya] retorts with [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." The intention here is that what is present is mere false imagination. Some apprehend the nonexistence of duality as having the nature of total extinction (''chedarūpa''), just as the son of a barren woman. Others say, "The freedom from an internal person as the agent (''antarvyāpārapuruṣa'') is the emptiness of phenomena." Therefore, in order to refute denials of emptiness and in order to teach true identitylessness (''bhūtanairātmya''), [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." "But if emptiness exists in false imagination, it consequently follows that all living beings would be liberated without any effort." This is not so, for [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." As long as emptiness is not purified, there is no liberation, and its being afflicted needs to be purified through great efforts. Thus, it is not that there is liberation without effort.</blockquote>
<blockquote>[Model 4] Or, in terms of characteristics,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5D-QINU`"' there is nothing other than the description of what is afflicted and what is purified. Therefore, in order to investigate what is afflicted and what is purified, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists," represents the details [of what is afflicted]. The nature of false imagination is afflicted, because it has the characteristic of mistakenness. "How is this characteristic of mistakenness to be understood?" It is through [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." It is to be understood as the very nature of mistakenness, because it appears in the form of the aspects of apprehender and apprehended, which are not present in its own nature. Now, in order to investigate the very nature of what is purified, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." The nature of emptiness is what is purified, because it is the nature of the nonexistence of duality. You should know that also the path and cessation are included in this, because they are characterized by emptiness. The domain of what is purified is to be searched from right within the domain of what is afflicted―it does not exist as something separate from it. In order to teach this, [line I.1c] says "[emptiness is present] in it." You may ask, "If duality does not exist, given the presence of this [emptiness], why is the world mistaken?" Therefore, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." This refers to the imagination of apprehender and apprehended, just as an illusion is empty of the aspects of elephants and so on, yet the aspects of elephants appear.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5E-QINU`"'</blockquote>
From Sthiramati's approach here, it is clear that he does not primarily speak about ontological models of the three natures, but treats them as pedagogical means to counteract particular wrong ideas. Thus, both false imagination and emptiness are described in several different ways. False imagination is said to be "existent by a nature of its own" (model 1); "substantially existent" (model 2); "of the nature of modulations of consciousness" (model 3); and "having the nature of being afflicted" (model 4). Emptiness is described as "the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended" (models 1 and 2); "the pure object" (model 2); "true identitylessness" (model 3); and "having the nature of what is purified" and "being the nature of the nonexistence of duality" (model 4). The first two models sound rather realist and substantialist, but that does not necessarily mean that false imagination is held to be ultimately existent, which is in fact not affirmed anywhere.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B5F-QINU`"' Also, though Sthiramati describes the above four models, it does not mean that he fully subscribes to all of them. In fact, commenting on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5, Sthiramati explicitly states that false imagination is the other-dependent nature, which arises under the power of causes and conditions, but does not exist or come into being on its own. He also quotes two verses, which add that the other-dependent nature is the sphere of correct mundane cognition, while the perfect nature is the sphere of nonconceptual (supramundane) wisdom.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B60-QINU`"'
Given the explicit objectives of Sthiramati's commentary to redress strong kinds of clinging to utter nonexistence or absolute existence and so on, from a pedagogical point of view, equally strong statements on relative existence (or relatively having a nature of its own) and emptiness, respectively, are suitable to counteract wrong ideas and guide disciples on the middle path between these two extremes, but this does not necessarily mean that those who make such statements accept everything in them as their own position. Such a middle path is clearly explained in Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's commentaries on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.2, following the statement in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that all phenomena are neither absolutely empty nor absolutely nonempty. Sthiramati further clarifies that false imagination is conditioned, because it depends on causes and conditions, while emptiness is not. False imagination is present in emptiness in the form of phenomena, and emptiness is present in false imagination in the form of the nature of phenomena.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B61-QINU`"' This is further clarified in Sthiramati's comments on I.13, where the being of the nonbeing of duality is described as the characteristic of emptiness, which is neither existent nor nonexistent. Emptiness is not existent because of the nonexistence of duality. Nor is it nonexistent, since the nonexistence of duality exists. In other words, emptiness is not just the sheer absence of apprehender and apprehended, but constitutes the true mode of being of all phenomena. Emptiness is also neither the same as, nor different from, false imagination. If it were different from false imagination, it would not be its nature, and if it were the same, it would not be the sole pure object that is conducive to liberation.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B62-QINU`"'
To summarize, in the first two models, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is described more as an abstract property of false imagination (the other-dependent nature), which is said to not be without nature in every respect. Thus, duality (the imaginary nature) and emptiness are just the two poles of false imagination―the way it mistakenly appears and the way it actually is. Vasubandhu and Sthiramati both say that ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5 is taught in order to include all three natures in false imagination, ''if''―or as long as―mere false imagination exists. Since the immediately preceding line I.4d explicitly says that liberation is nothing but the extinction of false imagination, this can only mean that the three natures are only included in, and applicable to, false imagination as long as it exists as the display of saṃsāra. Within this saṃsāric framework, the imaginary nature is the mistakenly imagined duality of which false imagination is actually empty; the other-dependent nature is false imagination itself; and the perfect nature is the very absence of duality in false imagination. This seems to indicate that the first two models above revolve around false imagination as primarily describing the deluded saṃsāric mind. By contrast, the latter two models seem to discuss the three natures more from the perspective of the ultimate. Thus, false imagination is not said to have a nature of its own or to exist substantially, but to exist just as modulations of consciousness and as being afflicted. Emptiness is described as being more than just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the very nature of the absence of duality, that is, true identitylessness, which is the pure object conducive to liberation and even includes the path that leads to this liberation (at the same time, it is not to be looked for outside of what appears as afflicted phenomena). Thus, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is only taken as the mere absence of duality in false imagination, when the latter is described in more ontological or saṃsāric terms (models 1 and 2). But in the more epistemological or path-oriented explanations of false imagination, emptiness is described in more encompassing, positive, and ultimate terms (models 3 and 4). In other words, in the former approach, emptiness is basically just a property of false imagination, but in the latter approach, it is the true ultimate nature of false imagination. The latter accords with ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.20, in which the last one of the sixteen emptinesses―the emptiness that is the nature of nonbeing―is said to be different from the other fifteen, which all refer to the nonexistence of persons and phenomena. Together, these emptinesses serve to remove all superimpositions and denials―if persons and phenomena were not empty and nonexistent, they would truly exist, but if emptiness itself were nonexistent too, persons and phenomena would not be empty and thus again be truly existent.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B63-QINU`"' ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.21 is explained as "the establishing of emptiness," making it clear that this emptiness (and not false imagination) is the final word here―without it, there would be no path and no liberation.
<blockquote>If this [emptiness] were not afflicted,<br>All beings would be liberated.<br>If it were not pure,<br>Efforts would be fruitless.</blockquote>
From the ultimate perspective, verse I.22 says, emptiness is free from all dualistic pinpointing, such as existence, nonexistence, pure, impure, and so on.
<blockquote>It is neither afflicted nor nonafflicted,<br>Neither pure nor impure.</blockquote>
As for emptiness being neither afflicted nor impure, Sthiramati comments that what is described here is purity per se, and that the dual terminology just serves to emphasize this. He refers to Vasubandhu's quote from the scriptures, which says that it is pure "because of mind's natural luminosity," and says that "mind" here refers to the true nature of the mind (''cittadharmatā''). As for its being neither nonafflicted nor pure, this indicates that it is only afflicted through adventitious stains, but not afflicted by nature. The scriptural support is, "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B64-QINU`"' In this way, emptiness is far beyond being just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the ultimate, luminous and pure nature of the mind.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B65-QINU`"'
In brief, all these different models can be summarized in two, which Sponberg (1981, pp. 99ff) calls (a) the pivotal and (b) the progressive models. The "pivot" in (a) is the other-dependent nature (just as in models 1 and 2 above), with the imaginary and perfect natures just being its two "extreme" poles of how it mistakenly appears and actually is. Model (b) refers to the three natures as three levels of reality, progressing from dualistic delusion to nondual freedom from delusion, as well as the realizations of these levels as outlined in the four yogic practices above.
====Mind's Fundamentally Different Outlook on Itself====
As for the Sanskrit term ''āśrayaparivṛtti'' (change of state), there are a great number of Buddhist scriptures (from the Pāli canon up through the tantras) in which this term is used with reference to a variety of different states or processes (for an overview, see Davidson 1985). For some of these processes, the term "transformation," which is mostly used in translations, may be appropriate, but as far as the dharmadhātu, natural purity, buddha nature, or the luminous nature of the mind are concerned, the whole point of this notion of "change of state" is that there is absolutely no transformation of anything into anything else. Rather, the revelation of mind's primordially pure nature, which from the perspective of the path appears as fruitional enlightenment, only manifests as a change from the perspective of deluded mind—mind seeming to be obscured before and then unobscured later. But this does not refer to any change in nature, just as the sun first being covered by clouds and then being free from clouds would not be called a transformation of the clouds into the sun, or even any transformation of the sun itself. It is solely from the perspective of those who watch the sun that its state seems to have changed (being with and without clouds, respectively). Even children know that the presence or absence of clouds does not affect the sun itself in any way, but just our perception of it. In fact, for the sun itself, there is not even a question of whether it has changed, let alone how. ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.22 says:
<blockquote>Though without difference between before and after,<br>It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Being neither pure nor impure,<br>Suchness is held to be buddhahood.</blockquote>
Sthiramati's commentary on this explains:
<blockquote>"Purity" is said to mean having the nature of being afflicted before, and then the stains having become nonexistent later through having cultivated the path, with "before" referring to the time of an ordinary being, and "later" to the time of full buddhahood. But the dharmakāya of a buddha is held to be of the nature of suchness, emptiness. Emptiness has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous even at the time of ordinary beings. Also later, at the time of full buddhahood, it has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous. Therefore, in its nature of purity, there is no difference.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B66-QINU`"'</blockquote>
''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIII.18–19 says:
<blockquote>When murky water becomes clear,<br>[Its] transparency does not arise from elsewhere,<br>But is just its becoming free from pollution.<br>The same goes for the purity of your own mind.</blockquote>
<blockquote>It is held that mind, which is always naturally luminous,<br>Is [only] blemished by adventitious flaws.<br>It is stated that there is no other mind apart from<br>The naturally luminous mind of dharmatā.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B67-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The most detailed presentation of the Yogācāra notion of change of state is given in the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' (covering two-thirds of its contents), which describes the nature of the change of state as follows.
<blockquote>As for apprehending its nature,<br>It is stainless suchness<br>In the sense of adventitious stains<br>Not appearing and<br>Suchness appearing.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B68-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In the following, the text mainly speaks about the foundation of this change of state (lines 159–60), which is nonconceptual wisdom. In terms of the path, bodhisattvas cultivate and engage in this wisdom through (a) relinquishing the four progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about factors to be relinquished, their remedies, suchness, and realization (lines 171–79);'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B69-QINU`"' (b) understanding that, by virtue of being ignorant about suchness, the delusive appearance of actually nonexistent false imagination and duality out of the ālaya-consciousness prevents the appearance of the nature of phenomena, and that the latter appears, once the former two cease to appear (lines 252–63); and (c) cultivating the above-mentioned four yogic practices (lines 180–85 and 264–75). The basic characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom are described as threefold (lines 186–204). Its characteristic of being grounded in the nature of phenomena means that it is nondual and inexpressible. Its characteristic of nonappearance means that duality, designations, sense faculties, objects, cognitions, and the outer world do not appear for it. Its characteristic of appearance means that, during meditative equipoise, all phenomena appear equal to space, while, during subsequent attainment, all conditioned phenomena appear like illusions. Nonconceptual wisdom is further characterized through excluding its being mistaken for five other states, such as its being nothing but the sheer absence of any mental engagement (such as deep sleep); its possessing five excellencies; and its five functions (223–46). Finally, the text presents four disadvantages, if there were no such change of state; four advantages, since it exists; and three examples of the fleeting nature of the adventitious stains and the unchanging basis of the change of state―the nature of phenomena (lines 293–307). The Third Karmapa's commentary on these examples explains:
<blockquote>For example, space is nothing but pure by nature. Therefore, by virtue of certain conditions (such as fog or mist) in the world, one can observe statements such as, "The sky is not pure" and, "It is pure," [when] it is clear and free [from these conditions]. However, it is not suitable to claim such because of a change of the nature of space. Its own nature being pure, empty, and unconditioned, it is indeed not suitable that it either becomes pure by virtue of itself or becomes pure by virtue of something else. Still, mistaken minds that connect mere conventional terms to it cling to space as being pure and impure, [but] this is nothing but an error. Likewise, though it may appear as if the naturally pure nature of phenomena―the perfect [nature]―has become free from the fog and mist of conceptions, it is not asserted that this perfect [nature] has changed―it is absolutely without any arising or ceasing in terms of itself, others, both, or neither. In the same way, the fact of gold remaining in its excellent state is not changed by stains, and the fact of water remaining clear and moist is not changed in its nature, even if it becomes associated with sullying factors, such as silt. Likewise, all that happens to the unmistaken path and the pure dharmas is that they just become associated with stains and sullying factors through the conceptions of ignorance, but it is not asserted that these uncontaminated dharmas [―the path and the pure dharmas entailed by cessation―] change. Therefore, naturally luminous stainlessness is unconditioned and changeless. Thus, though the nature of phenomena is referred to by this term "fundamental change of state," it is also called "permanent."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6A-QINU`"'</blockquote>
All of this underlines that there is no change of state in nature or substance, but only a revelation of the way things actually have always been, once the delusion of what is projected onto this is seen through. Also, nonconceptual wisdom as both the underlying basis and the result of this change of state is clearly described in terms of the dynamics of an enlightened mind, and not as sheer emptiness or an inert state. Thus, as far as the notion of "change of state" refers to this process of uncovering mind's fundamental nature, even when it is sometimes described in Buddhist texts as if there were a transformation of one "thing" into another "thing," or of something impure (such as the skandhas or mental afflictions) into something pure (such as the pure skandhas or wisdoms), this is just a conventional or expedient way of teaching. The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' says:
<blockquote>Those present-day followers of [Mahā]mudrā whose confusion is even a hundred thousand times bigger than this exclaim, "Through refining the ālaya-consciousness into something pure, it turns into the result of mirrorlike wisdom." This is not justified for the following reasons. Something like this does not appear in any of the traditions of the mahāyāna, and what does not appear [there also] does not appear in the sense of something that is obtained through reasoning. A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abhidharma that actually fulfill these functions'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6B-QINU`"' (that is, what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya-consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6C-QINU`"'</blockquote>
To highlight the different perspectives of the notion of change of state, Asaṅga's ''Abhidharmasamucchaya'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6D-QINU`"' speaks of three kinds of change of state―(1) the change of state of mind upon the attainment of the path of nonlearning; (2) the change of state of the path; and (3) the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies. Sthiramati's commentary'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6E-QINU`"' explains that (1) refers to the naturally luminous mind that is the nature of phenomena having become free from all adventitious afflictions without exception. This is also called "the change of state of suchness." (2) means that, once clear realization occurs on the mundane path, it has become the supramundane path. The latter is also called "the path of learning" because there still remain tasks to be accomplished. Once all antagonistic factors are eliminated through being free from attachment to the three realms, this is presented as the perfectly complete change of the state that is the nature of this path. (3) means the ālaya-consciousness being free from even the most subtle latent tendencies of all afflictions.
The tenth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' explains the change of state of the five skandhas as follows:
<blockquote>Through how many kinds of masteries is the mastery of the dharmakāya attained? In brief, mastery is attained through five kinds: (1) Through the change of state of the skandha of form, mastery over [pure buddha] realms, kāyas, the excellent major and minor marks, infinite voices, and the invisible mark on the crown of the head [is attained]. (2) Through the change of state of the skandha of feeling, mastery over infinite and vast blissful states without wrongdoing [is attained]. (3) Through the change of state of the skandha of discrimination, mastery over the teachings [is attained] through all groups of words, groups of phrases, and groups of letters. (4) Through the change of state of the skandha of formation, mastery over creation, transformation, gathering retinues, and gathering the immaculate dharmas [is attained]. (5) Through the change of state of the skandha of consciousness, mastery over mirrorlike [wisdom], [the wisdom of] equality, discriminating [wisdom], and all-accomplishing [wisdom] is attained.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B6F-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In his commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.12–17, Sthiramati'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B70-QINU`"' says that "state" in this context refers to the five skandhas, while "change" means that the dharmadhātu has become pure and has also become nonconceptual wisdom by virtue of the relinquishment of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations contained in these skandhas (for details, see below). In slightly different terms, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.41–47 also describes the various changes of state of the skandhas (primarily that of consciousness). Verse IX.48 concludes that the facets of such changes are in fact innumerable, but that all of them occur within the changeless and ever-pure dharmadhātu.
<blockquote>Thus, infinite masteries are asserted<br>In infinite changes of state<br>By virtue of the inconceivable all-accomplishment<br>Within the stainless foundation of the buddhas.</blockquote>
In sum, all these changes of state entail both a negative (relinquishment) and a positive aspect (attainment, purity), thus usually designating both a process and its result (cause and effect). By keeping in mind that the term "change of state" is used in Yogācāra texts sometimes to refer to the first and sometimes to the second aspect, seeming contradictions in differing ways of describing or applying this term are resolved. In other words, "state" may either refer to the ālaya-consciousness (or all eight consciousnesses, or adventitious stains) as that which changes from the perspective of the path. Or, it may be understood as nonconceptual wisdom, the Tathāgata heart, or the dharmadhātu as the very state within which any of the above "changes" take place, but which remains changeless itself.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B71-QINU`"' As for "change," again, even in terms of the eight consciousnesses or adventitious stains, there is no real change, since all of them are always explained to be delusive and illusionlike, and thus actually nonexistent in the first place―the only "change" being the realization of exactly this fact. Thus, there is no change in terms of the object, but in terms of the realizing subject, which again happens only from the perspective of the (seemingly) evolving wisdom of the path, but not in terms of the fundamentally unchanging nature of nonconceptual wisdom. Thus, at any given time on the path, there is never any change in substance or nature (both on the side of what is to be relinquished and the side of what is to be attained)―all that happens is a cognitive change, or a change in one's outlook on oneself and the world.
These two aspects also represent the two reasons why, from the perspective of the path, any change of state is possible at all. First, what seems to "change" (the adventitious stains) can appear so precisely because it is merely an unreal and deceiving mental construct in the first place. Secondly, these fictitious mental projections are only superimposed onto, and occur nowhere else than within, the undeceiving ground of true reality, which is their actual nature, just to be revealed. In other words, though sentient beings' delusional seeming reality in the form of the imaginary and other-dependent natures has no beginning, for individual beings, it can end. On the other hand, ultimate reality―the perfect nature―has neither beginning nor end.
Thus, as said above, from a soteriological point of view, one of the primary purposes of speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to highlight how mind is deluded about itself and how it can free itself from that self-delusion. The stage for the process of mind freeing itself―the Buddhist path―is the other-dependent nature, which starts by taking a thorough look at its own dramas (the imaginary nature) and thus first sees its own bare structure―the dependently originating acting of the mind (i.e, ''cittamātra''). Next, taking a look at that very display of acting itself results in seeing and becoming immersed in its lucid yet empty true nature (the perfect nature). In other words, the more the complex, yet delusively quivering and fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent natures collapse, the more their immovable and stable fundamental ground shines through, which is not simply yet another structure, but mind's natural state free from all reference points. Thus, it cannot be pinpointed as anything, but revealed and experienced as mind's most basic make-up, which is only possible through this very mind not entertaining any grasping at anything, including its own nongrasping. For example, upon seeing an ice sculpture of a dog, one may think of it as "a dog" with all its characteristics (the imaginary nature), but it is clear that it is just a particular configuration of ice (the other-dependent nature), which in turn is actually nothing but a particular state of water (the perfect nature). The "dog" is reducible to ice, which is in turn reducible to water. However, without ice, one cannot create the sculpture of "a dog"―such is not possible with water in its natural fluid state. Likewise, the dualistic sculptures of the imaginary nature are only possible through and within the other-dependent nature, but never in the perfect nature. At the same time, the former two natures can eventually "melt" into the natural and stable state of the perfect nature.
This natural state is nothing other than buddhahood, the dharmakāya, and so on. Yet again, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the irreversibility of this change of state. Buddhahood (subject) and ultimate reality (object) themselves are no exceptions to being dynamic in nature, though it is impossible to fall back into delusion or duality from this particular dynamics. Of course, some people argue that there is no such state of permanent liberation or buddhahood without reversing into delusion, just as gold or water can only be heated up temporarily (or, as in the case of melted ice, can be refrozen again). When heated up, gold will become liquid, but eventually will always solidify again. Likewise, water may become hot and even boiling, but will inevitably cool down. The Buddhist reply is that these examples miss the point, because the nature of gold is precisely to be solid and cool—and not liquid and hot—to begin with, so it just reverts to its natural state (the same goes for water). As ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.24ab and IX.25 say:
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is said to be<br>Neither existent nor nonexistent.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Just as with the subsiding of heat in iron<br>And blurred vision in the eyes,<br>The mind and wisdom of a buddha<br>Are not said to be existent or nonexistent.</blockquote>
The ''Bhāṣya'' comments:
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is not said to be existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of persons and phenomena, and that is its nature. Nor is buddhahood said to be nonexistent, because its characteristic of being suchness exists. . . . The subsiding of heat and blurred vision is not existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of heat and blurred vision. Nor is it nonexistent, because it exists through the characteristic of having subsided. Likewise, the subsiding of attachment and ignorance (which resemble heat and blurred vision) in the mind and wisdom of buddhas is not said to be existent, since it consists of their nonexistence. Nor is it nonexistent, since the liberations of mind and prajñā exist through their respective characteristics of being liberated.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B72-QINU`"'</blockquote>
In other words, heat and blurred vision do not exist any more, but the iron (characterized by its natural temperature and hardness) and clear eyesight still exist and function accordingly. Likewise, in buddhahood, ordinary states of mind (the eight collections of consciousness) have subsided, while the five wisdoms operate freely. Sthiramati adds that if the state of the visual disorder of blurred vision having subsided were absolutely nonexistent, then also the eye would not exist and could thus not perform the function of seeing clearly (the same goes for cool iron and a body free from illness functioning properly). Thus, the function of clear eyesight arises by virtue of blurred vision not existing. Likewise, in buddhahood, the afflictions and ignorance do not exist, but the liberation of mind (freedom from the afflictions―nirvāṇa) and prajñā (freedom from ignorance―omniscient wisdom) exist. The first liberation refers to being liberated from the afflictions to be relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B73-QINU`"' which arises from the lack of attachment. The liberation of prajñā means realizing, just as it is, that the liberation of mind actually is liberation, which arises from the lack of ignorance. In addition, the characteristic of the joy of being free from attachment and ignorance is not nonexistent either.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B74-QINU`"' In brief, buddhahood is not just some indifferent state of lacking some things and seeing others, but it is the most fundamental freedom and insight that can possibly be experienced, which is naturally immensely joyful.
Thus, realizing buddhahood means nothing but to recognize the true nature of the mind, which can never be altered through its opposites, such as mistakenness and afflictions. Once the latter are seen through and recognized as adventitious illusory phenomena, mind will not revert to them. In other words, unlike water being reheatable over and again, once the nature of the mind is known for what it is, it is impossible to unknow it. As Dharmakīrti says in ''Pramāṇavārttika'' II.210cd–211ab:
<blockquote>Having the nature of being free from harm<br>And being actual reality, it is not reversed</blockquote>
<blockquote>Through its opposites, even with effort,<br>Since mind adheres to this side that is its [nature].'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B75-QINU`"'</blockquote>
====Mind's Awakening====
It should be noted at the outset that, fundamentally, both Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that all descriptions of buddhahood (subject) or ultimate reality (object) are by definition incomplete, relative, and ultimately false, since it lies completely beyond the scope of words, thoughts, and dualistic perceptions. As ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.36 says:
<blockquote>The profundity of the buddhas<br>In terms of their characteristics, state, and activity<br>Within the stainless dharmadhātu<br>Is said to be but a colorful painting in the sky.</blockquote>
Thus, Mādhyamikas usually refrain from saying much, if anything, about this topic. On the other hand, the Yogācāra approach is twofold. Just like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras point out, as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati comment here, that the uncontaminated dharmadhātu is completely free from reference points, so that any teachings by the Buddha on the varieties of its profundity resemble painting space with colors.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B76-QINU`"' However, the Yogācāras also acknowledge the pedagogical need for painting this colorful picture anyway, to be inspired by it, and also to inspire others, thus using it as an expedient means to facilitate progressing on the path, until what is painted in an illusory manner is nevertheless directly experienced. Accordingly, Sthiramati comments that, of course, it is difficult to paint space with colors, but if some very skilled person actually manages to do so, it is quite amazing. Similarly, the uncontaminated dhātu is the dharma that is to be personally experienced by the wisdom of the noble ones. As it is inexpressible in words, the Tathāgata's putting it in words by way of the threefold profundity in terms of characteristics, state, and activity is indeed a difficult task and something quite amazing to do. Still, it can be accomplished by virtue of the Buddha's skill and the dharmadhātu’s existing in all beings. Thus, the next verse says:
<blockquote>Though not being different in all of them,<br>Suchness has become pure.<br>Therefore, it is the Tathāgata,<br>And all beings possess its Heart.</blockquote>
Sthiramati says that suchness refers to the nature of the two kinds of identitylessness in terms of persons and phenomena, which pervade all entities. The personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in ordinary beings and the personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in the noble ones are not different. It is only by virtue of this suchness having become pure that it is called "Tathāgata." Though suchness exists in everything, once the two kinds of identitylessness have become free from the adventitious afflictive and cognitive obstructions, they are pure, which is called "Tathāgata." Thus, because suchness exists in sentient beings, they are all said to have the Tathāgata heart.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B77-QINU`"'
In general, buddhahood is described as both excellent relinquishment and realization (wisdom). Thus, in terms of the path, there is not only something to be relinquished (all reference points as per the Mādhyamikas, or the duality of apprehender and apprehended as per the Yogācāras),'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B78-QINU`"' but also something to be cultivated (the yogic valid perceptions of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment), which eventually results in the culmination of the nondual nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha. It is precisely because this nonconceptual wisdom (or dharmadhātu, or buddha nature) is the fundamental ground for all activities on the Buddhist path toward its (re-)discovery that the sūtras, tantras, and the Yogācāras describe it not only in purely negative terms.
The classical Yogācāra "sky painting" of buddhahood (which greatly accords with the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'') is chapter 9 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', which begins with two verses on buddhahood being omniscience:
<blockquote>Through hundreds of immeasurable hardships,<br>Immeasurable accumulations of virtue,<br>Immeasurable time,<br>And the extinction of immeasurable obscurations,</blockquote>
<blockquote>The knowledge of all aspects is attained―<br>Immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Buddhahood is illustrated<br>By an opened jewel casket.</blockquote>
Sthiramati's commentary'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B79-QINU`"' says that it is the four wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom) and the dharmadhātu that are called "buddhahood," and buddhahood is in turn referred to as "omniscience." Following Vasubandhu, Sthiramati continues by saying that buddhahood is taught here through three points: (1) Full realization is illustrated by the innumerable hardships undergone by bodhisattvas for the sake of other beings (such as giving away their possessions and even their bodies); their infinite accumulations of virtue (such as the six pāramitās, the ten bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment);'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7A-QINU`"' the innumerable eons (three or more) of practicing bodhisattva conduct; and the innumerable afflictive and cognitive obscurations that are overcome in this process. (2) The nature of buddhahood is the attainment of excellent relinquishment (being immaculate in terms of being free from all obscurations) and the attainment of excellent wisdom. The latter is called "knowledge of all aspects" by virtue of unmistakenly knowing [all phenomena] to be impermanent, suffering, empty, and identityless, just as they are. It is "omniscience" by virtue of knowing all phenomena, such as skandhas and dhātus, without exception.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7B-QINU`"' (3) The example for buddhahood is an opened casket of very powerful and variegated wish-fulfilling jewels―once the covers of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations have been removed, the unique qualities of buddhahood (such as the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses) manifest. Thus, verses IX.4–5 speak about buddhahood being characterized by nonduality and power.
<blockquote>Buddhahood is all dharmas,<br>But itself is no dharma whatsoever.<br>It consists of pure dharmas,<br>But is not portrayed by them.</blockquote>
<blockquote>By virtue of its being the cause of the jewel of the dharma,<br>It resembles a jewel mine.<br>By virtue of being the cause of the harvest of virtue,<br>It is held to resemble a cloud.</blockquote>
Sthiramati comments that buddhahood is nondual in terms of apprehender and apprehended (any subject-object duality has been relinquished) as well as existence and nonexistence. As for the latter, at the time of buddhahood, what does not exist is the imaginary characteristic of imagined apprehender and apprehended, and what does exist is the characteristic of the existence of the perfect nature. What is called "buddhahood" is the dharma that consists of personal identitylessness, phenomenal identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing. There are no phenomena that are not pervaded by these two kinds of identitylessness and the fact of nonarising and nonceasing. The nature of twofold identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing of the dharmakāya of the buddhas and the nature of these in all phenomena is in no way different. But in buddhahood, no phenomena that are characterized as being imagined by childish beings (such as apprehender, apprehended, pots, or clothes) exist. Yet buddhahood consists of pure dharmas, because (a) it is accomplished through practicing virtues such as the pāramitās, bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and (b) upon being accomplished, it abides as fully embodying these virtues as well as the unique buddha qualities of the ten powers and so on. Nevertheless, buddhahood is not portrayed by these pāramitās and so on, because the pāramitās that are characterized by being imagined and are observable as the three aspects of giver, recipient, and what is given do not exist by a nature of their own. These imaginary pāramitās and so on cannot be said to portray the nature of buddhahood, because buddhahood is not an imaginary phenomenon.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7C-QINU`"' As for buddhahood's power, it resembles a jewel mine, because it is the cause, the condition, and the foundation for the innumerable jewels of the dharma (the teachings) as well as its qualities (such as the ten powers). It resembles a cloud, since its vast, wellspoken, and inexhaustible rain of dharma brings forth the harvests of the pāramitās and such in the fields of the mind streams of those to be guided.
Verses IX.7–11 explain how, based on all this, buddhahood is the supreme refuge for all beings, and the following six verses speak about buddhahood being the "fundamental change of state." Verse IX.12 says:
<blockquote> the seeds of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations, ever present since primordial time,<br>Are destroyed through all kinds of very extensive relinquishments,<br>Buddhahood is attained as the change of state endowed with the supreme qualities of the pure dharmas,<br>Which is obtained through the path of utterly pure wisdom that is nonconceptual and very vast in scope.</blockquote>
This describes the removal of the antagonistic factors of buddhahood and the remedies through which it is attained. The relinquishment of the latent tendencies of the two obscurations being "very extensive" refers to the path of supramundane wisdom from the first to the tenth bhūmi. "All kinds" means that the wisdoms on each one of these bhūmis have nine degrees in terms of lesser, medium, and great. "Wherever" refers to someone's mind in which the two obstructions have been purified through applying these remedial wisdoms, which is the meaning of "attaining the change of state." Once the two obstructions are relinquished in this way, this change of state consists of the attainment of the five dharmas (the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu) as well as the unique qualities of a buddha (such as the ten powers), all of which are supreme, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess them. The path of supramundane wisdom is twofold―utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom and the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, whose scope consists of all knowable objects. Utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom sees all phenomena to be empty, just as space. The pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment sees all entities of worldly realms in the three times as illusions and mirages.
Verse IX.14 plays on the word "change of state" by adding ten different prefixes to the Sanskrit word ''vṛtti'' in ''āśrayaparivṛtti'','"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7D-QINU`"' most of which highlight the dynamic character of this change of state called "buddhahood." Thus, it is a "pro-change," because it is always engaged in the welfare of others―all sentient beings. It is a "super-change," since it is the best of all phenomena, superior to any mundane phenomena, and even superior to the change of state of supramundane śrāvakas. In the term "non-change-state," "state" refers to the state that is the result of change, which is a state of nonchange in the sense of the inactivity of the three causes of afflictions (that is, the presence of objects, improper mental engagement, and not having relinquished the latencies of both). It is a "counter-change," since it does not engage in afflictions or nonvirtue, and counteracts selfish actions. It is an "ongoing change," since it functions all the time (once this change of state has occurred, its operation will never decline until the end of saṃsāra) and engages in all the remedies for afflicted phenomena. It is a "dual change," because it first engages in demonstrating becoming fully enlightened and finally engages in demonstrating nirvāṇa. It is a "nondual change," because, ultimately, it neither engages in saṃsāra nor in nirvāṇā. For, by virtue of being endowed with prajñā, what is conditioned is relinquished, and by virtue of possessing compassion, what is unconditioned is relinquished. It is an "equal change," because as far as being liberated from all afflictions goes, it is equal in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. It is a "special change," because it is superior to the change of state of the śrāvakas by virtue of the relinquishment of the cognitive obstructions and the qualities of the powers, the fearlessnesses, and so on. It is an "omnipresent change," because the three yānas engage all sentient beings in an omnipresent way. This change of state of the Tathāgata is endowed with all these supreme qualities, which are the uncontaminated dharmas, or the remedies for all afflictions. Therefore, it operates in a very vast manner. Verse IX.15 says:
<blockquote>Just as space is held to be always omnipresent,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is held to be always omnipresent.<br>Just as space is omnipresent in what has form,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is omnipresent in the hosts of beings.</blockquote>
Just as space is omnipresent in all entities in the three times, the uncontaminated dharmadhātu exists and is omnipresent in the mind streams of all sentient beings. This is to be understood here in terms of buddhas experiencing and accepting all beings as not being different from themselves in a perfect manner. Buddhahood has the nature of the dharmadhātu, and once the characteristic of the omnipresence of the dharmadhātu is realized on the first bhūmi, a state of mind of perceiving oneself and all beings as equal is attained. Through further cultivating this throughout the remaining bhūmis, at the time of buddhahood, this all-encompassing experience is perfected. This is what is called "being omnipresent in the hosts of beings."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7E-QINU`"'
As for why sentient beings do not realize the dharmadhātu and do not see buddhas, though the dharmadhātu always exists and is omnipresent in them, verse IX.16 says:
<blockquote>Just as a water container, when broken,<br>Does not show the reflection of the moon,<br>The image of the Buddha does not show<br>In bad sentient beings.</blockquote>
Just as the moon is not seen in a vessel that is without water or broken, the mind streams of beings are either like an empty vessel through not being filled with the accumulations of merit and wisdom, or their mind streams are impaired through being full of afflictions and evil deeds. Despite such beings having the nature of a buddha, they do not see it. Of course, the reverse applies for beings whose mind streams are endowed with merit and wisdom.
This is followed by four verses (IX.17–21) with examples of buddha activity being effortless, spontaneous, and uninterrupted. The next sixteen verses (IX.22–37) explain the profundity of the uncontaminated dharmadhātu, which is free from all reference points of being pure, impure, existent, nonexistent, one, or many:
<blockquote>Though without difference between before and after,<br>It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Being neither pure nor impure,<br>Suchness is held to be buddhahood.</blockquote>
Verse IX.23 designates buddhahood as "the supreme self that is the lack of self":
<blockquote>In pure emptiness, buddhas attain<br>The supreme self of the lack of self.<br>Through attaining the pure self,<br>They have gone to the great self of the self.</blockquote>
To attain the supreme self means to attain the supreme lack of self. The supreme lack of self consists of personal identitylessness and phenomenal identitylessness. Since the buddhas have this twofold lack of a self as their self and nature within the uncontaminated dhātu, they are presented as being the supreme self. As for the word "self" (''ātman''), on the one hand, it means the imaginary self of the tīrthikas, referring to "self," "sentient being," "life-force," and so on. But on the other hand, it can also refer to the nature of a phenomenon, such as saying that the defining characteristic or nature of fire is to be hot. In these cases, the word "self" is used in the sense of "nature" (''svabhāva''). Thus, because the buddhas have the nature of the lack of self, it is said that they have attained the supreme self. So, what is the supreme lack of self? It means pure emptiness. Once the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness have become pure of the stains of apprehender and apprehended, emptiness is pure. Having attained this purity is called "having attained the supreme lack of self." "The great self of the self" (''ātmamahātmatā'') designates the incomparable nature of this supreme self that is the supreme lack of self, which consists of the twofold identitylessness of persons and phenomena. In terms of exactly this being the very nature of buddhas, it is called "the self of the buddhas."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B7F-QINU`"' Consequently, verse IX.24 points out that buddhahood cannot be pinpointed.
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is said to be<br>Neither existent nor nonexistent.<br>So, upon such questions about the Buddha,<br>The principle of being undecidable is held.</blockquote>
In the uncontaminated dharmadhātu, buddhahood is not existent, because buddhahood is the dharmakāya, and the dharmakāya is emptiness. In emptiness, there are neither any imaginary persons nor phenomena. Since the perfect nature does not exist in the way of imaginary persons and phenomena, which resemble the horns of a rabbit, it is not presented as existent at the time of budddhahood. However, buddhahood is not nonexistent either, because suchness―the perfect nature―exists at this time. The last two lines of this verse refer to, from a buddha's point of view, merely speculative and soteriologically pointless questions, such as the fourteen issues of whether buddhas still exist after their death or not and so on, which the Buddha did not answer in either an affirmative or a negative way.
The following verses of chapter 9 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' speak about the masteries of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas being progressively more distinguished (38–40); the masteries of bodhisattvas and buddhas in terms of the changes of state of the five skandhas (41–48); buddhahood, by virtue of its masteries, being the cause for maturing beings (49–55); and the complete purity of the dharmadhātu (56–59). Verse IX.56 defines the nature of the uncontaminated dharmadhātu:
<blockquote>It has the characteristic of the suchness of all phenomena<br>Being pure of the two obscurations.<br>It [also] has the characteristic of the inexhaustible mastery<br>Over the wisdom of the real and [the wisdom] whose object that is.</blockquote>
The suchness of all conditioned, unconditioned, contaminated, and uncontaminated phenomena refers to emptiness. The suchness that is the emptiness of the buddhabhūmi has the characteristic and nature of being free from the afflictive and cognitive obstructions. This is the change of state of suchness. "The wisdom of the real" refers to the pure mundane wisdom that is attained subsequently to this change of state, while "the real" refers to the nonconceptual wisdom that is the characteristic of the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the other-dependent nature. This nonconceptual wisdom (of meditative equipoise) is known in an unmistaken manner through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, but not through any other kind of wisdom. This describes the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the support for the impregnations of negative tendencies. The word "that" in the last line refers to the dharmadhātu, which means that nonconceptual wisdom focuses on the dharmadhātu. This describes the change of state of the path.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B80-QINU`"' Through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment focusing on nonconceptual wisdom, inexhaustible mastery is attained, because this pure mundane wisdom realizes the nature of nonconceptual wisdom in an unmistaken manner. Also, nonconceptual wisdom attains inexhaustible mastery over suchness―the dharmadhātu―because nonconceptual wisdom settles one-pointedly on the dharmadhātu. This describes the nature of the dharmadhātu.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B81-QINU`"'
As was said before, the realization of ultimate reality equals buddhahood―in fact buddhahood ''is'' nothing but ultimate reality, since there is no subject-object duality at that point. So to further highlight the close connection between the planes of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology, the above characteristics of buddhahood in Yogācāra (neither existent nor nonexistent, neither pure nor impure, being changeless suchness, like space, yet consisting of pure dharmas, and so on) may be compared with the characteristics of ultimate reality as presented in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' VI.1:
<blockquote>Neither existent nor nonexistent, neither such nor other,<br>Neither arisen nor perished, neither decreasing nor increasing,<br>Not purified and yet purified again—<br>These are the characteristics of the ultimate.</blockquote>
Sthiramati'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B82-QINU`"' comments that the ultimate is twofold―suchness (the pure dharmadhātu) and nondual nonconceptual wisdom. Suchness is called the ultimate, since it is the fruition of having cultivated the path of the noble ones and represents all phenomena. Or, in terms of its being an object, it is the ultimate, because it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B83-QINU`"' Here, the above fivefold characteristic of the nonduality of the ultimate primarily refers to suchness (nonconceptual wisdom being explained later in chapter 9 and so on). (1) The ultimate―the perfect nature―is not existent, because it does not exist like the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, the essence of the ultimate―the perfect nature―is not nonexistent either. (2) The perfect nature is not the same as the imaginary nature, because the latter does not exist and appears in a mistaken way, while the former is the true reality and unmistaken. Nor is the perfect nature the same as the other-dependent nature, because the latter is the support for imaginary phenomena, with its nature being dependently originated and afflicted, while the former does not serve as a support for imaginary phenomena―it is not dependently originated and represents purified phenomenon. The perfect nature is also not different from the imaginary and the other-dependent natures, because what is referred to as "the perfect nature" is the fact of the other-dependent nature being free from the imaginary nature, but there is no extra perfect nature apart from that. (3) The perfect nature is not arisen, since it is not produced by karma and afflictions. It does not perish, since unarisen phenomena do not cease―it has the nature of being unconditioned. (4) The perfect nature is without decrease and increase, just as space. Even when clouds in space decrease, there is no decrease in space. Even when previously nonexistent clouds appear in it, space does not arise newly. Likewise, though saṃsāric afflictions decrease during the time of cultivating the path of the noble ones, there is no decrease in emptiness, and even though purified phenomena―the factors concordant with enlightenment―increase, there is no increase in emptiness. (5) The ultimate is emptiness. Just as space, gold, water, and a crystal are naturally pure, it is pure in that it is of the nature of emptiness. Just as the natural purity of space cannot be purified by washing it with water or the like, in the nature of emptiness, there are no stains to be purified. Therefore, it is said to be "not purified." Though there are no stains to be removed in this nature, it is not that the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in emptiness in an adventitious manner are not to be removed―indeed they must be removed and purified, a process like removing adventitious clouds from space, or adventitious earth and stones from gold. This is called "the ultimate becoming pure." In brief, the ultimate refers to the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness.
====Mind's Three Enlightened Bodies and Four Wisdom Eyes====
The nature and the functions of buddhahood as the realization of ultimate reality are described as the four wisdoms, which represent the cognitive processes within the all-encompassing dharmadhātu'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B84-QINU`"' that result in the two rūpakāyas performing enlightened activity within the dharmakāya. This description once again clearly highlights the fact that buddhahood is not an inactive or inert state. These processes are presented in the classical Yogācāra format of a change of state in terms of the eight consciousnesses on the one side and the four wisdoms and the three kāyas on the other side. As explained before, this does not mean any actual transformation of the former into the latter, such as miraculously transforming something really bad into something excellent. Still, conventionally speaking, it is taught that, upon being purified (or realized to be adventitious), the ālaya-consciousness manifests as mirrorlike wisdom, the afflicted mind as the wisdom of equality, the mental consciousness as discriminating wisdom, and the five sense consciousnesses as all-accomplishing wisdom. Most fundamentally, once the emptiness in these consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu is completely pure. In other words, these changes of state take place within the fundamental space of the dharmadhātu, while always being inseparable from it. The ''Nighaṇṭa'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000B85-QINU`"' (a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary of key Buddhist terms) describes the dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms as follows:
<blockquote>''Dharmadhātuviśuddha'' means the completely pure dharmadhātu. It serves as the cause and expanse for the arising and originating of the dharmas of the noble ones (such as the powers and fearlessnesses). Therefore, within the dharmadhātu (that is, suchness), the adventitious afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations (which are like clouds) are translucent and purified. Since it is similar to the pure expanse of the sky, it is called "the completely pure expanse of dharmas."</blockquote>
<blockquote>''Ādarśajñāna'' means mirrorlike wisdom. Since it focuses on the completely pure dharmadhātu, it is free from all conceptions of apprehender and apprehended. This refers to the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, through which the reflections of all phenomena appear [as clearly in it] as anything whatsoever [can] appear in a polished mirror. Thus, it is called "mirrorlike wisdom."</blockquote>
<blockquote>''Samatājñāna'' means the wisdom of equality. When the utterly pure familiarization with the actuality of true reality is clearly realized for the first time on the first bhūmi, no distinction is made between oneself and others and they are realized to be an equality. Through purification on the following higher bhūmis, on the buddhabhūmi, this [eventually] becomes the nonabiding nirvāṇa. At this time, the afflicted mind has undergone a transition and changed state as wisdom. This is called "[the wisdom of] equality."</blockquote>
<blockquote>''Pratyavekṣājñāna'' means discriminating wisdom. Through the change of state of the mental consciousness, [this wisdom] serves as the basis for all dhāraṇīs, samādhis, dhyānas, and meditative absorptions. It represents the operating of the wisdom that is unobstructed with regard to all knowable objects, pours down the great rain of dharma, cuts through all kinds of doubt, and serves as the cause for [buddhas] displaying their kāyas in the colors of precious substances (such as blue beryll). This is called "discriminating wisdom."</blockquote>
<blockquote>''Krityānuṣṭhānajñāna'' means all-accomplishing wisdom. Through the change of state of the consciousnesses of the five sense faculties (such as the eye), [this wisdom] serves as the basis for promoting the welfare of many sentient beings in all worldly realms through various infinite means. This is called "all-discriminating wisdom."</blockquote>
To be sure, the set of the four wisdoms plus the pure dharmadhātu and the set of the three kāyas are absolutely equivalent―both describe the same thing, that is, complete buddhahood with all its qualities. Thus, when these two sets are matched, mirrorlike wisdom represents the dharmakāya, the wisdom of equality and discriminating wisdom make up the sambhogakāya, and all-accomplishing wisdom is the nirmāṇakāya.
As the quotes in the translations below show, these formats are already found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'', the ''Trikāyanāmasūtra'', and the ''Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra''. However, the classical source on correlating the eight consciousnesses with the four wisdoms and the dharmadhātu in the Yogācāra tradition is the introduction in Sthiramati's commentary on verses IX.12–17 on the fundamental change of state in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''.
<blockquote>Here, "state" refers to the five skandhas from the skandha of form up through the skandha of consciousness. After the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in these skandhas have been relinquished, the dharmadhātu has become pure and has become nonconceptual wisdom. This is called "change of state into something else." In this regard, when the four skandhas of form, feeling, discrimination, and formation as well as [everything] in the skandha of consciousness from the eye consciousness up through the afflicted mind have become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. When the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes nonconceptual wisdom.<br>Or, when the emptiness that exists in form, feeling, discrimination, formation, and the eight consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. From among the eight consciousnesses, when the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes mirrorlike wisdom. When the afflicted mind has become pure, it becomes the wisdom of equality. When the mental consciousness has become pure, it becomes discriminating wisdom. When the five [sense] consciousnesses, from the eye [consciousness] up through the body [consciousness] have become pure, they become all-accomplishing wisdom. The attainment of these five―the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu―are called "the five changes of state into something else."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B86-QINU`"'</blockquote>
As for the three kāyas, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.59–60 highlights their not being static states, but different functions of the pure dharmadhātu.
<blockquote>The purity of the dharmadhātu<br>Of the buddhas is explained<br>As its function varying in terms of<br>Nature, enjoying the dharma, and emanating.</blockquote>
<blockquote>The svābhāvika[kāya], the sāmbhogikakāya,<br>And the other one, the nairmāṇikakāya,<br>Are the divisions of the kāya of the buddhas.<br>The first one is the foundation of the [other] two.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B87-QINU`"'</blockquote>
Sthiramati comments that "nature" (''svābhāvika'') refers to the dharmakāya,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B88-QINU`"' meaning that the nature of buddhahood as such is the pure dharmadhātu. When the stains of apprehender and apprehended that exist in the ālaya-consciousness have been relinquished, and thus the dharmadhātu has become mirrorlike wisdom, this is called "dharmakāya." The sāmbhogikakāya refers to the afflicted mind having changed state, and thus having become the wisdom of equality, as well as the mental consciousness having changed state, and thus having become discriminating wisdom. It is called "enjoyment body," because it provides the great enjoyment of the dharma for bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis. The nairmāṇikakāya represents the change of state of the five sense consciousnesses and all-accomplishing wisdom. It demonstrates the twelve deeds of a buddha and brings sentient beings to maturity. Thus, the Tathāgatas are not limited to a single kāya, but there is a division into three, with the dharmakāya being the foundation or support of the other two.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B89-QINU`"'
The different functions of the three kāyas and four wisdoms are described in detail in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.61–76.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8A-QINU`"' Further treatises that deal with the eight consciousnesses, the three kāyas, the four wisdoms, and their changes of state include the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' (chapter 10) and its commentaries. Also the explanations on the three kāyas in Śīlabhadra's ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' and Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (which is largely based on the former) greatly rely on the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' on IX.60–66 and chapter 10 of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''. These texts also relate the four wisdoms to the three kāyas and explicitly say that the three kāyas are nothing but a division in terms of the functional aspects of buddhahood, which in itself is the single and indivisible purity of the dharmadhātu (of course, the same goes for the four wisdoms too). These functional aspects appear for different beings―the svābhāvikakāya or dharmakāya (which is equivalent to the pure dharmadhātu) is only realized by buddhas; the sambhogakāya is perceived by bodhisattvas; and the nirmāṇakāya is seen even by impure beings.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8B-QINU`"' Both texts furthermore relate the dharmakāya and mirrorlike wisdom to the nonconceptual wisdom in meditative equipoise, and the two rūpakāyas and the remaining three wisdoms to the wisdom that is active during subsequent attainment. In particular, Śīlabhadra explains that all elements of the dualistic structure of the phenomenal world in terms of apprehender and apprehended (all consciousnesses and their objects) appear like reflections in mirrorlike wisdom and are discerned accordingly through the other three wisdoms, for which this mirrorlike wisdom serves as a foundation. Thus, it is primarily through mirrorlike wisdom that all aspects of phenomena appear for a buddha's mind, although without any dualistic discriminations. Rather, they are perceived "in their aspect of self-awareness," which is also referred to as buddha wisdom having the quality of total recall. Buddha is said to be omniscient by virtue of mirrorlike wisdom, which is ever present and ever clear.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8C-QINU`"' The discussions of these topics in Nāgamitra's ''Kāyatrayāvatāramukha'' and its commentary by Jñānacandra also relate the three kāyas to the three natures. Buddhaśrījñāna's (eighth/ninth century) ''Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā'' discusses the last chapter of the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' in terms of the change of state of the eight consciousnesses as the five wisdoms (adding dharmadhātu wisdom) and the four kāyas.
As mentioned before, the four wisdoms are not four different entities or static qualities of one entity, but just stand for the processes that represent the main functional activities of the single nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha, which cooperate with and supplement each other. Mirrorlike wisdom is like an all-encompassing TV screen that simply reflects what is there, thus providing the "raw data" to be processed and used. Discriminating wisdom means to intently look at this screen and clearly see all its distinct data without getting confused or mixing them up.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8D-QINU`"' The wisdom of equality refers to being empathic, but lacking any kind of judgment, about the data seen on the screen, as well as making no difference between seer and seen. All-accomplishing wisdom represents the resultant impulse to altruistically act upon what is seen. Thus, nonconceptual buddha wisdom reflects all sentient beings and phenomena within a buddha's field of activity without any bias and personal concern (mirrorlike wisdom). At the same time, this nonconceptual wisdom perceives and discerns all these beings and phenomena in every minute detail, just as they are, with perfectly clear discernment and without any personal projections or superimpositions (discriminating wisdom). Nonconceptual wisdom is also completely nondual, which not only refers to its perceptual structure (no subject-object duality), but also to its "affective" structure―it neither takes saṃsāra as something bad to be avoided, nor nirvāṇa as something good to dwell in; lacks any attachment and aversion to anybody or anything; and instead sees the buddha nature of all beings, which is not different in essence from a buddha's very own state, thus naturally being loving and compassionate toward all those who do not see this (the wisdom of equality). By virtue of all these features, nonconceptual wisdom is the most efficient mental mode of operation possible, which underlies everything that, from the perspective of those to be benefited, appears as a buddha's helpful activity in an effortless, unpremeditated, and uninterrupted way (all-accomplishing wisdom).
As for the five wisdoms "in action" in realized beings during all situations, the Third Karmapa says that, when embraced by the correct yoga, sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are all yogic valid perception, which is connate wisdom's own nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8E-QINU`"' Through all aspects of knowing and what is to be known being embraced by the perfect view, in terms of its functions, this connate wisdom then manifests as the five wisdoms. These are the wisdom that discriminates all causes and results; the wisdom of being empty of a nature of its own (mirrorlike wisdom); the display of wisdom's power by virtue of having gained mastery over it (all-accomplishing wisdom); the wisdom of seeing the equality of all this; and the principle of not moving away from suchness, which pervades all of this (dharmadhātu wisdom).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B8F-QINU`"' Pawo Tsugla Trengwa, one of the main students of the Eighth Karmapa and a teacher of the Ninth, describes the complementary functions of these wisdoms as follows:
<blockquote>[Buddhahood means] to know without exception how all the aspects of each phenomenon are, because it is endowed with discriminating wisdom. In this process, it is not endowed with a seeing [that entails] any subject or object to be seen, any higher or inferior, any same or different, and so on, because it is endowed with the wisdom of equality. This knowledge does not entail any efforts [either], because it is endowed with mirrorlike wisdom. Also, all of these are indescribable as being one or different and so on, and are neither a seeing nor a nonseeing, because they never move away from the dharmadhātu.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B90-QINU`"'</blockquote>
The ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' concludes with a verse on buddhas being neither one nor many (IX.77), four verses on applying the means to attain buddhahood (IX.78–81), four verses on the unity of the activities of all buddhas (IX.82–85), and one verse on generating enthusiasm for buddhahood (IX.86). Sthiramati says that the means to attain buddhahood are the first five pāramitās. The pāramitā of prajñā is what renders these five pure, and it is taught in IX.78–81 (in themselves, these verses exhibit the typical style of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras).
<blockquote>Precisely what does not exist<br>Is the supreme existent.<br>Nonobservation in every respect<br>Is held to be the supreme observing.</blockquote>
On the first bhūmi, bodhisattvas realize that the imaginary nature―apprehender and apprehended―does not exist. The very fact of its nonexistence is designated as "the supreme existent," because the perfect nature―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended―exists. On this bhūmi, bodhisattvas neither observe nor see the imaginary nature, nor any conceptions of "me" and "mine," nor any conceptions of phenomena. This is called "the supreme observing," because they see the perfect nature―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended.
<blockquote>The supreme meditation is held<br>To be not seeing any meditation.<br>The supreme attainment is held<br>To be not seeing any attainment.</blockquote>
During the second up through the tenth bhūmis, bodhisattvas relinquish all conceptions of apprehender, apprehended, "me," and "mine." The very meditation in which neither a meditator nor something to be meditated on are seen is called "the supreme meditation," because bodhisattvas familiarize themselves with the characteristic that there is nothing to be observed. At the time of buddhahood, not seeing the sambhogakāya, the nirmāṇakāya, or the qualities such as the powers and fearlessnesses is called "the supreme attainment," because the supreme attainment consists of the dharmakāya―the supreme of all dharmas. Thus, familiarizing themselves with the characteristic of there being nothing to be observed is the means to become a buddha, while those who entertain any kind of focus or reference point will not become enlightened.
<blockquote>For arrogant bodhisattvas who consider<br>Their own grandeur, length [of practice],<br>Characteristics, and vigor,<br>Enlightenment is said to be far away</blockquote>
Some bodhisattvas may consider their own grandeur, since they see that enlightenment possesses magnificent qualities (such as the ten powers) and that it is difficult to attain. They may consider that attaining enlightenment takes a long time, since they must practice for three or more countless eons. They may see characteristics, since they see some objects to meditate on. They may think that enlightenment is to be attained through effort and feel superior, because they make such efforts, while others do not. When they are proud in this way and focused on real entities, enlightenment is distant for them.
<blockquote>Nonconceptualizing bodhisattvas<br>Who see all that has been mentioned<br>To be mere imagination<br>Are said to attain enlightenment.</blockquote>
On the contrary, those bodhisattvas who see all that has been explained above (one's own grandeur and so on) as being nothing but mere imagination and mere mind, and who do not even conceive of this mere mind have attained the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, with their nonconceptual wisdom thus being effortless and spontaneously present. Therefore, attaining this is called "attaining enlightenment."
For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000B91-QINU`"''"`UNIQ--references-00000B92-QINU`"'
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David Higgins and Martina Draszczyk's ''Mahāmudrā And The Middle Way'' is a study of four Tibetan philosophers from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who attempted to forge a middle way between contemporary doctrinal extremes regarding Mahāmudrā and buddha-nature theory. Three of the four authors were Kagyu: Karma Trinle Chokle Namgyel, the Eighth Karmapa, and the Fourth Drukchen Pema Karpo, and one was Sakya, Śākya Chokden, who was, late in life, a student of the Seventh Karmapa. The four authors did not agree with each other, all finding their own ways to steer, as Higgins and Draszczyk put it, "a middle course between the Scylla and Charybdis of eternalism and nihilism."
All four authors studied were "scholar-yogis,"—philosophers who were also keenly interested and accomplished in the meditative practices of their traditions. Higgins and Draszczyk position the four as responding to the doctrinal extremes of the Geluk and Jonang traditions, the first representing nihilism of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Candrakīrti, and the second being Dolpopa's teaching on ''zhentong''. All four wrote in an era in which Geluk Prasangika was becoming dominant, in a language that suggested an anti-tantric polemic; Geluk and Sakya authors were rejecting Saraha, an Indian saint whose writings form part of the Mahāmudrā canon. Certainly, the two hierarchs of Kagyu traditions could not afford to leave their central doctrines undefended. This perspective is true to the authors studied, but it should be noted that followers of the Geluk or Jonang would certainly not accept the label of extremism, and would—and did—view the authors' positions as intellectually naive.
Still, the four attempts at reconciliation between doctrinal poles are a needed corrective to the many studies in which the extremes are presented as contradictory; for all four authors, the philosophical binaries were complementary and integral to the practice of Buddhism. They each advocated for an intellectual inquiry of emptiness using the language of negation favored by Geluk and mainline Sakya teachers, paired with or followed by a meditative engagement with positive-language doctrines of buddha-nature and the natural luminosity of mind. The great debates of the era between Madhyamaka and Yogacāra, ''zhentong'' and ''rangtong'', analytical or meditative approach, Sudden vs. Gradual Enlightenment, and so forth, were for these authors not issues of either/or but matters of synthesis and balance.
Michael Radich argues that the ''[[Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]]'' was the first appearance of the term ''tathāgatagarbha''. Previous scholars have assumed that the term first appeared in the ''[[Tathāgatagarbhasūtra]]'', although as Radich's thesis advisor [[Michael Zimmermann]] has argued, the term was possibly added to the scripture that uses it in its title only in later versions. Radich's argument in this way buttresses Zimmerman's, which has been disputed by other scholars. His thesis rests partly on the <i>[[Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]]</i>'s unique exposition of the term, one that was not repeated elsewhere.
In this scripture, tathāgatagarbha is not an exhortation to practice, or a means to soothe fears of nihilism. Instead, it is an explanation of how a perfectly pure being such as a buddha could arise out of a polluted and degraded human being. It would seem that early Mahāyāna Buddhists had a misogynistic crisis similar to that of early Christians: an inability to accept that their divine hero could have been born from a woman. Radich places this intellectual struggle within a context of "docetic Buddhism," meaning the attempt to explain that what one sees—the Buddha in a body—is not what is ultimately real; appearances are always deceiving. Similar to the way Yogācāra built on emptiness-theory with positive descriptions of the ultimate, the ''[[Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]]'', Radich argues, offered a positive solution to the origin of buddhahood: because buddhas could not be generated out of a human womb, they were given metaphorical wombs—garbha —that are present in all sentient beings. Radich presents his argument alongside meticulous and extensive textual analysis to support his dating of the ''[[Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]]'' to earlier than the ''[[Tathāgatagarbhasūtra]]''. +
Ken and Katia Holmes offer a new English translation of the root verses of the Ratnagotravibhaga with their own commentary focused on advice to those interested in engaging in a path of practice. +
In this book the author explains. spiritual cultivation from the Vajrayana perspective on the common preliminaries, the four immeasurables, tranquillity meditation, and insight meditation. In particular, he elucidates the need to develop the correct view.
The author of this text is Kyabje Traleg Rinpoche, the emanation of Saltong Shogam, one of the three principal disciples of the physician Gampopa, who is the common lineage forefather of the Kagyu tradition. This line of tulkus successively reincarnated, with each bearing the name Nyima. The ninth one, whose name is Karma Tenpa Rabgye Thinley Nyima Gocha Pal Zangpo, was recognized by the glorious sixteenth Karmapa, Rangjung Rigpe Dorje. Through his vision and faculty of foreknowledge, one year prior to conception, in the year of the Snake, a prediction letter was given with the instruction that this letter should remained sealed for a period of one year arid opened only on the tenth day of the first month of the Wood Sheep year. From the central part of Tibet a search was launched to eastern Tibet, where the Traleg tulkus had their seat at Thrangu Monastery. Upon opening the letter at the appointed time, the search party was led to the home of his parents: his father, Gyurme Lodro, and his mother, Pema Zung. The house was located west of Thrangu Monastery, three days journey by horse, where Traleg Rinpoche had just taken birth in the year of the Sheep, thus confirming the prediction letter to the amazement of all.
Rinpoche is exceptionally learned and demonstrates marked and genuine spiritual activity. He has undergone extensive study and experience in the traditional Buddhist training as well as having studied the contemporary mind sciences. His book is bound to generate both certainty and ease of understanding and will, with its many outstanding qualities, bring tremendous benefit to all spiritual seekers in the West. Please, students of the Dharma, take this to heart.
KHENCHEN THRANGU RINPOCHE,<br>tutor to His Holiness seventeenth Gyalwa Karmapa,<br>Urgyen Thinley Dorje, at Karma Triyana Dharmachakra,<br>Woodstock, New York, 2 August 2003.
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Jacqueline Stone’s groundbreaking study moves beyond the treatment of the original enlightenment doctrine as abstract philosophy to explore its historical dimension. Drawing on a wealth of medieval primary sources and modern Japanese scholarship, it places this discourse in its ritual, institutional, and social contexts, illuminating its importance to the maintenance of traditions of lineage and the secret transmission of knowledge that characterized several medieval Japanese elite culture. It sheds new light on interpretive strategies employed in pre-modern Japanese Buddhist texts, an area that hitherto has received a little attention. Through these and other lines of investigation, Stone problematizes entrenched notions of “corruption” in the medieval Buddhist establishment. Using the examples of Tendai and Nichiren Buddhism and their interactions throughout the medieval period, she calls into question both overly facile distinctions between “old” and “new” Buddhism and the long-standing scholarly assumptions that have perpetuated them. This study marks a significant contribution to ongoing debates over definitions of Buddhism in the Kamakura era (1185–1333), long regarded as a formative period in Japanese religion and culture. Stone argues that “original enlightenment thought” represents a substantial rethinking of Buddhist enlightenment that cuts across the distinction between “old” and “new” institutions and was particularly characteristic of the medieval period. +
The text in this volume has a long and rich history in the world of Tibetan Buddhism. Gampopa's ''Ornament of Precious Liberation'' remains to this day the quintessential understanding of the Buddhist path to enlightenment in the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism. Trained in the Kadam teachings stemming from the Bengali master Atiśa as well in the Mahāmudrā instructions of Marpa Lotsāwa and his famed disciple Milarepa, Gampopa presents in his work a unique blending of two important streams of Tibetan spiritual instructions.
The step-by-step instructions developed in this work continue to guide and elevate the attentive reader and practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism today. Imbued by Gampopa with so much insight and helpful instruction, it is not surprising that this manual was considered a classic of Buddhist literature in Tibet. With this new translation, students and teachers of Tibetan Buddhism will have a chance to directly engage with the insights and instructions of a great spiritual master. For the general reader, it offers an opportunity to appreciate the richness of the Tibetan tradition and its creative synthesis of the vast corpus of classical Indian Buddhist teachings.
(Source: Thupten Jinpa's Editor's Preface) +
One of the central projects of Kālacakra literature is a detailed correlation between the human body and the external universe. In working out this complex correspondence, the Kālacakra texts present an amazingly detailed theory of cosmology and astronomy, especially about the movements of the various celestial bodies. The Kālacakra tantra is also a highly complex system of Buddhist theory and practice that employs vital bodily energies, deep meditative mental states, and a penetrative focus on subtle points within the body’s key energy conduits known as channels. Ornament of Stainless Light addresses all these topics, elaborating on the external universe, the inner world of the individual, the Kālacakra initiation rites, and the tantric stages of generation and completion, all in a highly readable English translation. (Source: [https://wisdomexperience.org/content-author/gavin-kilty/ Wisdom Experience]) +
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The Dagpo Tarjen'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' or The Jewel Ornament of Liberation'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' of Gampopa is one of the most important texts of Tibetan Buddhism. In the Kagyu'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' tradition it is the main text used in the instruction of monks. It is sometimes referred to as the "merging of the two streams" because Gampopa here combines two traditions or currents of Dharma teachings, that of the Mahayana Kadampa'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' tradition and that of the tantric Mahamudra'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"' tradition.
Gampopa's teachings brought these two traditions together in such a way that they could be practiced together as one experience. They quickly became one of the most important and effective foundation texts used in the teaching of Buddhism in Tibet from the eleventh century onward. The whole Kagyu tradition is based mainly on this teaching.
====The Author====
Gampopa was born in 1079 and died in 1153. Despite his renown as a physician, he was unable to save his wife and two children, who died in an epidemic that ravaged the region where they lived. Full of grief, he came to a deep understanding of the transitory nature of all things and the inherent suffering that this implied. He renounced the world and devoted himself totally to spiritual practice, seeking a way out of the suffering of samsara. Gampopa became a monk and for many years followed the teachings of the Kadampa geshes'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"' of the time. One day he happened to hear the name of Milarepa, the famous Tibetan yogic poet, and intense devotion immediately arose in him. Deeply inspired, he began to cry and left at once to seek out Milarepa.
After many hardships Gampopa arrived near the place where the yogi was staying. Having traveled without any rest, Gampopa was by now ill and exhausted. The people in the local village took him in and treated him with great respect and hospitality. "You must be the one whom Milarepa spoke of," they said. "What did he say about me?" asked Gampopa. The villagers replied that Milarepa had predicted his arrival, telling them, "A monk from Ü'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' is coming. He is a very great bodhisattva and will be the holder of my lineage. Whoever shows him hospitality when he first arrives will be liberated from samsara and will enjoy the best of good fortune."
When Gampopa heard this, he said to himself, "I must be a very special person." Feelings of pride and conceit arose in his mind, and, consequently, when he went to meet Milarepa in his cave, the latter refused to see him. He had Gampopa wait in a nearby cave for fifteen days. When he was finally allowed to see Milarepa, Gampopa found the yogi sitting there with a skull cup full of wine. He handed the skull to Gampopa and invited him to drink. Gampopa was perplexed. He was a fully ordained monk and as such had vowed to abstain from alcohol. Yet here was Milarepa commanding him to drink. It was unthinkable! So great, however, was Gampopa's trust and devotion to his guru that he took the skull cup and drained it of every drop.
This act had a very nice and auspicious significance, as it showed that Gampopa was completely open and ready to receive the entirety of Milarepa's teachings and full realization. It is said that how much a student can benefit from a teacher depends upon how open he or she is. Although Gampopa was a very good monk, he drank the skull cup of wine without any hesitation or reservation, which signified that he was completely open and without the slightest doubt.
Milarepa subsequently gave Gampopa his complete teachings, and within a very short time Gampopa became his best and most realized student.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000008-QINU`"' In Gampopa's teachings we therefore find the scholarly erudition and discipline of his monastic tradition combined with the total realization of a fully accomplished yogi, which he received through Milarepa.
The present commentary relies mainly on the original Tibetan text but draws upon both Guenther's and Holmes's translations where necessary.
'"`UNIQ--references-00000009-QINU`"'
This commentary is a key source for teaching buddha-nature and the ''Gyü Lama'' in the Sakya tradition and was authored by the famous Sakya master [[Rongtön Sheja Kunrik]]. The book is an updated version of Bernert's dissertation, which includes an annotated translation of Rongtön's commentary on the fourth chapter of the ''Gyü Lama'' (''Ratnagotravibhāga'') and an analysis of Rongtön's position, which is a useful starting point for understanding the view of buddha-nature teachings from a Sakya perspective. Rongtön's view of buddha-nature follows the analytical tradition of [[Rngog blo ldan shes rab|Ngok Loden Sherab]], but is somewhat complex, and Bernert does a good job of presenting the complexities in his analysis. +
