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Articles/A Second Tibetan Translation of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in the Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang: A Translation of the Early Period (snga dar) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Among the Tibetan Collection of the Newark Museum in Newark (New Jersey) there is an incomplete manuscript Kanjur from Bathang in Khams (East Tibet). In spite of the fact that this
Kanjur was already donated to the museum as early as 1920 it is surprising that it has only recently become the object of a scholarly treatment of some length.[1] In his critical edition of the ''Mahāsūtras'' (cp. n. 1), Peter Skilling has used internal criteria to prove that the Bathang Kanjur is affiliated to neither the ''Tshal pa'' lineage nor to the ''Them spangs ma'' lineage of textual transmission. Its independent character can also be ascertained by external kanjurological
criteria: the collection of the texts, its grouping and its order within the volumes are unique. It becomes, therefore, very plausible that "the Newark Kanjur belongs to an old and independent textual transmission that predates the compilation of the ''Tshal pa'' and ''Them spangs ma'' collections."[2]<br> Contained in the ''ta'' volume of the sūtra section (''mdo bsde ta'') of this Kanjur is the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (''TGS'').[3] In the process of editing the Tibetan text of this important Mahāyāna work, of which no Indic copies have come down to us, I used most of the available, historically relevant Kanjurs.[4] Among these 13 versions alone the ''TGS'' found in this Kanjur from Bathang represents a different, second translation (''Bth''). As the existence of two independent Tibetan translations of the same Indic text are of rare occurrence, this study intends to throw light on the differences between the two Tibetan texts, to describe the particular features of ''Bth'' and finally to classify it within the history of Tibetan translation activities. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 33–35)<br><br>
[https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/zimmermann/tohoku-gakkai-1998-tathagatagarbha.pdf Read more here . . .]<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a description of the Kanjur cp. Eleanor Olson, ''Catalogue of the Newark Museum Tibetan Collection'', Vol. III, Newark 1971, p. 114, dating it to the 16th century; the most detailed analysis of the 23 volumes of the Kanjur can be found in Peter Skilling's unpublished article ''Kanjur Manuscripts in the Newark Museum: A Preliminary Report'', Nandapurī 1995; the only study including some texts of this Kanjur in a textcritical edition is Peter Skilling's (ed.) ''Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha'', Vol. I: Texts, Oxford 1994 (The Pali Text Society, Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. XLIV).
#Skilling, ''Kanjur Manuscripts''. . . . , p. 4.
#Vol. ''ta'', folios 245b1–258a8. The title at the beginning of the volume reads ''de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba'i mdo' ''. The title at the beginning of the sūtra itself runs: ''de bzhin gshyes <pa'i> snying po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo''. It seems remarkable that the Tibetan equivalent for Skt. ''ārya'', '' 'phags pa'', does not appear in the titles of the Bathang translation whereas it is common to all the other major Kanjurs. The spelling ''mdo bsde'' can be found "consistently on all tags" (Skilling, ''Kanjur Manuscripts''. . . , p. 6, n. 16).
#The critical edition of the ''TGS'' is part of a Ph.D. thesis to be submitted at the University of Hamburg. The collation comprises the versions of the ''TGS'' as contained in the Kanjurs from Berlin, Derge, Lithang, London, Narthang, Peking (Ōtani reprint), Phug brag (three versions), Stog, Tabo (fragmentary) and Tokyo (Toyo Bunko) compared with the two Chinese translations. ''Bth'' will be appended as a diplomatic edition.
This article concerns the Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature: Mahāyānist works, produced no later than the early fifth century, which assert that all sentient beings possess already the qualities of a Buddha. Early works of this tradition—perhaps even the earliest that are available to us—explain possession of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' to constitute the existence of the self (''ātman''). These sources, foremost the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', show evidence that their authors faced strong opposition from audiences committed to the more conventional Buddhist doctrine of ''anātman'', but contend defensively that the ''ātman'' that they teach is nothing like any notion of selfhood found in non-Buddhist religious traditions.<br> With reference to two of these '' 'ātmavādin’ '' ''tathāgatagarbha'' works, I present evidence that authors of this tradition used the idea of a Buddhist doctrine of the self to undermine non-Buddhist accounts of liberation: not only describing them as deficient, but as having been created (''nirmita'') by the Buddha himself. Such claims expand the boundaries of the Buddha’s sphere of influence, after the description of his activities found in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra'': a clear influence upon these ''tathāgatagarbha'' sources. Other Mahāyānist literature of an ‘ekayānist’ orientation used this strategy also: i.e. that any teaching regarding liberation from ''saṃsāra'' finds its origin in the activities of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, but has its definitive expression in the Buddhist dharma. The ''tathāgatagarbha'' presented as a Buddhist doctrine of the self can hence be understood as a complement to a certain understanding of the Mahāyāna, here the archetype of all paths that claim to deliver an end to ''saṃsāra'', and to an account of the Buddha as the architect of all ostensibly non-Buddhist accounts of liberation. +
Buddhanature, or tathagatagarbha: some say it is not Buddhist, some say it is quintessentially so. I do not want to push either judgment upon you; there is more than one way to be a Buddhist! Instead, I want to provide a roundup of some formative buddhanature texts and allow you to see what is unique about them, in the hope that you might explore these fascinating works for yourself.
In the texts outlined below, we see innovative steps taken away from the philosophical preoccupation with emptiness (sunyata) and not-self (anatman) with which much early Buddhist scholasticism was concerned, with a focus instead on a type of liberative phenomenology that allows us to uncover our “true” nature and realize liberation. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/a-short-guide-to-key-buddhanature-texts/ Read more here]) +
Articles/A Study of the Early-Stage Translations of Foxing 佛性 in Chinese Buddhism: The Da Banniepan Jing 大般涅槃經 Trans. Dharmakṣema and the Da Fangdeng Rulaizang Jing 大方等如來藏經 Trans. Buddhabhadra +
The ''Da fangdeng rulaizang jing'' 大方等如來藏經 (Skt. ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra''), translated by Buddhabhadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (358–429) is one of the early Chinese Buddhist canon texts where the term ''foxing'' 佛性 (Jp. ''busshō''; Buddha-nature) is clearly used to express Buddha-nature. However, the term ''foxing'' cannot be confirmed in other extant translations of the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra''. Another early text in the Chinese Buddhist canon, the ''Da banniepan jing'' 大般涅槃經 (Skt. ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra''), translated by Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 (385?–433), also used the term ''foxing'', which cannot be correspondingly confirmed in the surviving Sanskrit fragments of this scripture. Some significant differences in ''foxing'' between the Sanskrit fragments and Dharmakṣema's translation of this sutra belong to the
first twelve fascicles of Dharmakṣema's translation completed under his collaborators' support when he had not mastered the Chinese language. It is very likely that Faxian 法顯 (337–422) translated a version of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' that featured ''buddhadhātu'' as ''foxing''. Buddhabhadra, in the same period, translated a version of the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'', in which he favoured the term ''foxing'' over a literal translation of the Sanskrit. As another contemporary monk with these two, Dharmakṣema translated the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', going further than Faxian by using the term ''foxing'' regularly. These texts influenced the Dilun monastic tradition 地論宗. Among these, the term ''foxing'' and its Sinicism explanations played the most significant role, influencing the whole of the Chinese and even East Asian Buddhist thought. +
In this paper, historical materials are employed to point the reader toward scriptural sources for the tathāgatagarbha traditions of India and Tibet, including their relationship with theories of the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes, ālayavijñāna). In addition, three primary tathāgatagarbha traditions in Tibet are described and compared: those of the Jo-nang-bas following Döl-bo-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (dol bo pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the Sa-ḡyas following Bu-don (bu ston, 1290–1364), and the Ge-luk-don following Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa, 1357–1419). Doctrines concerning the basic constituent (khams, dhātu) and three buddha bodies are examined insofar as these doctrines shed light on theories of tathāgatagarbha. Since Dzong-ka-ba extensively refuted the Jo-nang position─often called Other Emptiness (gzhan stong)─in his Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po) and other works on the philosophical view of emptiness, this paper examines Dzong-ka-ba's discussion and critique of the Jo-nang Other Emptiness. Ten specific criticisms of Other Emptiness made by Dzong-ka-ba and his followers are compared with presentations of Other Emptiness by Jo-nang authors. Two Jo-nang texts recently translated by Professor Jeffrey Hopkins are employed in this comparison: Döl-bo-ba Śhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meanings (ri chos nges don rgya mtsho) and Tāranātha’s Essence of Other Emptiness (gzhan stong snying po). These comparisons show that Dzong-ka-ba's critique does not always accurately reflect the Jo-nang philosophical view. +
No abstract given. The following are the first relevant paragraphs. Japanese characters following the transliteration for names and works are unavailable.<br><br>
La question n'est pas nouvelle; plusieurs fois déjà elle a été étudiée, et diverses solutions lui ont été données. Kern, dans son ''Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde'' (<sup>1</sup>), rejetant l'opinion communément admise en Extrême-Orient, plaça Vasubandhu au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle de notre ère. Buhler (<sup>2</sup>) essaya vainement de le ramener au IV<sup>e</sup> : la thèse de Kern conserva la faveur des indianistes. En 1890, M. Sylvain Lévi, dans son remarquable ouvrage sur ''Le théâtre indien'' (<sup>3</sup>), tentait d'établir que la période d'activité de Vasubandhu couvrait toute la première moitié du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle ; et dans une note sur ''La date de Vasubandhu'' (<sup>4</sup>), il la reportait même jusqu'au milieu et à la fin de ce siècle. Depuis lors à diverses reprises, notamment dans ses ''Donations religieuses des rois de Valabhī'' (<sup>5</sup>) et dans ses ''Notes chinoises sur l'Inde parues ici même'' (<sup>6</sup>), il s'est efforcé d'étayer sa thèse de nouvelles considérations. M. Takakusu Junjirō, après avoir proposé les limites de 450–550 pour l'« àge moyen » (<sup>7</sup>) dans lequel Yi-tsing range Vasubandhu et Asaṅga, essaya ensuite de les préciser davantage en ce qui concerne le premier et d'établir qu'il avait vécu de 420 à 500 environ de notre ère (<sup>8</sup>). En 1908, M. Wogihara (<sup>9</sup>) démontrait en détail ce que les anciens catalogues chinois du Tripiṭaka, ''Nei tien lou'', ''K'ai-yuan lou'', etc., des écrivains comme Touen-louen des T'ang dans son ''Yeou-kia louen ki'' (<sup>1</sup>), еt M. Nanjio Bunyu (<sup>2</sup>) avaient déjà dit sommairement, à savoir qu'un ouvrage d'Asaṅga, le ''Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra'' (<sup>3</sup>), avait été partiellement traduit en chinois par Dharmarakṣa entre 414 et 421, soit dès le commencement du V<sup>e</sup> siècle (<sup>4</sup>).<br>
Enfin dans l'introduction de sa traduction du ''Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra'' (<sup>5</sup>) parue en 1911, M. S. Lévi, abandonnant sa première opinion, écrit à propos d'Asaṅga : « Son activité couvre toute la première moitié du V<sup>e</sup> siècle, en débordant de part et d'autre sur les deux extrémités de cette période. » C'est peutêtre un peu long, car si Asaṅga a vécu soixante-quinze ans, les documents à notre connaissance nous disent qu'il chercha sa voie un certain temps. N'oublions pas d'ailleurs que le ''Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra'', l'œuvre maîtresse d'Asaṅga, est de dimensions considérables: la traduction chinoise compte 100 ''kiuan''. Son importance dogmatique n'est pas moindre. Il est l'expression d'une pensée maîtresse d'elle-mème, qui a dépassé la période des incertitudes et des tàtonnements. Il est assez peu vraisemblable, mème sans tenir compte des indications données par Paramārtha dans sa vie de Vasubandhu, qu'il ait été écrit par un tout jeune homme. En tout cas, quelque différence d'àge qu'on veuille admettre entre Asaṅga et Vasubandhu, — et il faut tenir compte de l'existence d'un troisième frère, Viriñcivatsa (<sup>6</sup>) — celui-ci, bien qu'il ait vécu quatre-vingts ans, n'aurait pu, dans ces conditions, dépasser ni mème atteindre la fin du V<sup>e</sup> siècle.<br>
D'une manière générale, il semble que dans les études qui ont porté sur ce sujet, quelques documents aient été ignorés et que d'autres aient été délibérément écartés de la discussion comme douteux. En bonne logique, ce simple doute qui ne parait pas avoir jamais été sérieusement éclairci, suffirait à enlever toute sécurité aux conclusions que l'on a cru pouvoir formuler sans en tenir compte, ou si l'on préfère, elles ne sauraient ètre que provisoires tant que la menace qu'il laisse planer sur elles n'a pas été définitivement écartée. La question me parait donc devoir ètre reprise, les documents déclarés douteux soumis à un nouvel examen, et mis en œuvre aussi ceux qui n'ont pas encore été utilisés. Je n'ai pas d'ailleurs la prétention d'ètre complet. C'est à peu près uniquement à la première série, (missing characters), du Supplément du Tripiṭaka de Kyōto, œuvres hindoues et chinoises, que sont empruntés les textes qu'on trouvera au cours de cette étude. Les quelque 700 fascicules déjà parus de cette admirable publication, d'une importance capitale pour les études bouddhiques, en contiennent sans doute d'autres encore, qu'une recherche plus approfondie et plus complète ferait découvrir. Je n'ai pu que feuilleter les œuvres qui m'ont paru devoir ètre les plus intéressantes pour mon sujet par leur date, leur auteur ou leur genre. (Péri, preliminary remarks, 339–41)<br><br>
[https://www.persee.fr/doc/befeo_0336-1519_1911_num_11_1_2695 Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
1. T. II, p. 414; ''Annales du Musée Guimet'', t. XI, p. 450; il parle principalement d'Asaṅga, et se basant sur la date de l'avènement de Çīladitya (610, propose les dates de 485 à 560. C'est évidemment à cet ouvrage que la ''Chronology of India'' de Mrs. Mabel Duff les emprunte, et non au ''Buddhismus'' de Vassilieff, auquel elle renvoie. Celui-ci ne dit rien de tel; si je ne me trompe, il donne seulement la date bouddhiste de 900 ans, dont je parlerai plus loin.<br>
2. ''Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie'', dans ''Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften'', Wien, 1890, p. 79 sqq.<br>
3. Cf. I, 165, et II, 35.<br>
4. ''Journal Asiatique'', 1890, II, p. 552–553.<br>
5. ''Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes''. Sciences religieuses, vol. VII. ''Etudes de critique et d'histoire'', p. 97.<br>
6. ''La date de Candragomin. BEFEO'', III (1903), 47-49.<br>
7. ''A Record of the Buddhist religion.... by I-tsing'', p. VIII.<br>
8. ''La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise, BEFEO'', IV (1904), p. 37-56; et ''A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu'', dans ''Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society'', 1905.<br>
9. ''Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten'', Leipzig. B. E. F. E.-O. T. XI. —22.<br>
1. Grand ouvrage en 48 k., publié dans le supplément au Tripiṭaka de Kyoto, 1<sup>re</sup>
série, boites LXXV, fasc. 4 et 5, et LXXVI, fasc. 1 à 4. Le passage cité se trouve boite LXXV, fasc. 4, p. 308.<br>
2. Cf. Nanjio, ''Catalogue'', n<sup>os</sup> 1083, 1086, etc.<br>
3. Nanjio, ''Catalogue''. n<sup>o</sup> 1170.<br>
4. Le canon chinois contient sept ou huit traductions partielles de cet ouvrage, faites à des époques parfois très voisines les unes des autres, sous des titres différents ; encore n'avons-nous pas toutes celles qui le furent: le ''K'ai-yuan lou'', k. 12, en cite une dizaine pour le mème texte. Le fait qu'il en existait des extraits si nombreux, assez différents pour que des contemporains les traduisissent séparément à quelques années de distance, permet de croire qu'un intervalle assez long sépare la composition de l'ouvrage des premières traductions d'extraits faites en Chine.<br>
5. B. E. H. E. Sciences historiques et philologiques, fasc. 190, p. *2.<br>
6. (Characters not available). Watters, ''On Yuan Chwang's travels'', I, p. 210, propos Bilindibhava qui paraît inadmissible. ''Bilindi'' est inconnu, tandis que ''viriñci'' est employé dans la composition de plusieurs noms ; ''bhava'' ne concorde pas avec le sens de « fils, enfant », que Paramārtha attribue aux deux dernières syllabes et qu'il expose avec beaucoup de précision, représente d'ailleurs un mot à ancienne finale dentale; quant à (missing character), c'est sùrement ici une simple faute de copiste, très fréquente du reste pour (missing character).
This is a compilation of several sources that speak about buddha-nature. These include:
Pabhassara Sutta<br>
Kevaddha Sutta<br>
Nibbana Sutta<br>
Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra<br>
Samdhinirmochana Sutra<br>
Mahaparinirvana Sutra<br>
Shrimaladevi Sutra <br>
Tathagatagarbha Sutra <br>
Lankavatara Sutra<br>
Bodhidharma’s Breakthrough Sermon<br>
Sengcan’s Song of the Trusting Mind<br>
Hongren’s Treatise on the Supreme Vehicle<br>
Huineng’s Platform Sutra<br>
Yongjia’s Song of Realizing the Way<br>
Shitou’s Record<br>
Shitou’s Song of the Grass-Roof Hermitage <br>
Dongshan’s Song of the Jewel Mirror Samadhi <br>
Caoshan’s Verse<br>
Guishan’s Record<br>
Mazu’s Record<br>
Baizhang’s Record<br>
Huangbo’s Transmission of Mind <br>
Linji’s Record<br>
Nanquan’s Record<br>
Changsha’s Record <br>
Yunmen’s Record <br>
Yuanwu’s Letters <br>
Hongzhi’s Record<br>
Dogen’s Treasury of the True Dharma Eye<br>
Ejo’s Absorption in the Treasury of Light<br>
Keizan’s Transmission of Light<br>
32nd Ancestor Hongren<br>
34th Ancestor Qingyuan<br>
38th Ancestor Dongshan <br>
40th Ancestor Dongan <br>
46th Ancestor Tanxia<br>
49th Ancestor Xuedou<br>
52nd Ancestor Dogen<br>
53rd Ancestor Ejo <br>
Chinul’s Complete Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood<br>
Chinul’s Secrets of Cultivating the Mind<br>
Bassui’s One Mind<br>
Bankei’s Record<br>
Hakuin’s Four Cognitions<br>
Menzan’s Self-Enjoyment Samadhi<br>
Shunryu Suzuki’s Mind Waves (from "Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind")<br>
Shunryu Suzuki’s Resuming Big Mind (from "Not Always So")<br>
Padmasambhava’s Self-Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness<br>
Dakpo Tashi Namgyal’s Clarifying the Natural State<br>
Karma Chagmey’s Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen<br>
Jamgon Mipham’s Lamp that Dispels Darkness +
The following preface was added by Aurel Stein to Appendix F, which was prepared for this publication by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle:
[NOTE. The materials embodied in this list were received in a final form from Dr. Hoernle. early in 1918. The typed press copy prepared from them was after his death in November of that year checked with the original under the kind supervision of Dr. F. W. Thomas.
Owing to various reasons difficulty was experienced about verifying the exact reading of all extracts quoted by Dr. Hoernle from particular MSS., mainly in Khotanese language. It being thus impossible to assure in this respect the degree of accuracy which that most painstaking collaborator would have aimed at, I have thought it advisable to reduce the reproduction of such quotations within narrow limits. For convenient reference by future students the original Inventory ' slips' as received from Dr. Hoernle's hand, as well as a typed copy of them, have been deposited at the India Office Library.—A. STEIN.]<br><br>
[http://dsr.nii.ac.jp/toyobunko/VIII-5-B2-9/V-3/page/0402.html.en Read more here . . .] +
B
Articles/Beings, Non-Beings, and Buddhas: Contrasting Notions of Tathāgatagarbha in the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta and *Mahābherī Sūtra +
This article concerns a little studied text of the Mahāyānist ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature, namely the *''Mahābherī Sūtra'', and its relation to other Indian texts which advance forms of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine. Its focus will be the contrast between the content of this ''sūtra'' and the only other text of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition which discusses a particular issue: the unchanging mass of existing sentient beings, without the possibility of any decrease or increase in their number. This is an issue addressed also by the ''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta'', which I shall argue presents a more sophisticated and likely later consideration, both of this matter and of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine, than that exhibited by the *''Mahābherī Sūtra''. Though it is not clear that either text knew of the other, their different treatments of how one should understand the nature and number of existing sentient beings casts light on their respective places in two distinct strains—one very likely older than the other—of Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>Buddhism has a profound and thoroughly developed set of teachings on human being. One might well argue that the question of human being is the question ''par excellence'' with which the Buddhist tradition as a whole struggles. According to the traditional account, for example, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Moreover, vast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusing upon it as the source of both question and answer. Nonetheless, many questions a modern Westerner asks as a matter of course about human being are not directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. There are of course important reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individuality are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of finite bodily existence, the course of history, the meaning of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus, for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question "What is a person? What is a human being?" of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal in their own way a preoccupation with the human condition as intent as that of our own hyperindividualistic, anthropocentric culture.<br> With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other side on this subject, despite the incommensurability of each other's questions and answers. The present essay is one such attempt: not an East-West comparison, but an effort to address a Buddhist text from the perspective of cross-cultural philosophy (still, despite the name, a thoroughly Western enterprise) . Herein I will engage in dialogue the ''Buddha Nature Treatise'' (Chinese: ''Fo Hsing Lun''<sup>a</sup>; hereafter, ''BNT''), a text representative of the Buddha nature tradition that contains an extensive discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a crucial component, if not the most crucial component, of the East Asian Buddhist concept of human being. I will attempt to wrest from the text answers to two categories of questions-it s view of the ontological nature of human being and its view of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as: What roles do individuality and freedom play in the view of human being portrayed in this text? What value, if any, does an individual human personality possess? Is there anything of value in human history? Clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined American. In order to bridge the cultural gap, I will first give a summary account of the text's concept of Buddha nature in its own terms and in its own format. Then, acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor shares my concerns, I will put my questions to the text and attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subject of my concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author of the ''BNT'' does make the statements I will give as responses to my questions about human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit in and follow from the statements he does make about Buddha nature. Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, nonetheless, I believe that if the author of the ''BNT'' were here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor remained consistent, something close to the views I will articulate in the course of this essay would emerge. (King, "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person," 151–52)
Kyabje Lama Zopa Rinpoche explained how we can attain the state of the omniscient mind at the 14th Kopan Course in 1981. This is an edited excerpt from Lecture 3, Section One of the course. [https://www.lamayeshe.com/article/chapter/section-one-lectures-1-5 Click here] to read more. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs
To understand what is meant by “Buddha Nature,” we can look at the story of the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma taught by Shakyamuni Buddha. The first turning of the Dharma wheel is the four noble truths: that discontent arises from grasping the ever-changing phenomena of body and mind as “me,” and that freedom from this discontent is revealed through the path of not grasping anything as truly me. The
four noble truths is a kind of deconstruction method. However, in this first turning, all the different elements that we can deconstruct this person into really do exist. Earth, wind, fire and water, for example: those kind of physical elements, when you break them down into their smallest bits, are indestructible elemental energies or physical matter, atoms. Early Buddhists, who were first turning exponents, had this kind of theory—that the world is made up of atoms—several centuries B.C., long before modern scientists discovered atoms. We don’t really exist as independent “persons”; we are a conglomeration of all this stuff that we think is a real “me,” but if we look closely, we only find atoms. This turning of the Dharma wheel was only the first.
Read more [https://kokyohenkel.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/7/4/127410773/buddha_nature.pdf here] +
Articles/Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna +
This paper addresses the age-old question of how buddha nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') relates to Yogācāra psychology, focusing on the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s (1507-1554) responses to this question. In the centuries following the first appearance of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrines in India (circa 2nd c. CE), opinions became divided over whether buddha nature should be identified with or distinguished from the Yogācāra idea of a substratum consciousness (''ālayavijñāna''). The topic attracted a great deal of discussion and debate among Buddhist scholars, both within and beyond the borders of India. At stake were a set of specific doctrinal issues as to whether and how the Yogācāra ''ālayavijñāna-vāsanā'' model could be reconciled with [1] buddha nature theory [2] tantric buddha nature proxies such as the unconditioned ground (''gzhi'') and causal continuum (''rgyu rgyud'') [3] Indian and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of an immaculate consciousness (''amalavijñāna'') and [4] certain anti-foundationalist strains of Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that rejected any transcendental basis of consciousness. The Karma pa’s repeated forays into these contested subject areas reveal time and again his commitment to reconcile two contrasting lines of Buddhist thought and praxis: [1] the affirmative appraisal of the nature of mind and reality emphasized in Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' classics, the tantras, and the songs and writings of the Buddhist ''mahāsiddhas'' and [2] the metaphysically disinclined stance of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that avoided extremes of affirmation and denial, existence and nonexistence. To adequately appreciate his contributions to such issues, I will first sketch in rough strokes the historical evolution of the ''ālayavijñāna'' doctrine and its complex confrontations with ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine in India. Against this backdrop, attention will turn to the Karma pa’s contextualist framing of the ''ālayavijñāna-tathāgatagarbha'' relationship in terms of a progressive understanding that begins with differentiation and culminates in unity. His is a view that stresses the need to initially distinguish between conditions of spiritual awakening (such as ''tathāgatagarbha'') and delusion (such as ''ālayavijñāna'') in order to eventually realize their underlying unity (''zung ’jug'') by recognizing buddha nature as an ever-present continuum (''rgyud'') of awareness that is a precondition of the substratum consciousness that derives and deviates from it. In his attempts to strike a balance between traditional differentiation and unity models, we encounter a thinker who was as confident about the mind’s ability to discover its own unborn and nonconceptual nature as he was skeptical about its ability to discover any underlying metaphysical foundation. (Source: [https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3287479&journal_code=JIABS Peeters Online Journals])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
====Emulating Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva====
'''''The Quest of the Monk Sōō to Practice Revering Buddha-Nature'''''
The "marathon monks" of Japan are one of the iconic images of Japanese Buddhism, familiar to people the world over. These monks walk excruciating mountain circuits on Mount Hiei near Kyoto and Mount Kinpu in Nara Prefecture for a summer retreat of one hundred days. A handful in the posar period have performed the insufferable thousand-day version of this retreat, and also completed additional ascetic practices to gain the title of Great Acarya. Having achieved the humanly impossible, they are sometimes referred to as living buddhas.<br> Hagiographic sources tell us that the founder of this practice, the Tendai monk Sōō (831-918), was motivated to seek enlightenment when as a novice monk he studied the part of the Lotus Sutra that tells the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva. Sōō set his heart on emulating Never Disrespectful's way of practice, walking about making obeisances to other people as future buddhas. Unfortunately, Sōō's responsibilities to look after his teacher, and the daily task of going into the mountains to harvest anise-tree leaves for the offerings at the monastery's central hall, prevented him from dedicating himself solely to the reverence of other people's buddha-nature. According to tradition, however, Sōō's daily forays into the mountain became the origin of today's marathon-monk practice, in which ascetic monks revere the shrines of Buddhist deities and places where Japanese divinities abide in the mountains. It is often said that the marathon monk's true object of reverence is the buddha-nature of the natural world.<br> The Lotus Sutra's Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva is an archetype of respect for the inherent dignity of sentient beings. As told in chapter 20 of the Lotus Sutra, one time in the past there was a monk who did not practice by chanting sutras but instead went around making obeisance to every person he met, telling them, "I would never dare to disrespect you, because surely you are all to become buddhas!" As the reader can probably anticipate, the Lotus Sutra tells us that Never Disrespectful was oftentimes ridiculed, even physically attacked, but he bore it all patiently and through this practice not only purified his mind and body but also transformed the hearts and minds of the people around him. The Lotus Sutra tells us that performing this practice leads to quickly attaining the Buddha Way. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (1)," 28-29) (Read entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
In the last installment of this column we explored the concept of buddha-nature—its meaning, the Lotus Sutra's teaching of revering buddha-nature, and how Buddhists can reveal the buddha-nature of themselves and others by demonstrating respect for people and discovering their goodness. This time we will consider another way of realizing buddha-nature that is inspired by the stories of the Lotus Sutra. Rissho Kosei-kai members speak of awakening to buddha-nature as attaining the conviction that both oneself and others are, in the allegorical language of the Lotus Sutra, "children of the Buddha." Rev. Nikkyo Niwano, the founder of Rissho Kosei-kai, held that feelings of worthlessness thwarted people's ability to improve their own lives and brought them much suffering, and for this reason he employed the sutra's allegory of the parent-child relationship to help people see themselves as future buddhas and heirs to all the qualities that the Buddha Shakyamuni possessed. The belief that living beings are children of the Buddha also encourages the appreciation of all human life. As members of the human family, all people are our brothers and sisters, possessing the same inherent dignity and human potential as the Buddha. Today some people may not be entirely comfortable with the gendered language of the Lotus Sutra's allegory, but a close reading of the text can open pathways to an understanding appropriate to contemporary society and twenty-first century social norms. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (2)," 35) (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW19_Spring.pdf here]) +
Articles/Buddha-Nature and Personality as the Ground of Ethics: A Metaethical Dialogue between Dōgen and Berdyaev +
This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing Buddhist-Christian dialogue by bringing together the teachings of Zen Master Dōgen and the Russian Christian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. This dialogue discusses a metaethical question: What is the foundation of ethical practice? I aim to show that Dōgen's idea of "buddha-nature" and Berdyaev's idea of "personality" can be understood as the foundations of ethical practice in ways that are similar and mutually clarifying in their total affirmation of human temporal existence. We begin by discussing the general contours of Dōgen's practice-realization and Berdyaev's creative ethics, and then proceed to a comparative examination of the foundation of ethics found in Dōgen's notion of Buddha-nature and Berdyaev's notion of personality. The comparison considers four facets of Buddha-nature and personality: being, time, nothingness, and impermanence. First, we show how both thinkers consider the ground of ethics to be something inseparable from the entire being of an individual and the being of all existence as a whole. This refutes the tendency to see the foundation of goodness as a mere fragment of human existence or as restricted to particular existents. Second, we show how both thinkers consider this foundation to be manifest not merely in the future or the past, but in every moment seen as a whole in itself. Third, we examine the collision between this immanent foundation and individuality, and show how the non-substantiality of Buddha-nature and God make room for creative and individual expressions of authenticity. Finally, we consider the problem of impermanence, and show how the ground of ethics is not an escape from impermanence but an acceptance and embracing of this impermanence as the ground of the efficacy and dynamism of ethical practice. (Source: [https://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/index.php/budhi/article/view/3 Budhi]) +
The topic on what the compound ''tathāgata-garbha'' means has indeed a long history of research in the !eld of Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, despite a good number of studies so far executed on this topic, it is most unfortunate for us to recognize that the above question remains unsolved. The present paper, therefore, tries again to solve the question through an analytical inquiry into the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (RGV) in rather a wide perspective. +
This article begins with a reflection on why medieval Chinese Buddhist thought has not been more conspicuous in recent comparative work on Buddhism and Western philosophy. The Japanese proponents of "Critical Buddhism" (''hihan bukkyō'' 批判仏教), Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, would see this neglect as merited since, in their view, East Asian Buddhism in general, and Chinese Chan in particular, is philosophically crippled owing to its embrace of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and buddha-nature thought. Indeed, Matsumoto singles out Shenhui 荷澤神會 (670-762), one of the architects of the Southern School of Chan, as an example of the early Chan advocacy of buddha-nature doctrine.<br> This article is not concerned with whether buddha-nature and ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought is actually deleterious to critical philosophical work. Rather, the concern is to demonstrate that, far from embracing buddha-nature doctrine, the eighth-century founders of Southern Chan had serious concerns with it. Evidence for this is found in: (1) the writings of Shenhui, notably in his opposition to the doctrine of the "buddha-nature of insentient objects" (''wuqing foxing'' 無情佛性); and (2) the ''Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch'' (''Liuzu tanjing'' 六祖壇經), particularly in the variant versions of Huineng's famous "enlightenment verse." Thus the Southern School may be viewed as a forerunner of the Critical Buddhist anti-''dhātuvāda'' polemics. The article closes with comments on the ongoing problems Chinese Buddhist exegetes had in marrying the metaphysical monism of Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings with the anti-foundationalist thrust of Madhyamaka and ''Prajñāpāramitā'' literature. +
Buddhist traditions express our potential for awakening in diverse ways: natural luminous mind; suchness; nondual awareness; basic goodness; ''dharmakaya''; the unity of emptiness, self-existing wakefulness; unconfined capacity; and so forth, all under the rubric of "buddhanature" (''tathagatagarbha''). Mahayana Buddhists understand this dimension of our mind to be an innate source of joy, compassion, courage, and wisdom. It is always operative and always available. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/buddhanature-beyond-mere-concept/ Read more here]) +
The primary aim of this article is to outline the Buddhist idea of a pure, luminous mind. First, the conception of a “luminous mind” (''pabhassara citta'') from the Pāḷi Nikāyas is considered. Two functions ascribed to this idea are examined: its soteriological role, i.e. pure mind as a enlightenment-enabling factor, and its role as a “link” between consecutive ''saṃsāric'' existences. Next comes the examination of the Theravāda idea of ''bhavaṅga'', which is seen as being related to the pure mind in its diachronic function. Main part of the article deals with combining the notion of a pure mind with Mahāyāna Buddhism by showing the role of the “innate mind” (''cittaprakṛti'') in tathāgatagarbha tradition. +
